

first impression of the Polish capital. Animation on the streets, cafes, restaurants, high-rise buildings - everything is like in a large city, but still it was neither Petersburg nor old Moscow. Yes, I must admit, I didn't particularly look at Warsaw, not having time for this. Czȳstochowa was waiting for me - a large county town. Three-day Christmas holidays began on December 25, but since the division headquarters asked me about the arrival time in Tashkent, I decided not to stay in Warsaw and on December 25, at seven in the morning, I was already at the station in Czȳstochowa. Stopped at a hotel. Having put himself in order, in dress uniform he went on a visit to the head of the division. Called. The door was opened by a batman in a hussar uniform. He helped me undress and led me to the general's office. We didn't have to wait long. Soon a tall, youthful and fit general entered the office. After my report and explanation why I was bothering him on the holiday, he invited me to sit down and began to ask about studying at the academy and serving in Turkestan. It turned out that in his younger years he also served in Transcaspia. During our conversation, Oranovsky's wife, the daughter of the former commander-in-chief of the Russian armies in Manchuria, Linevich, entered the office and invited us to breakfast. Instead of an official visit, I immediately fell into Oranovsky's family environment. As I learned later, the Oranowskis had a son who studied at the gymnasium in Czȳstochowa. The younger unmarried sister of Oranovskaya, Nina Nikolaevna Linevich, also lived with them, who had the court title of maid of honor to the Empress, granted to her after the death of Linevich. Although Nina Nikolaevna was 3–4 years younger than Tamara Nikolaevna, she looked older than her sister, seemed more withdrawn. At breakfast I received an invitation to visit the Oranovskys easily. In a word, I was received very cordially by the Oranovskys. After spending an hour and a half at the head of the

division, he paid a visit to the chief of staff, Colonel of the General Staff Westfalen. He was the same age as Oranovsky, but looked older. From him I learned the reason for my hasty call to the division headquarters. Westphalen was afraid that I would go on vacation: the time in connection with the Balkan war was turbulent. Austria-Hungary carried out frequent mobilizations, and it was not known how it would all end. At the Westphalens I met

a more prim and official reception, so I did not particularly linger with them.
The next day I met

Lieutenant Janson, adjutant of the division headquarters, with the divisional quartermaster, the divisional doctor, the clerk of the divisional quartermaster - a military man official.

With the departure of part of the troops from the left bank of the Vistula to the internal districts, the 14th division was scattered over a large area due to the reorganization of the army in 1910. The division headquarters, the 14th Hussar Mitavsky Regiment and the 23rd Horse Battery were located in Czystochowa. The 14th Dragoon (formerly Cuirassier) Little Russian Regiment was stationed in Kaligay, the 14th Don Cossack Regiment was stationed in the town of Bendzin, near Sosnovets, at the junction of three borders (Russian, Austrian, German), the 14th Lancers Yamburg Regiment - headquarters and three squadron - was in Kielce, and three squadrons - in Pshechuv (south of Kielce). The administration of the 11th cavalry artillery battalion and the 21st cavalry battery were located in Warsaw and, due to the absence of their own artillery in the 13th cavalry division, served it more than the 14th cavalry division. Interspersed with the 14th division were units of the 1st and 2nd rifle brigades. Directly on the border there were units of the border guard, united in brigades. The largest garrisons were in Lodz, Czestochowa,

Kielce and partly in Radom. Czestochowa was located on the northern border of the Dybrowski coal basin. In the city and its environs, there were many factories and factories that produced a variety of products - up to crystal and children's toys. On the mountain is the ancient Yasnogorsk Monastery, which has seen Tatars, Hungarians, and Swedes near its walls. According to legend, the sun always shines above this mountain, hence the name Yasnaya Gora. The buildings of the monastery are surrounded by walls, and the moat is turned into a flower garden, which has become a favorite place for festivities of the Czystochowa

The treasury of the monastery was rich in gold and silver in the form of various objects, there I saw porcelain - a gift from John Sobiesky to the monastery. In November 1912, three armed bandits broke into the monastery to steal the icon. The monks alerted the police in time. Bandits, sowing in one of the buildings, became

shoot back. The police couldn't do anything. The monastery had to be cordoned off by hussars, one squadron of which, on foot, led a real offensive. As a result, one wounded bandit was detained, two were killed. Hussars also had losses. To preserve the jewels on the icon, the monks made steel blinds that were opened only during the service, and were closed the rest of the time. I made the customary visits to all the officers of the units of the division. I did not get

acquainted with the civil Russian administration and officials of the state bank and the police, who were a host of bribe-takers, thinking that I would not have anything to do with them, but I had to deal with them at work. I did not like the police and the gendarmerie. Sukhomlinov in his memoirs complains that the gendarmes gossiped about Dragomirov and him, Sukhomlinov. And the same Sukhomlinov planted gendarmes in the army before the war. According to tradition, part of the part did not suit the officer leaving for the gendarme corps, and then all relations with him ceased altogether. This is how the army reacted to the existence of the corps of gendarmes, it read with disgust the circulars of the Minister of War about introducing the scum of the officers to work in the army. The division headquarters was located on the outskirts of the city in barracks built by a private entrepreneur. They were a huge three-story building, occupied by the 7th Infantry Regiment. On the ground floor was the

headquarters of the division. The atmosphere at the headquarters was spartan. Only the chief of staff had an office and a desk, all the rest huddled in two large rooms, worked at ordinary wooden tables, sat on stools. The head of the division received reports at his home. The staff of the division headquarters was limited: the chief of staff, two senior adjutants - one of the General Staff and one out of order for the inspectorate. The divisional quartermaster had a chief officer for assignments and a clerk. The divisional doctor in his person represented the entire medical department.

There were five clerks in the state, of which three were senior and two were ordinary. For training, nine people and two topographers were seconded from the regiments. That's the whole staff of the division headquarters. At the end

In 1913, a communications team of two officers and fifty non-commissioned officers and privates with cable and telephone equipment was added to the staff of

the division headquarters. I have already spoken a little about Chief of Staff Westfalen, a 45-year-old colonel who at one time taught tactics at a cavalry school, then served at the headquarters of the Kazan Military District, a man of average ability. Given that the head of the division was himself an officer of the General Staff, accustomed to personally compiling papers, then Westfalen, in fact, had nothing to do. Here, in general terms, was the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division, as I found it at the end of 1912. The 1st brigade was

commanded by Major General Tchaikovsky, a purely combat officer who had not passed through either the academy or the officer cavalry school, but who knew the military service very well and was well versed in matters of tactics. With the outbreak of war, he accepted the secondary Kuban Cossack division, but in December 1914, for some reason, he was removed from command of it and returned to the division again. In battle, Tchaikovsky always acted competently. The complete opposite of him was the commander of the 2nd brigade, Major General Mikheev. After graduating from the Academy of the General Staff, he served for a long time in a military school and in the rear districts. Poorly trained in combat and tactics, Mikheev coped rather poorly with the brigade on maneuvers. With the outbreak of war, he left to command a second division of the Orenburg Cossacks. The 14th Little Russian Dragoon Regiment, whose chief was the Crown Prince of Germany and Prussia, was commanded by Colonel Sencha of the General Staff - a handsome, medium-sized southerner, 44-45 years old, an educated man who knew military service well, a real cavalryman of the good old days. With the outbreak of hostilities, Sencha was not immediately drawn into the front-line situation, but later he showed himself the type of an excellent military commander.

The commander of the 14th Lancers Yamburgsky regiment was Khmyrov, an elderly colonel from the combatant. Khmyrov later served in the Red Army, commanded the 13th Cavalry Division on the Eastern Front. Later I lost sight of him.

The 14th Lithuanian Hussar Regiment was commanded by a Guards officer, Colonel Dabich, a real guest performer. All Dabich's thoughts were directed towards how to go to Warsaw to see his wife and son. Knowing well the drill business, Dabiŷ was completely illiterate in matters of tactics, and meanwhile, with the outbreak of war, he was supposed to take temporary command of the 2nd brigade of the division. The commander of the 14th Don Cossack Regiment was Colonel Korneev. A modest, industrious staff officer, he trained his regiment well. Korneev showed himself to be a calm and brave officer in battle: on horseback or on foot, he was always among the soldiers, intelligently led the actions of the regiment. I forgot the name of the commander of the 11th Cavalry Artillery Battalion: he lived in Warsaw with the 21st Cavalry Battery. The commander of the 23rd horse artillery battery, Lieutenant Colonel Artsishevsky, is a bachelor, a big zhuir, although he commanded somehow, but the battery was in order: a senior officer and an experienced over-duty sergeant-major helped out. The soldiers were well done to well done, strong, tall. Everyone could turn the gun any way they

wanted. The 21st Cavalry Artillery Battery was commanded by a young Lieutenant Colonel Sarandataki. I met him already in the Red Army, in which he served from its very creation until the 1930s. He died kind of unexpectedly.

For me, an infantryman who served for more than nine years, the cavalry was practically a completely new branch of the army, but four years (of which one and a half years in peacetime) spent at the headquarters of cavalry formations made it possible to get acquainted with the cavalry. I knew the officers of the cavalry from the poems of Denis Davydov, the stories of Afanasyev-Chuzhbinsky, the novels of Salias and Krestovsky. Of course, there is nothing daring and romantic in the life of the officers of the division's regular regiments. If Davydov had risen, he would have exclaimed bitterly: "Where are the hussars of the old days?" True, even in his time, the hussars were already talking about Jomini, which Denis lamented about: "Jomini, yes Jomini, but not a word about vodka!" Now, if they did not study Jomini, then most of the cavalry officers were working to increase their military knowledge. According to many people, only the rich served in the cavalry. I didn't catch it. Almost all of the dragoon officers lived on a salary, and so did the uhlan.

Only in the hussar regiment, two or three people, in addition, had income from estates or were married to the

rich. Among the young officers of the hussar regiment, there were sons of merchants who, at one or two years old, managed to squander their father's capital and left the regiment. With a staff of 40 officers, eight to ten cornets arrived annually from military cavalry schools in the regiment. Each officer hoped to receive a squadron; then a more prosperous life began. To be honest, there were also deals with fodder contractors, there was also squadron manure, which local residents willingly and at a high price bought. The squadron commander already had his own exit. The Cossack regiment lived its own special life: the elderly - according to the

legends of the Don, and the youth went to have fun in Germany, in the neighboring border town of Katowice, which is 15 minutes away from Bendzin. Nobody asked for passports. The officers did not wear only weapons. Officers of the troops of the Warsaw district often traveled to the city. The distances from the regiments to Warsaw were short, and therefore this city attracted many people. It was possible to get well-equipped only in Warsaw, officer's things were also purchased there. Going to the theater and having fun in general was also possible only in Warsaw.

About five days after my arrival in Czÿstochowa, the head of the division asked me if I introduced myself to the authorities in Warsaw through the General Staff. I replied that I didn't. Then Oranovsky ordered the chief of staff to send me with a secret package to the headquarters of the district, advised me to introduce myself to the chief of staff of the district and the quartermaster general, and then to get acquainted with the officers of the general staff of the district.

December 30, in the morning, I left for Warsaw. Arriving at the headquarters, handed over the package, went into the reception room of the chief of staff of the district and told the secretary that I wanted to introduce myself to General Klyuev. Fortunately for me, I did not have long to wait for a reception from the general, who later played a shameful role in the surrender of the remnants of the Samson army near Soldau in 1914. But at the end of 1912, Klyuev was at the height of his career and was considered a capable district chief of staff. True, even then they were talking about some of the shady sides of his character and moral instability. General Klyuev

my service in Tashkent, and after asking a few questions about Samsonov, he dismissed

me after shaking my hand. From Klyuev he went to the quartermaster-general of the district headquarters, General Postovsky, later the chief of staff of Samsonov's army. Postovsky sat in his office with an absent-minded look. Having introduced myself to the drowsy general, I was ordered to sit down and tell my biography. After listening to me, the general said: "So, captain, you serve with General Oranovsky. If you are being harassed, contact me directly!" I bowed and left, amazed that I was asked to complain about my superiors. Yes, it was not for nothing that he was called the "crazy mullah" at the headquarters.

In 1914, saving his life when the headquarters of the 2nd Army left encirclement, he abandoned the headquarters and army commander Samsonov.

The senior adjutant of the intelligence department was Colonel Batyushin, a firm man who knew the German and Austro-Hungarian armies well. He did not chase after major agents, but worked with the help of headquarters clerks, petty civil officials, etc. Batyushin did not provide particularly valuable materials, but on the other hand, all reports on military games, maneuvers, and the strength of units of potential opponents at the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District were always present. Not without reason, both the Germans and the Austrians were afraid of Batyushin's mass agents.

At the head of the reporting department was Lieutenant Colonel Lukirsky, a man of extraordinary abilities, tactful and able to control the numerous staff of the General Staff in the Warsaw Military District. Here, in the department, I met Captain Drozdovsky, Lukirsky's assistant. An energetic face, pursed lips and a cold look in blue eyes - that's the look of this captain, later one of the leaders of the counter-revolution.

Such was the top of the headquarters of the Warsaw military district, which was considered the foremost in the Russian army. And if the times when the chief of staff of the Warsaw district was General Puzyrevsky, well-known in the history of the General Staff, were not fully revived, then, in any case, military thought worked more in Warsaw than in state-owned St. Petersburg. The officers of the General Staff in the Warsaw Military District lived as a close-knit family. This was facilitated by the presence of the only special assembly in the army

officers of the General Staff, where reports, war games, friendly dinners and lunches took place. Here the general spoke in a friendly manner with the captain and exchanged views on military matters. A small military magazine was published at the district headquarters. In addition, the newspaper "Officer's Life" was published in Warsaw, whose views on tactical and operational issues of military affairs did not coincide with the "Russian Invalid" and "Military Collection". At the

very beginning of January, an order was received from the district headquarters to conduct a series of exercises for the Czesochowa garrison near the Prussian border. Whom they wanted to scare with these exercises remains unclear to me to this day: the Balkan War was going on as usual, Austria-Hungary systematically carried out partial mobilizations. The only role that cavalry maneuvers along the border could play was to support the Germans' belief that with the outbreak of war, masses of Russian cavalry would pour into Germany. But the Russian General Staff refused this draft plan for the invasion of the cavalry ... Of course, a cavalry raid on Germany would not be easy, but on the left bank of the Vistula such a bridgehead was formed on which the actions of the cavalry in large masses would justify themselves. This is what happened at the beginning of the war. But the same 5th Cavalry Division had to be transported from the Volga back to Warsaw.

One day in January, I received a task sent from the head of the division to the parties and sent it to the addressees. The 7th Rifle, 14th Hussars with artillery moved to the Prussian border. I was supposed to accompany Oranovsky to the exercise. Having dressed warmly, at the appointed hour, the general and I, accompanied by messengers, set off on horseback to the exercise area. Having visited both sides, we were in time for the attack of the 7th Infantry Regiment against the hussars defending on foot. Having made a short analysis of the teachings, they set off in pursuit of the troops. Oranovsky looked back more than once to see if the senior adjutant from the infantry was in place. I understood that I was being tested in riding. Looks like he passed the test with a "good" rating.

Three days later, another exercise was to be held, this time between the 14th Hussars and the 14th Don regiments in the Kozeglova area, near the German border. Once I asked Oranovsky why he himself develops tasks, and does not instruct the headquarters. "It only confuses, it's useless

little," he replied. I asked him to explain the idea of the exercise and let me sketch out the task. He smiled and agreed. Having completed the task, the next day, through the surprised chief of staff, he sent it to the division chief.

Soon it returned without amendments with an order to send it to the troops. From now on, I began to fulfill my direct duties. Westphalen did not prevent me from doing them. By January 15, the

exercises were over, and I was no longer able to fit snatches, but closely acquainted with the operational task of the division in case of war. First of all, I will dwell on the mobilization plan of the division. All parts of the division were kept almost according to the states of wartime, only the regimental convoys of the units, the convoy of the headquarters and the 2nd echelon of the park of the 23rd cavalry battery were not equipped with people and horses. With the exception of the 14th Lancers, which was stationed in the Ring at a sufficient distance from the border, the carts of the 14th Dragoon, 14th Hussars and 14th Don Cossack regiments and the division headquarters were subject to mobilization in Piotrków, also at a distance from the border. According to the current "Manual on mobilization", units of the 14th division were to be mobilized in an accelerated manner, that is, the first echelon after 6 hours on the first day of mobilization, and the second after 48 hours. The instructions of the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District noted that "the declaration of mobilization is at the same time a declaration of war on Germany and Austria." Thus, the mobilization plans of the units were relatively simple and developed in accordance with the "Mobilization Manual". However, according to the tradition that has been preserved since the time of Gurko, when the cavalry invaded neighboring states immediately after the declaration of war, mobilization diaries were developed with the calculation of the mobilization of units two hours after the announcement of mobilization. Of course, not all work could be completed within this period, but the combat units could enter the battle in two hours. The hardest part of the plan was the evacuation of the families of officers and the sending of various cargoes to the rear on the right bank of the Vistula.

I have already mentioned that mobplanes for both the first and second echelons were prepared. I had to develop a new mobilization plan according to schedule No. 20. All correspondence with parts of the division, with the headquarters of the district and the headquarters of the 14th corps on this

I led the question. I had to learn how to type. The mobilization files were kept in a fireproof safe, the key to which I always had. As for the operational plan, it was kept by the chief of staff. Only three people were privy to the plan: the division chief, the chief of staff, and myself, as senior adjutant of the General Staff. The first task fell on the division located on the border:

cover for the mobilization and strategic deployment of armies.

Later, in 1919, I wrote a historical account of the planning and execution of this first operational mission by the 14th Cavalry Division. It is placed in the "Collection of Articles on the Art of War". Since the collection is currently a bibliographic rarity, and also in connection with the publication of many materials distorting reality by the Germans and Austrians over this 30-year period, I am forced to briefly state what I have already written about the actions of the 14th Cavalry Division.

Unfortunately, I survived more than one war, and if all of them are described, it would be necessary to write the history of each. This is beyond my power, and it would be boring for the reader, so I will briefly dwell on the most characteristic moments, the illumination of which will help the true historian add color to the events of the past he draws. Considering that a lot of written material (documents) has not survived and has been lost forever, my testimonies, as a participant in the events, will probably not be superfluous, although, according to my plan, these testimonies will not appear soon, in any case, after my death. Who knows, maybe they will get lost in some hiding places?.. One thing I can say is that before posterity I will be right in sketching these lines now. When I

turned to the chief of staff of the division with a request to get acquainted with the combat mission of the 14th division, the old colonel laid out several documents in front of me. It was a rough draft of a report written by General Oranovsky to the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Military District, which outlined all the considerations for covering mobilization and strategic deployment on the left bank of the Vistula, as well as copies of instructions to the executors. Oranovsky's report did not indicate where the Russian armies were deployed. In all likelihood, he was

known. According to the Sukhomlinov reform, troops from the left bank of the Vistula were withdrawn to the Kazan and Moscow military districts. The fate of the left bank of the Vistula as a springboard for the deployment of armies was sealed. Only the 1st and 2nd rifle brigades remained there. The 31st Infantry Regiment of the 8th Infantry Division, the 14th Cavalry Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 15th Cavalry Division and units of five and a half border brigades, which, in the event of mobilization, formed four foot and four mounted hundreds of border guards. In total, therefore, on the left bank of the Vistula there were 20 battalions, 36 squadrons, 48 field and 6 horse guns, 22 foot and 22 horse hundreds. It was these forces that were entrusted with covering the mobilization and deployment of armies. To accomplish the task, all troops were divided into two detachments: the northern one, subordinate to the commander of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and the southern one, under the command of the head of the 14th Cavalry Division.

The southern detachment included: the 2nd rifle brigade, three regiments with a battery of the 14th cavalry division (the 14th dragoon regiment remained subordinate to the head of the 1st rifle brigade) and two and a half brigades of border guards. A total of 8 battalions, 24 field and 6 cavalry guns, 10 foot and 10 cavalry hundreds of border guards located in the area of Radom, Piotrkow, Czesochowa, Bendzin, Sandomierz and Ivan-gorod. The southern detachment was charged with the duty to cover the mobilization at the assembly points in Piotrkow, Czysochowa, Endrzejów, Kielce, Radom and cover the withdrawal of units of the 2nd Infantry Brigade to the area of concentration on the right bank of the Vistula and, conducting reconnaissance of the enemy, concentrate on the left bank by the fourteenth day of the war Vistula, near Ivangorod. In fact, the head of the 14th Cavalry Division could only have 28 squadrons, 10 hundreds of foot soldiers, 8 machine guns and 6 horse guns to carry out a combat mission. The zone of action of the 14th Cavalry Division was divided into four regions: Czesochowa, Kielce, Piotrkow, Radom. The first two regions were directly adjacent to the border. If the Russian General Staff liberated the western bank of the Vistula from troops, then Germany and Austria-Hungary left their garrisons on the Russian border intact and reinforced them.

The deployment of units of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies was no secret to us. In the safes of the headquarters of the 14th division were two

documents sent from the headquarters of the Warsaw district: the deployment diagram of the Austrian army according to the data of 1912 and the layout of the 6th German Corps on the fifth day of mobilization, made on tracing paper. The scheme of deployment of the Austrian army was considered a reliable document.

The second document - the layout of the 6th German Corps - was in doubt. The scheme indicated only reserve and landwehr formations, and the deployment of some field military units was not indicated. In any case, even with the departure of the 6th Corps to the west, units of the first line could still remain on the border: for action against Czeszochowa - the 65th Infantry Regiment, located in Opole, and against Bendzin - the 23rd Infantry Brigade with the 2nd Lancers regiment, the closest units of which were in Gliwice.

How did General Oranovsky solve the problem of covering the mobilization in the southern part of the western bank of the Vistula? The division chief decided to gather the entire 2nd brigade of the 14th cavalry division into a fist. Enemy reconnaissance along the western border was assigned to two reconnaissance squadrons sent from the 14th hussar regiment to the Gerba station and to the village of Konopiska (south of the Gerba station), and to four horse hundreds of the 14th border brigade. Four foot hundreds of this brigade retreated to Czeszochowa and joined the 7th Infantry Regiment, following along with it to Ivan-Gorod.

From Czeszochowa to the border was only 14 kilometers. To mobilize the 7th Infantry Regiment and the Czeszochowa assembly point, it was necessary to win two days, and then cover the retreat to the east of the 7th Infantry Regiment. In a word, the more time we could win, the better it would be. General Oranovsky planned, entrusting the protection of Czeszochowa to the 7th Infantry Regiment, which for this purpose was to set up guard posts to the west of the city, with the 2nd Brigade on the second day of mobilization, to raid the nearest German city of Lubliniec in order to actively tie up the enemy. The Keltsevsky region, 65 kilometers away from the southern border, was completely protected from enemy active actions in the first three or four days of the war. To cover the direction along the left bank of the Vistula, north of Sandomierz, on the first day of the war, squadrons of the 14th Uhlans moved from the city of Kielce and Pinchov to Opatow. Concerning

Piotrkowsky and Radomsky districts, then, directly guarding the assembly points of mobilization, they could calmly fulfill their tasks. In the future, the actions of the 14th Cavalry Division (without the dragoon regiment) were to be reduced to reconnaissance of the enemy on the left bank of the Vistula with a retreat, if necessary, to Ivangorod. The combat missions of the districts in the part concerning them were reported to the chiefs of the districts. The commanders of the border brigades knew to whom they were subordinate in case of war, and each of the heads of departments, of which there were four in the brigade, kept special packages in red envelopes with the inscription: "Open in case of mobilization".

The combat defense plan drawn up by General Oranovsky was presented to the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Military District in the autumn

of 1912. Carefully done development required great mobility and training from the 14th Cavalry Division. If we compare the position of the 14th Cavalry Division with the 7th Austrian Cavalry Division according to the "documentary source", then the concentration of the Austrians in one point and the dispersion of the 14th Division for almost 300 kilometers are striking. The division chief himself had to be at the "fist", that is, to fulfill the duties of a brigade commander, which was the only real fighting force. In order to check the combat readiness of the

Sandomierz brigade, the district headquarters ordered in early February to send me to this unit. On February 26, I went by rail to Kielce and further to Ostrovets. From here I had to travel by post to Opatow and Sandomierz, since there was no railway to Sandomierz at that time. Arriving in Sandomierz, I introduced myself to the brigade commander, an

elderly colonel. Together with him, they developed a plan for my trip to the units and subunits for conducting officer classes. I spent my first lesson at the brigade headquarters. It was assumed that in Sandomierz and its environs, the enemy, with the forces of two hundred foot border guards, would try to cross the Vistula. To thwart such an attempt, it was necessary to organize a strong defense of the river bank. This issue was the focus of the session at the headquarters.

The next day, with the assistant commander of the brigade for combat units, I went to the brigade units. Here we worked out a reconnaissance action plan along the left bank of the Vistula, held a lesson on the topic: "Organizing a battle for the core of hundreds of cavalry with advanced enemy units crossing the Vistula". We also examined the officer and non-commissioned officer posts of the border guards. An officer's post was usually subordinate to two neighboring non-commissioned officers. The distance between them is 6-11 kilometers. The instruction obliged the officer to check non-commissioned officer posts daily and record the results of the check in a special book. I once saw such a book in a battery. The book was tied to the window sill with a cord and sealed with the seal of the brigade headquarters. When I turned to the assistant battery commander for clarification, he simply replied that the officers were being lazy: they forced the soldiers to bring a book to the officer's post to sign, and when they tied it to the table, there were such officers who ordered to bring a book with a table for handwritten signatures on the inspection of the post; now, my interlocutor explained, they decided to attach the book to the windowsill in the hope that it would not be broken.

Original invention! I remembered how in Tashkent there was a case about a border guard who fell asleep at his post. I was then on duty at the district military court. The young captain defending the border guard, who had just graduated from the Military Law Academy, asked the court to clarify when the sentry could rest during the day. He read out the instructions. In its first paragraph, it was said that the sentry was obliged to bypass the border day and night, as often as possible. As a result, the defendant was acquitted. This reminded me of a book tied to a window sill with a cord. Was it really impossible to come up with another way to control the officers?

My visit to the border guards brought variety to their monotonous life. 15-20 officers gathered for classes, who diligently carried out the tasks assigned to them, studied the regulations and tactics.

Some time later I returned to Sandomierz, from where I rode in a carriage along the Vistula to Zawichost. It was already dark when I crossed the Vistula on a fishing boat and ended up at the Zaklikovsky border post. From here, on horseback, accompanied by a messenger, I rode to the next post. Here the picture of border protection was already different.

The distance between the posts at night reached 100 meters, during the day - 400-500 meters. In addition, mounted patrols rode in the second line. In Germany and Austria, the border was guarded by rare gendarmerie posts, which traveled around their sites on bicycles during the day, and sometimes bypassed them at night. The smuggling went to us, not to them. Yes, obviously, and their secret intelligence was better organized than ours.

After spending two classes on the right bank of the Vistula, I got to the highway going to Janow, and decided already in the carriage through Janow and Krasnik to get to Lublin, so that I could then return by rail to Czystochowa, where a lot of things awaited me.

SERVICE AT HEADQUARTERS 14th CAVALRY DIVISION

In 1913, work began on the transition to a new mobilization schedule. For units of the 14th cavalry division, this transition made very few changes, but still it was necessary to make extracts for the regiments on a typewriter from the statements sent by the district headquarters and send them to the executors. I also prepared an order on the distribution of topographic maps in the shelves, on the issuance to officers of the necessary documentation for storage in a field bag, in saddle holsters, in an officer's horse pack. We gave instructions to the regiments that they should carry in a cart the regiment of the 1st category wagon train and in the 2nd rank wagon train. This painstaking work was completed successfully.

The training of young soldiers and older ages proceeded according to the established program.

The Russian cavalry in 1912 received a good cavalry charter, in which both horse and foot battles were recognized as equivalent. Oranovsky taught the division combined actions. This was dictated by the need to prepare it for a future war.

Work began on the implementation of a large military program, according to which the division was to form a cavalry regiment. She was preparing to receive people and horses. The division headquarters received documents for the annual contingent of young horses for the regiments. Each regiment had its own suit. The dragoons sat on red horses, the lancers on bay horses, and the hussars mostly on gray ones, but due to the lack of horses of this suit, karak horses also arrived, which were concentrated in the last, 6th squadron in the regiment. According

to cavalry legends and signs, bay horses were the strongest breed, then red horses came, gray and karakov were considered weak. So it was with us. The best cavalry was in the 14th Lancers and the weakest in the Hussars. The Cossacks were mostly on their bay Donchaks. Horses arrived for

officers. They were purchased at state and private factories, including in Poland, especially in the Lublin province. The

schedule of my working day was as follows: at 8 o'clock in the morning I was already sitting on horseback and until 9 o'clock in the morning traveled in the arena or in

the field. For a better reading of the map, Oranovsky advised me to practice the following method. Before leaving for the field, I mapped out a route for myself, studied it, memorized local signs, and then, without a map, went into the field and drove from memory. Thanks to such exercises, I developed my topographic memory and could easily imagine the area from the map. Subsequently, when serving in higher headquarters, this was very useful to me.

Office work began at 9 am and continued until 5 pm. Then I went home for dinner and from 20 o'clock either came to the division headquarters for evening classes on top secret and secret correspondence, or sat at home doing reporting work, or read newspapers and magazines.

It must be said that every officer of the General Staff in the Warsaw Military District had to submit a decision (report) to the chief of staff of the corps for a defensive or offensive operation. In March 1913, I submitted a report to the Chief of Staff of the 14th Corps on the attack on the Gorai Heights, which the Grenadier Corps then unsuccessfully tried to capture during the First World War. In addition, for the senior

adjutants of the border divisions, the intelligence department of the district headquarters necessarily issued two newspapers in German (for me, one from Silesia, the other from Krakow). I had to look through them and everything related to military matters, translate them and send them with clippings to the senior adjutant of the intelligence department of the district headquarters. This activity also took a lot of time. And, finally, I had to look through the Russkoye

Slovo newspaper, which I always read, run through the small newspaper Varshavskaya Mysl (published in Russian) and at least one Polish newspaper, since telegrams appeared in them rather than in Varshavskaya thoughts". Well, it was necessary to be aware of periodical military literature.

All this filled the evening to overflowing. I had to go to bed at about one in the morning, so that the next day at 7 in the morning I was already on my

feet again. In early April 1913, the division headquarters received an order to send two privates to the railway battalion to train them as drivers. At the end of April, both businessmen returned to us with a car of the Russian-Baltic plant. A powerful, heavy car (in the hands of inexperienced drivers) gave Oranovsky and me a lot of trouble while traveling around the shelves: we got into accidents for which we had to pay with money. They were on the road for hours. But on the other hand, trips to Kalisz, Kielce, Pinchuv and Bendzin by car allowed me to quickly get acquainted with the theater of the upcoming military operations.

In the Russian cavalry it was customary to exchange their orders in divisions. Therefore, orders from other cavalry divisions flocked to our headquarters from all sides. Looking through these orders, one could see who was in command of the division

and how. Life in Czystochowa was fairly monotonous. True, sometimes I visited the Oranovskys: one could have a pleasant time here. I also attended family parties in the 14th Hussars and 7th Rifle Regiments. I didn't go to the officers' assembly, where the card game of chance flourished. At least twice a month, on Saturday and Sunday, I went to Warsaw, where in 1913, after graduating from the St. Petersburg Polytechnic School, my younger brother Evgeny came with his family. He served as assistant chief of communications for the Warsaw-Viennese railway. Sometimes I had to go to Warsaw for friendly lunches and dinners in the meeting of officers of the General Staff. With me

were two soldiers, both uhlan regiments, the batman Ponomarenko and the equestrian messenger Ignatov. One is a Ukrainian from near Belgorod, the second is from the Simbirsk province. Both are modest and honest people who served with me from 1913 to 1917 inclusive, and Ignatov served for another year and a half, when I was the head of the Operational Directorate of the Red Army. I maintained a correspondence with him until 1932, when I learned from his son about the death of a faithful friend. As for Ponomarenko, then, unfortunately, since 1918 I had no news of him.

The summer of 1913 was approaching. General Oranovsky and his family went to one of the resorts in Germany, and we were preparing to participate in a two-way corps field trip in the direction of Lublin, Krasnik under the leadership of the commander of the 14th Army Corps, General Voyshchin-Murdas-Zhilinsky. The regimental commanders and the division chief of staff were to participate in the exercises. Since Oranovsky was on vacation, the commander of the 2nd brigade, Mikheev, temporarily commanded the division.

Since the beginning of May, the chief of staff of the Westphalen division had been serving a qualified secondment to artillery at the Ranbertkovsky training ground, near Warsaw, and I went on a field trip instead of him. According to the task, our group represented, in essence, the 2nd Austrian cavalry division, according to the document of the strategic deployment of the Austrians already known to us, which was supposed to advance north along the right bank of the Vistula. From Krasnik to the north along the highway, the neighboring infantry corps advanced, represented on the trip by the headquarters of the 18th Infantry Division. Our opponents were: advancing from Lublin along the right bank of the Vistula, the 14th Corps and the 13th Cavalry Division. Of the assembled regimental commanders, the eldest was Colonel Dabich, who led the group as the head of the division. There were six commanders and six orderlies in total. We took a gig to transport things. In addition, a platoon of Cossacks of the 9th Dragoon Regiment was attached to send reports to the assembly points of communication of the main leadership, located along the highway Krasnik, Lublin. We were required to send orders and instructions according to the received platoon data, and then reconnaissance material of our places of lodging for the night and the routes we were

to follow. The course of the field trip showed that the 14th Corps was forced to retreat to Lublin, to a classic position 16 kilometers south of Lublin, near the village of Nedzhvitsa-Duzha. This position was really good. She saved Lublin twice: in August 1914 and in 1915, when the 15th Russian Corps retreated to her during the Mackensen offensive. Anyway, the field trip was interesting.

The corps commander made an analysis of the field trip in Lublin. He did not tell us anything new, only lovingly described the merits

indicated classical position south of Lublin. The commander of the 14th Army Corps, an elderly but still vigorous Lieutenant General of the General Staff, Voishin-Murdas-Zhilinsky, although there were not enough stars from the sky, he knew combat service better than tactics and operational art. A friendly person, he did not consider either ranks or ranks. Fate promised him in the very first battle of Galicia, after an unsuccessful battle for the corps near Krasnik, to retreat to that classic position, which I spoke about above. For this withdrawal, he and the commander of the 4th Saltz Army were removed from command. But Zhilinsky was again returned to the corps, and he commanded them until the February Revolution. He was not to blame for the loss of the battle near Krasnik. When, after the October Revolution,

my article appeared in the press, in which I wrote that I did not know where our reconnaissance reports sent to the 14th Corps had disappeared, the deep old Zhilinsky sent me a letter explaining that all the reports were transferred to the headquarters of the 4th Corps. th army. At this time, he taught tactics at the Nizhny Novgorod command courses of the Red Army.

The chief of staff of the corps, General Leontiev, had just been appointed quartermaster general of the headquarters of the Warsaw Military District. A trickster, but a limited person, Leontiev, after the retreat of Rennenkampf in 1914 from East Prussia, was removed from the post of Quartermaster General of the North-Western Front. The staff officer for assignments turned out to be Colonel Dreyer, familiar to me from Turkestan of the General Staff. Captain Voskoboynikov was the senior adjutant. Here are the main characters of the headquarters of the 14th corps. The head of the 13th Cavalry

Division, Prince Tumanov, a native of the Caucasus, graduated from the Academy of the General Staff and served in staff positions for a long time. He liked to eat, drink in moderation, sit at the table, tell jokes. Tumanov spent more time in restaurants than commanding a division. From the first days of World War II, the division acted mediocrely and in the cavalry earned the nickname "foggy" division for evading battles.

I returned to Czystochowa from a field trip at the end of May and immediately set about preparing a general cavalry muster for the division near the village of Raduchz, south of Skierniewice.

Finally, it was time to send the echelon of the division headquarters to Skierniewice. I left the next day. The regiments of the 14th division were located in the surrounding villages in private houses. In the village of Babusk, the headquarters of the division was located in peasant houses. The cavalry muster began with the formation of squadrons in cavalry formation, because (according to A.A. Brusilov) if the squadrons are removed, then the regiments will also be removed. After the squadron exercises, there were drill regimental exercises and only one divisional exercise, as a tribute to antiquity, and then field exercises. Drawing up assignments, attending classes - either as an observer or as an intermediary - filled my working day.

The time for the cavalry muster flew by unnoticed, and the division was to move south for joint tactical exercises with units of the 2nd Rifle Brigade.

On July 20, I went to the headquarters of the rifle brigade to agree on a program of exercises, the overall direction of which was entrusted to the head of our division. Appearing to the chief of staff of the brigade, I went with him to the commander of the brigade, General Artemiev. This general was from a special breed of chiefs who shout in peacetime, but are more silent in war. He met me unfriendly, although he saw me for the first time in his life, only because I was from the cavalry, which he did not recognize. When they got down to business, Artemiev lost his general tone, and the program of bilateral exercises proposed to him, approved by Oranovsky, was accepted by him unconditionally. At the end of the conversation, he turned to economic issues and asked, when culling horses, to give up 10 horses for his regiments. Each regiment of the division received annually up to 60 young horses and the same number had to be culled and sold at auction. The lowest price for such a horse was 35 rubles. The horses, still fit for riding, were handed over to the infantry for company commanders, adjutants, and, finally, simply in the convoy. The rest were bought by the population, mostly city cabbies, but already at the auction price. The proceeds were deposited into the treasury. The law strictly forbade cavalry officers to buy culled horses from their regiment or leave them in the regiment. Usually, when arriving in a city, it was possible to judge by the color of the horses of the cabbies which regiment, that is, dragoon, hussar or lancer, was stationed in this city.

On July 24, bilateral tactical exercises of cavalry with arrows began, and the cavalry was either assigned to rifle regiments, or acted independently against an entire rifle brigade, delaying its march and leading oncoming clashes, arranging fire screens, etc. The exercises were calculated in such a way that 14- I cavalry division all the time moved east to the Vistula, on the right bank of which large district maneuvers were to take place under the leadership of the chief of staff of the district, General Klyuev, since the commander of the troops, General Skala, was ill.

If in the Turkestan military district large-scale exercises served as a measure of the training of troops and their commanders, then it is needless to say that district maneuvers in the Warsaw military district provided abundant material for attesting higher commanders, their staffs and commanders of individual units. They prepared for district maneuvers as for a real battle. First of all, a timetable followed, which units were involved in the maneuvers and from which units and how many intermediaries were allocated. This already gave some guidance: for example, intermediaries were appointed from the 1st Don Cossack division from one of the regiments, therefore, this regiment as part of the division no longer participated in the maneuvers. My trip to the

district headquarters to find out something about the upcoming mission was unsuccessful. The headquarters kept a deep silence. It was said that in view of Joffre's arrival in Russia, the possibility of his appearance at the maneuvers was not ruled out. The inspector general of the cavalry Ostrogradsky was also expected to attend the maneuvers.

Finally, around August 10, an order was received from the district headquarters by August 15 to concentrate the division in the area of \u200b\u200bthe town of Opole, on the right bank of the Vistula. The bridge across the Vistula was only near Ivangorod. It was unprofitable to move the division through Ivan-gorod on Opole, since it would have to make a long detour and thereby undermine the forces of the horse composition, and they were needed for maneuvers. I suggested to the head of the division that in two days the division be ferried across the town of Solets and go straight to Opole. Some regimental commanders were frightened by such a crossing: how not to melt people and horses. Oranovsky also hesitated, but finally decided to take a chance. On August 12, the crossing of the division began on two large ferries, and by the evening of the 14th everything was completed successfully.

In the afternoon we were already in Opole, where we found the guards and the 21st cavalry battery, who had come on a campaign from Warsaw. A senior mediator also arrived - the head of the 4th cavalry division. I don't know what the district headquarters was guided by when drawing up the task, but it was a continuation of our corps field trip in the spring of 1913.

The "red" side under the command of General Zhilinsky had the task of capturing Lublin. The corps, consisting of two infantry divisions, concentrated in Kraske and the vanguard were occupied by Velkolaz. The 14th Cavalry Division was in the Opole area, occupying the advanced units of the crossing across the Khodelka River. The "blue" side - it was headed by the commander of the 19th Corps, General Gorbatovsky - was finishing its concentration in the Lublin region. Obviously, there was a head-on clash on both sides.

On August 17, in the evening, we received an order from Zhilinsky, which ordered the 16th Corps to advance along the Lublin Highway from the morning of August 18, and the 14th Cavalry Division, conducting reconnaissance towards Lublin, to intercept the railway between Lublin and Wonvolpitsa. Oranovsky called me and the chief of staff and gave instructions for reconnaissance and

the march of the division. Having sent three reconnaissance squadrons to the front of Nedzhvitsa Duzha, Lublin and Motych, the 14th division at 9 am on August 18 in three columns, brigade, with artillery, each had to move in the general direction to Motych. Inspector General of the cavalry Ostrogradsky arrived at the division, who was interested in managing a three-brigade division, which had not yet been in the army. I quickly jotted down a draft order for the division, instructions to the reconnaissance squadrons, and summoned their commanders to give instructions and personal instructions to the division chief. The draft orders were signed by Oranovsky. The division was ready to begin the maneuver. I was supposed to lead the divisional headquarters along the indicated route. I was preparing to accurately report to the head of the division about the point of its parking, or to lead it along a changed route in a different direction. The situation demanded to know where each column of the division was located. From 7 o'clock in the morning the deployed squadrons moved forward, and at 9 o'clock the division also set out.

The training in reconnaissance had an immediate effect, and by 11 o'clock in the morning there were already reports of trench work in the Nedzwitz Duzha area and of the movement of two columns of cavalry in a southerly direction. Our division was on the flank of these columns. Oranovsky did not dare to attack the "enemy" cavalry yet. Finally, a guards lancer who came with a report reported that the horse artillery was stuck in the mud in the village of Belzhitsa, and the horses could not pull out the guns. This put an end to Oranovsky's hesitation, and he ordered the Guards Lancers with a battery to attack from the north of Belzhitsa, and two brigades of the 14th division to cover it from the east and west; The Grodno Hussar Regiment remained in the reserve of the head of the division. As soon as our regiments began to deploy for the attack, up to three regiments of the Don Cossacks rushed to counterattack against our center. Oranovsky immediately ordered the Grodno hussars to be sent to support the uhlans. I quickly galloped up to the regimental commander and gave him a direction to attack.

Grodno residents rushed to the attack so swiftly that five horses fell from a broken heart on the move. The 1st Donskaya division of the "blue" cavalry corps was surrounded by six regiments of the 14th cavalry division from all sides, and its artillery really did not fire a single shot. The second division of this corps - the 7th cavalry - at that time, ten kilometers south of Belzhitsa, was located for the night. The victory of the 14th Cavalry Division was complete, so the mediators decided to withdraw the "blue" corps for fifteen kilometers, and give us freedom of action. We took advantage of this, moving away from Belzhitsa fifteen kilometers to the north, in order to be on the flank of the "enemy". Not reaching seven kilometers to Wonvolpitsa, we spent the night. I wanted to eat, but our convoy was gone. I had to limit myself to milk and black bread bought from local residents.

On August 19, Oranovsky decided to move through Wonvolnitsa to Garbow, intercept the railway and the highway from Lublin to the northwest and go to the rear of the "enemy". Accordingly, I organized reconnaissance. Our infantry continued to approach the "enemy" who had dug in near Niedzwitz-Duzh, pushing their reconnaissance forward. About ten o'clock in the morning, a report was received at the headquarters of the division that at nine o'clock in the morning

infantry battalion. Oranovsky, galloping, galloped with his staff to Kuruv, ordering the commander of the 1st brigade to send a lancer regiment there. We found our way there. Rifle chains advanced south from Kuruv. Oranovsky pulled a separate regiment of the 1st brigade and the 2nd brigade of the 14th division here, leaving only the guards brigade against the "blue" cavalry corps. At about thirteen o'clock both brigades of the 14th Cavalry Division began fighting with the Blue Infantry Division advancing south from Kuruv, and under its pressure slowly retreated to Wonvolnitsa. In front of the 14th Cavalry Division stood: an infantry division, which had advanced five kilometers south of Kuruv, and a cavalry corps of the Blues, which had spent the night south of Garbuva. The search for the convoy of the division headquarters, which lasted all day, did not yield results. The wagon train sank into the water. On August 20, Oranovsky decided to take a wait-and-see position in the Vonvolnitsa area.

At 6 o'clock in the morning on August 20, I was informed that south of Vonvolnitsa, our Cossack, who was heading with a package to the main leadership, was seized by an "enemy" patrol, the package was taken away from him, and he was released. This was already hooliganism, since the package was neutral, addressed not to the maneuvering units, but to the leadership. Complaining about this to the senior mediator, I still could not avert the consequences of the interception. Indeed, as it turned out later on the analysis, the commander of the "blue" cavalry corps received the package, opened it with triumph and announced, rejoicing that now the maneuver of the opposing side was clear to him. True, the intermediary at the headquarters of the corps, Colonel Zalessky, ordered General Tyulin to send our package to Lublin. Before the speech, I reported what had happened to Oranovsky, but he accepted this news calmly: there was such a superiority of forces against us that he no longer counted on success.

From the command post at Vonvolnitsa, a large cavalry column was visible, moving from Gorbuva to the west, covering our left flank, at the same time, up to three regiments of Cossacks appeared against our right flank. Oranovsky decided on a bold maneuver: leaving one regiment against the cavalry column, with the remaining five regiments heaped on three Cossack regiments, which were located ten kilometers southeast of Vonvolnitsa. In about half an hour all the units moved according to this plan. The cavalry "battle" began to boil. As a result, three Cossack regiments

The Blues were doomed to an hour of inactivity, and we got freedom of action. The head of the 14th Cavalry Division decided to withdraw with the main forces south of Vonvolnitsa along the road to Opole and here cover the flanks of the "Red" infantry. With the retreat of the 14th division to the south of Vonvolnitsa, at about five o'clock in the evening, a retreat was given. An hour after lights out, our convoy sprang up in front of us as if out of the ground. The explanation of the convoy commander boiled down to the fact that, having climbed into a remote manor, he sat out in it during the day, keeping all the gates locked, at night he left to join the division, but, bumping into the outpost guard guard, again returned

to his manor. On August 23, in Lublin, there was a debriefing of the exercises, which was done by General Klyuev. In general, the "red" side acted actively. The head of the 14th Cavalry Division was praised for winning two cavalry battles and for timely finding out the approach to Kuruvu of the units of the 2nd Infantry Division.

On the same day, we learned that General Oranovsky was appointed chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District, and General Klyuev received the 1st Caucasian Army Corps: he somehow compromised himself and left for a secondary theater of war.

A week after our return from the maneuvers, Oranovsky and his family left for Warsaw to a new duty station. A week later, in Warsaw, in a separate cozy office of the Grand Hotel, the generals and officers of the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division, regimental commanders, the commander of the artillery battalion with both battery commanders gathered to honor their former chief, Lieutenant General Oranovsky ...

Years have passed... Oranovsky died long ago. And now, returning to the personality of Oranovsky, I would like to say a kind word about him. As the head of the division, Oranovsky always took responsibility for the decisions made, taught the division and, it must be said, really made a good combat formation out of it; During the war, the fruits of the work of this unit were already reaped by Novikov, who considered himself almost a Russian Murat. As an officer of the General Staff, Oranovsky was active, experienced, tactful. He instilled these qualities in me. True, he cannot be called a "father-commander", as it was understood in the Russian army, i.e.

commander, who sometimes could pat a soldier on the shoulder in a friendly way. Is this the dignity of a commander? No and no. The soldier always figured out who is the real commander, and who adapts to him. He did not tolerate the latter. Did Oranovsky care about the soldier? I can rightfully answer that I have never seen a more caring boss.

Oranovsky left the division with a well-deserved promotion, and the division kept a good memory of him.

ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE WORLD WAR

There was no need to rest after the big Lublin maneuvers. Work according to the new mobilization schedule unfolded more and more widely. From the headquarters of the district, the corps came various directives and instructions that had to be transferred to the military units and control their implementation. Finally, it was up to me to develop a new mobilization plan for the division headquarters. True, it was not complicated, but it required careful work, all calculations must be confirmed by references to the relevant orders of the Military Department, states and tables. In 1913, the regulation "On the preparatory period for war"

was approved. In essence, it was a bureaucratic document setting out the requirements for verifying the implementation of those measures that should be carried out during the mobilization. This document did not in the least facilitate mobilization, but only foreshadowed the fact that a mobilization period could be announced. In my opinion, the provision "On the preparatory period for war" was borrowed from the German "Regulations threatening war." It was evident that its compilers did not realize what, in fact, they wanted to achieve by this provision. I understand that it would be possible to carry out part of the mobilization work on the basis of it, but this was not allowed to be done either. To stir up and reread the existing mobilization plans, especially in the units that are located on the border, did not make any sense.

The second order of the General Staff on the mobilization plan was of paramount importance. Previously, we knew that a declaration of mobilization was a declaration of war on Germany and Austria-Hungary, but now a declaration of war was considered "the receipt of a telegram from St. Petersburg signed by the Minister of War or if an enemy armed team crosses the border."

Due to the change in the terms of the declaration of war, I had to change the red packages in the border guard departments for new ones, and write on the packages themselves: "Open if you receive a telegram about

declaration of war or if an armed enemy team crosses the border. Once Westphalen called

me to his office and, carefully shutting the door, told me about the state of intelligence work in the division. It turned out that in Galicia he had some kind of civil official who reported local rumors and received for this a monthly reward of 30 crowns, that is, 10 rubles for our money. The chief of staff gave me Oranovsky's order to take matters into my own hands. From the district of the division, 50 rubles a month were released for undercover work. It was, of course, difficult to conduct undercover intelligence with such money. Therefore, on one of my next trips to Warsaw, I went to the senior adjutant of the intelligence department of the district headquarters, Colonel Batyushin, and asked him to increase the appropriations to 75 rubles a month, and to pay for all documentary data separately. Batyushin agreed. Now the question arose of how to get

an agent, at least first for Austria. I did not want to go along the beaten path past the border guards. Once I had to be in a small factory town Zawiercie and spend the evening there. Wandering around the place, I came across a signboard "Pleasure Garden". I went there and saw an open stage where chansonettes were singing in Polish and German. Having learned the name of the owner of the garden, I left for Czystembura. I decided to take a chance and wrote him a letter, asking him to come to Czystembura on business. After some time, I got a call and was told that a certain person from Zawiercie was waiting for me. I set off at once. After talking with him, I said that I knew about his frequent trips to Krakow, and suggested that he take on some assignments. Seeing the officer in front of him, he realized what the conversation was leading to, and, after thinking, asked what my conditions were. He offered him forty rubles a month, and especially for documents. He agreed and started working. I gave him the task of making acquaintance with the clerks of the headquarters of the 1st Austrian Corps. A month and a half later, I began to receive the first data. On the other hand, through customs in Myslowice, I recorded all trips to Krakow of

my new employee. It was more difficult with the agent against Germany. Only in April 1914 was it possible to find a Pole whose cousin served in the

6th Prussian Corps. However, nothing came of this: the information was so shallow that I had to break up with him.

In mid-September, I received a request from the senior adjutant of the Lukirsky district headquarters department on what topic I intend to make a report in the winter period at a meeting of officers of the General Staff in Warsaw. The last shots were fired in the Balkans, and it was already possible to sum up the past events. True, there was nothing in Russian, except for newspaper articles, but books in foreign languages have already appeared. After thinking a little, I told Lukirsky the topic of my report: "Actions of the cavalry in the Balkan War of 1912-1913." At the same time he wrote a number of books in German and French concerning the actions of the cavalry in the Balkans. The German General Staff issued a special collection that outlined the events, drew conclusions from them from an operational and tactical point of view ... In our country, many officers did not even know the course of hostilities, not to mention the results. The books arrived quickly and I sat down to study them. Meanwhile, instead of Oranovsky, the commander of the 2nd brigade of the 5th cavalry division, Lieutenant General Alexander Vasilyevich Novikov, was appointed head of the 14th cavalry division. I knew him from the Moscow Military School, where, as chief of staff of the 1st Cavalry Division, he lectured us on tactics and impressed the junkers with his loud voice and appearance of an old-time cavalry cuirassier. I haven't seen him for ten years. The training affairs and the combat readiness of the division did not bother him much. He lived by his family interests. With such a division chief, many responsibilities fell on the

shoulders of the division chief of staff. Westphalen perked up and spoke in a different tone. But because of this, the work itself was not done, and Westphalen was beyond its strength. Knowing Novikov from the Yelisavetgrad [12] cavalry school, Westfalen considered himself now a full-fledged manager of the division's fate.

When familiarizing the new division chief with the combat mission of the division, I drew the attention of Colonel Westfalen to the changes that had taken place in the deployment of parts of the 6th German Corps, namely: again

formed 11th cavalry regiment; 2) the location of four squadrons of this regiment and an infantry battalion in Tarnowice[13]; 3) the advancement of one battalion in Katowice, which was established by the officers of the 14th Don Cossack Regiment who visited the city. Yes, the Germans did not make

secrets from this. The deployment of parts of the 6th German Corps sent from the headquarters

of the district confirmed this. Now after the war, from the history of the Reichsarchive, the memoirs of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Konrad "From my service", and in particular from Gaye's book "History of the Landwehr Corps in the World War 1914-1918", published in 1935, it is known that already In January 1913, the Chief of the German General Staff agreed to the request of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff to cover the left flank of the deployment of the Austro-Hungarian armies with the offensive of the Landwehr Corps from Upper Silesia and Poznań in the general direction of Radom. Gaye complains that in fact, a year and a half before the start of the war, nothing was done to properly organize and supply the corps, that the corps was an "unscheduled" organization. The Landwehr Corps was considered active in the operational assumptions of the Chief of the German General Staff. Contrary to the assumptions of Oranovsky, and indeed of the entire Russian General Staff, the German corps, consisting of 34 battalions, 12 squadrons and 48 guns (cannons and howitzers) and only 8 machine guns, was supposed to operate on the left bank of the Vistula.

In his memoirs, Konrad writes that on December 20, 1913, in Vienna, he negotiated with the Chief Quartermaster of the German General Staff, General Waldersee, who had arrived there from Berlin, in the presence of the head of the German Operations Bureau, Colonel Pappen and his chief of the Operations Bureau, Colonel Menozger, about Russian deployment. Waldersee definitely reported to Konrad that "we want to capture Czystochowa and thereby, by creating a flank threat, interfere with the work of their (Russian. - B.Sh.) railways." "In a further exchange of views," Konrad

continues, "it was established that in order to strengthen the cover of the Oderberg [14] - Krakow railway section, as well as the entire coal region of Katowice, Beiten [15]

—, German troops invade Russian territory in order to

in order, in cooperation with the 7th Austrian cavalry division, to advance to the Wolbrom-Olkusch area.

We discussed the question of a joint offensive on the left bank of the Vistula by German and Austro-Hungarian forces. It was supposed to be directed to the Vistula to the Annopol, Ivan-Gorod section. On the German side, 32 battalions, 4 batteries and 4-8 squadrons should be concentrated for this - half from Posen, half from Silesia, in order to advance concentrically together with the left Austro-Hungarian wing. On the 12th, ours on the 14th day of mobilization, German forces can launch an offensive, so that from 22 to 24 days of mobilization they will reach the indicated section of the Vistula. Command will be governed by joint movement; in joint operations against the enemy, command is assumed by the senior in

positions."

So Konrad, at the end of the war, outlined negotiations with Waldersee about actions on the left bank of the Vistula, which, of course, was not known to either the headquarters of the 14th division or the

Russian General Staff. I do not know whether Westfalen Novikov reported my thoughts on the division's combat mission, but there was no decision to change the action plan of the 14th cavalry division. To finish with the changes in the combat mission, I'll jump ahead a bit. When Oranovsky was appointed chief of staff of the district, he approved his own request as the head of the 14th cavalry division to transport the 7th and 8th rifle regiments by rail to the army deployment area - to the right bank of the Vistula. This greatly facilitated the maneuver of the 14th division. I have already said that Oranovsky received

reports at his home. Now everything was reported to the chief of staff, and Novikov daily went to the headquarters for an hour and a half and in the office of the chief of staff accepted the report, signed the necessary papers.

In the first days of October 1913, verification mobilization of units began, and I found myself a member of several commissions. I had to be on the road all the time. True, the mobilization of cavalry units took no more than a day to write a report, but a lot of time was spent on the road. Each mobilization check ended with a 27-kilometer march and then a tactical exercise. In the 13th Dragoon Regiment, the chairman of the commission was

General Tumanov, head of the 13th Cavalry Division. Sometimes, in order not to delay the report, I imperceptibly left the table as soon as Tumanov began to tell endless anecdotes.

In early November, I was appointed a member of the commission to check the plan of the reserve artillery brigade, which is being formed under the 38th artillery brigade. It took me another 12 days. The 38th artillery brigade, as indicated in the deployment, was located near the city of Pruzhany. In reality, the military town stood in the middle of a field, six kilometers from Linevo station, six kilometers from Pruzhany, and two kilometers from the nearest village. The life of officers, especially young ones, was hard in such a town. At the end of classes, at about six o'clock in the evening, the youth gathered in the meeting and until 12 o'clock in the morning they drove balls into the billiard room. When I asked why they didn't go home, I got one answer: "It's boring, Mr. Captain, to sit alone at home in your room, but in the meeting you can at least exchange a word with someone." The desires of the young officers did not go beyond a trip to the small town of Brest. Everyone wanted to change their place of service in any way. However, the mobilization of this secondary artillery brigade was in order. In August 1914, on the battlefield, part of the batteries skillfully and well fired. Then it was already the 75th artillery brigade. In

general, until February 1914, I had to carry out 13 verification mobilizations. The time

was approaching for my report to the meeting of officers of the General Staff in Warsaw - my first report in this district. Didn't want to be embarrassed. On the evening of December 14, I left for Warsaw. The head of the division and the chief of staff went to report. And on December 15, at 7 pm, I stood at the pulpit in front of a large auditorium filled with generals and officers who had gathered to listen to a report on the war that had just ended. They were waiting for Oranovsky. With his arrival, I

began my report, slightly at first agitated, and then completely mastering myself. In 45 minutes, I spoke about the organization of the cavalry of both sides and their actions against the backdrop of the general events of the war. The actions of the cavalry were reduced mainly to a combination of foot combat with cavalry. Attempts by large forces to attack the infantry in cavalry formation ended in heavy losses. IN

At the end, he concluded that our 1912 cavalry drill charter correctly reflects the requirements for it. The report was listened to carefully.

Debates were not opened. Oranovsky thanked for the report, and Lukirsky offered to send me to the large garrisons of the cavalry units of the district to read the report. Oranovsky immediately agreed. Was I satisfied with my report? Yes, I'm happy. After the well-paid maneuvers of the 14th Cavalry Division near Lublin, I was now gaining some authority in the district and in scientific matters. For a young captain of the General Staff, serving for a year in the Warsaw district, this was a good step forward.

On December 16, having received the appropriate travel certificate from Lukirsky at the reporting department of the district headquarters, I left for Czŷstochowa. And started with him. Then he read a report in Vlotslavsk, Graev, Bialystok, Vladimir-Volynsky and Lublin. Such a tour around the district was difficult, since at night I moved from garrison to garrison, in the morning I introduced myself to the head of the garrison, and in the evening I made a report. True, during the trip he met some of the corps commanders, among other things, with Blagoveshchensky, the commander of the 6th Army Corps, later known from the Soldau disaster, the heads of cavalry divisions, brigades, regimental commanders and officers of the General Staff of cavalry divisions. On the way, I also met a new one, 1914. In the tenth of January he returned to Czŷstochowa and began his usual activities. During my departure on a business trip, the replacement of red packets for a combat mission was carried out by the senior adjutant for the inspectorate, Lieutenant Janson. He burned the old packages without opening them, making up

this act.

Life went on as usual. Occasionally he went to Warsaw and visited the Oranovskys. Once Oranovsky suggested that I go to the district headquarters. I agreed, but I wanted the question to be raised from below. For the second year I served in the provinces and had the right to be transferred to Warsaw. This proposal was made to me by Lukirsky on behalf of three adjutants. But I asked Oranovsky to wait with the transfer, so that they would not consider that he was "pulling" to the headquarters of his former senior adjutant.

Snow fell by the end of January, but it only lasted a week. One day the adjutant of the Cossack regiment called me and asked me to come to the regiment as soon as possible. I went. Together with him went to the Austrian border. The snow melted, and white stripes appeared that did not succumb to the sun. The secret was simple: the Austrians painted concrete fortifications located almost on the very border with white paint. Having put them on the map, the adjutant returned to the regiment, and I went to my

home, to Czestochowa. At the beginning of the year, the Warsaw governor-general and commander of the troops, Adjutant General Skala, died. He was succeeded by the former Chief of the General Staff, General Ya.G. Zhilinsky. Instead, the head of the Imperial Military Academy, General Yanushkevich, was appointed chief of the General Staff. The appointment of Yanushkevich to such a responsible post was completely incomprehensible: he did not match him either in knowledge or in character. German newspapers considered Yanushkevich a protege of Rasputin.

Zhilinsky, a native guardsman, married to the daughter of the rich man Yusupov-Sumarokov-Elston, well-known in Russia at that time, commanded the 14th Cavalry Division for about a year and a half. As the old officers told him, he had a mistress in Warsaw and once, on one of his visits, he found her in the hall kissing an officer. Zhilinsky killed this officer, and then they put a revolver in his hand and called the doorman to declare the young officer's suicide. So it was or not - I can not vouch. The hushed up "hard labor" case did not prevent Zhilinsky from being the chief of the Russian General Staff, and the commander-in-chief of the armies of the North-Western Front during the World War, and, finally, the representative of Russia at the allied conferences in Chantilly.

Classes went on as usual. Novikov almost did not go to the regiments, so we also sat at the headquarters. True, I still went to the regiments to check on some issues and maintained close contact with the commanders and officers of the regiments.

Suddenly, Westphalen's chief of staff fell seriously ill. Left for the chief of staff, I barely had time to cope with all the duties. A strange impression was made by the head of the division, who visited the headquarters every day. He signed papers, did not show any activity in the preparation of divisions and was very

saddened by the illness of his horse. A few days later the horse felt better, Novikov also cheered up, and every day I learned from him how much his horse had eaten

oats in a day. In my youth, at first this resented me, but then I got used to it and was pleased that he did not delay signing the papers. He sat at my table for no more than 30-40 minutes, and then went to his home and no longer bothered anyone.

Chief of Staff Westphalen's illness was lingering, and I had to fill in for him at least all summer. Life in Czystochowa went on as usual, the troops were preparing to leave for a special cavalry gathering near the village of Raduch. The 23rd Cavalry Brigade was sent to the Rombertovsky district training ground, east of Warsaw, for firing. A field trip of officers of the General Staff to the border with East Prussia was planned. On June 10, the regiments of the division marched to the Skiernievits

area, the division headquarters was also preparing to be sent in echelons by rail to the village of Raduch. Suddenly, on June 15, the newspapers brought

extraordinary news: the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Franz Ferdinand, was killed in Sarajevo. No one thought that the Sarajevo shot would have fatal consequences. The personality of this offspring was associated with broad plans for the expansion of the Habsburg monarchy to the east and south at the expense of the Slavs. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand seemed to nullify the dreams of this state and push back the threat of war. The Sarajevo assassination was not given much importance. Did they kill the crowned persons? I recalled an anecdote with the murder in Moscow in 1905 of Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich. When a crowd gathered at the scene, the policeman began to convince everyone to disperse. Some old woman asked who was killed. The representative of the authorities majestically answered her: "Come in, grandmother, they killed whoever is necessary!" So it was with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand,

they argued: they killed whoever they needed. I didn't have to go to Raduch, because I received a notification from the district headquarters that I was part of the participants in the field trip of the officers of the General Staff and should arrive in Kolno (north of Lomzha) on June 20. Having made all the necessary orders to the headquarters on June 17, I left for Lom.

The field trip of the officers of the General Staff of the Warsaw Military District in the direction of Lomza, Kolno was carried out under the leadership of the chief of staff of the Oranovsky district. The assignment for the trip consisted of a head-on collision between the German army advancing from Johannisburg (in East Prussia. - B.Sh.) to Lomza, and the Russian army, which was ending its concentration on the Lomza-Bialystok line and advancing on Kolno.

I acted in the modest role of chief of staff of the German cavalry division, commanded by the handsome brigade commander of the 4th cavalry division, General Martynov.

First, I made a reconnaissance of the Pissa River, above its confluence with the Narew, and submitted to the headquarters of the leadership data on the patency of this river, and then the draw began by day, and the German cavalry division was supposed to flow around the left flank of the Russians along the western bank of the river.

Being in Kolno, our "red" side decided to pass to the city of Johannesburg, and we went on horseback to the border. Usually such a move was never forbidden by the Germans. However, this time, at the border barrier, the gendarme, politely apologizing, asked us to wait, as he must ask his superior for permission to enter. We stayed to wait, and the gendarme went to make phone calls. Fifteen minutes later he returned and, saluting, said that his superiors did not allow us to go to Johannesburg. Surprised, we went back to Kolno. Now it is clear why we were not allowed. After all, we tried to get to Johannisburg after June 23, when Wilhelm had already decided right up to the war to support Austria-Hungary in its demands on Serbia. Apparently there were some activities going on in East Prussia that they didn't want to show us, but which could easily be found in this small town. The field trip ended with a general detour by all participants with Oranovsky at the head of the Russian position, where they stopped the German advance. After the detour, Oranovsky made a detailed review of the field trip. This was my last meeting and last conversation with my respected former boss

divisions.

After Ruzsky was appointed commander-in-chief of the armies of the Northwestern Front, Oranovsky commanded the 1st Cavalry Corps instead of Novikov. Having carried out a number of hostilities with the corps in 1915, up to the liquidation of the Sventsiansky breakthrough of the Germans, at the end of the same year he was appointed commander of the special 42nd corps in Finland. According to the stories of the officers, Oranovsky, as the head of the Vyborg garrison, was arrested by revolutionary soldiers on the first day of the February Revolution of 1917, put in a guardhouse, but stayed there for only a few minutes. At the request of the Military Revolutionary Committee, Oranovsky was to be taken to prison, but on the way to the bridge he was shot dead by guards, and his body was thrown into a hole. In the whirlwind of unfolding revolutionary events, all this information reached me late. Where his family went, I also do not know. I have only fond memories of the entire Oranovsky family.

What Oranovsky represented as a military general, I cannot say, since the war separated us. Therefore, let the future historian pronounce his verdict, and I will refrain from praise, but also from blasphemy, since it is not my task to say what I myself have not observed. I can only say that Oranovsky was a head above other generals of the Russian army and with unsullied honor, like his former boss, General Zhilinsky. Although the political horizon was not yet overshadowed by clouds, the ban on our trip to Johannesburg led to some reflections.

Therefore, I traveled from Lomza to Czestochowa, calling my agent from Zawiercie. He reported that some kind of feverish work was going on at the headquarters of the 1st Austrian Corps in Krakow: officers were sitting around the clock at the headquarters and working on some kind of plans. The agent received such information from clerks. It was not possible to penetrate further into the mystery. Having reported this to the district headquarters, on July 1 I went to the division headquarters in

the village of Babsk (near Skierniewice).

At the cavalry gathering I found the most peaceful mood. There was a congress of squadrons in the regiments. I set about drawing up tasks for future tactical exercises, and then for the usual tasks of the chief of staff of the division.

Day followed day. The newspapers wrote about the arrival of Poincare in St. Petersburg, about the celebrations that took place there. On Sunday, July 16, the division's first officer jumps of the year were scheduled. Interests revolved around what new horses would take part in the races and what were the chances of winning one or another rider.

Nobody expected anything...

THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD WAR

July 13 arrived. In the morning, everything foreshadowed good weather. The race was supposed to start at 4 pm. Half an hour before the start of division chief, I received an invitation to go to the races with him. But I had a telegram just delivered from the headquarters of the 14th Corps on my desk. It needed to be deciphered. Therefore, I ordered to tell the head of the division that I would arrive later, and sat down to decipher the telegram. At the headquarters

of the division, there were no special cryptographers. Either the chief of staff, or I, the senior adjutant of the General Staff, were engaged in this. The ciphers were kept in the safe of the chief of staff. In this case, I had them as the deputy chief of staff. The telegram from the corps headquarters was short, and 20 minutes later I had its text in front of me. The crew stood at the gate of my hut, and after checking once again the correctness of the deciphered text, I went to the race field, ordering me to trot in order to get there as soon as possible. The telegram did turn out to be short in terms of the number of words, but its content was extremely important: it said that, by the highest command, July 13 was declared the first day of the preparatory period for war. The troops were ordered to proceed immediately to their winter quarters. When I arrived at the races at the beginning of the fifth and went up to the judges' tower, where Novikov and all the regimental commanders were, the first race was already at the start. My first desire was to stop the races, but then I decided to let the first run run so as not to create a panic. And so he did. The audience did not even suspect that these were the last races, that in the same 1914, blood would be shed on this field, and not music would rattle.

and fun.

When the first race was over, I approached the head of the division and asked him to come down with me from the tower to report to him a very important telegram. After reading the received telegram to Novikov, I suggested that we should finish the races, assemble the regimental commanders and give them the contents of the telegram so that on the same night, July 13, the regiments would set out for their permanent quarters.

The regiments had to make about 140 kilometers. We had to hurry to arrive at the border on time. Excited by the news received, the head of the division loudly announced from the judge's tower about the preparatory period for the war, although both the families of officers and invited civilians were present. Novikov, in his usual tone in such cases, delivered a speech about the defense of the faith, the tsar and the fatherland. I had a science for the future, how to keep secrets even from your superiors. There was a cheer, the music played the anthem, and the field was quickly empty. The regimental commanders immediately gathered, and in the presence of Novikov, I agreed with them on the hour of the speech, the route of movement, maintaining communication during the campaign, reminded them of the need to get acquainted with the combat mission as soon as possible. divisions.

The experience of the Russo-Japanese War taught us something. It was not believed that the war would begin with diplomatic subtleties, and therefore the regiments were ordered to move with security measures. Having given orders, we parted to our places.

Although the instructions sent earlier on the measures taken during the preparatory period for war were general, the corps commander promised to send additional detailed instructions. One thing was certain:

it was necessary to evacuate the families of the officers deep into the country. Having reported this to the division chief and received his consent, I immediately sent orders to the regiments, and from the division headquarters I sent a second senior adjutant to Czystochowa with a passenger train to take out the families of the officers. The divisional headquarters began to pack for the return to Czystochowa. At dawn on July 14, I

received reports from all the regiments and the 23rd cavalry battery about the performance. It was assumed that, making accelerated transitions, by the evening of July 16, all units would be in their places, and the 2nd brigade of the division, with the exception of one hundred Cossacks, in the Czystochowa area. Due to the delay in the supply of wagons, the division headquarters was only able to set off on the night of July 15 by rail from Skerpewice to Czystochowa, where it arrived by the evening of July 15.

Knowing that Czystochowa was left without troops for the summer, I suggested to the head of the division to speed up the march of the 2nd brigade of the division to Czystochowa so that the last 100 versts would be covered in one day.

Novikov agreed and sent a corresponding order to the commander of the 2nd brigade.

On the evening of July 15, the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division arrived in Czystochowa. The city did not feel that clouds were gathering over it. In the most knowledgeable banking circles, even the thought of a war was not allowed. At worst, they assumed, even if it comes to mobilization, then the parties will stand one against the other, and everything will end with an agreement, as it was in 1912. I did not share this point of view and believed that things were heading for war. In Czystochowa, only a small team of 100 people remained with an officer who carried guards to guard the regiment's barracks. The real power in the hands of the division headquarters was only the equestrian sapper team that arrived with it. Therefore, from it, until the arrival of the 2nd brigade, I sent two non-commissioned officer patrols: one to the Gerba station, and the second to the south, to the village of Konopiska, in order to get information about the

unexpected German attack on the border guards in time. Russian civil officials with their families gradually left the city, the bank took out valuables, the officer families of the 14th division, the 7th rifle regiment and border guards were evacuated. Therefore, it is strange now to read in the memoirs of the former chief of staff of the German landwehr corps Gaye, who after Seeckt was even the commander of the Reichswehr, that when the headquarters of the German corps entered Czystochowa on July 31 and settled in the office of the State Bank, they found thrown ink, pencils, paper and even a wall calendar showing the date July 11, 1914. This date should have led Gaye to the idea that on July 11 the bank was taking away valuables, that is, earlier than the period actually declared preparatory to the war. But there's nothing to be done, German historians firmly grasped Moltke's rule: in historical writings "to write the truth, but not the whole truth." This is

what Gaia followed. Having made the last transition of 100 kilometers, the 2nd brigade with the 23rd horse battery on the

morning of July 16 approached Czystochowa. With regard to the Cossacks, it should be noted that they appeared in three places: in Bendzin, teams loaded property and sent it to Czystochowa; in Czystochowa there were five hundred Cossacks, and the sixth hundred, even before entering the special cavalry collection, was allocated to help the police in

the German agents had the impression of an increase in the Cossack units on the left bank of the Vistula; the German command was expecting a Russian cavalry raid on Silesia and Poznan in order to disrupt the mobilization of the German army. A hundred Cossacks sent to Seradz were ordered to join the regiment. The district chief of staff warned the head of the 14th division about the need to take precautions in case of a surprise attack by the enemy. This has actually already been done. On the same day, additional instructions were received from the headquarters of the 14th Corps on the activities carried out in the preparatory period for the war. But they did not go further than instructions on replenishing transportable supplies, reforging horses and greasing the wagon train.

Meanwhile, the division stationed on the border was expensive every hour. Therefore, I suggested to the head of the division to announce the mobilization of its units. Having made thunderous speeches on the Raduga field, Novikov hesitated and asked if he would make control over us if there was no mobilization. I reassured him that everything would go well and got permission. On the

evening of July 16, he sent an order to the regiments to begin the general mobilization of the division from July 17. A second senior adjutant was sent to Piotrkow to mobilize the convoys of the 2nd category of the division's units. Thus, without notifying the authorities, the 14th Cavalry Division, on the morning of July 17, even before the announcement of the general mobilization, actually started it. Didn't have to

yawn! The families of the officers have already left Czystochowa. I settled in the headquarters, and gave my apartment, located not far from it, to Novikov, so that in case of an alarm he could quickly come to the headquarters. By the morning of July 17, echelons of the 7th Infantry Regiment began to arrive in Czestochowa from the camps. On the same day, a report was received at headquarters about the arrival of the 14th Dragoon Regiment

in Kalisz, and the 14th Lancers in Kielce and Pinchuv. On July 17, all parts of the division, with the exception of the convoys of the 2nd category in Piotrkow, were mobilized. On the evening of that day, the head of the 14th Cavalry Division, as head of the Czystochowa garrison, received a telegram about general mobilization, the first day of which was determined on July 18th. The next day, mobilization began in the 7th Infantry Regiment and at the C

On July 18, my job as acting chief of staff of the division ended. From the headquarters of the district, a staff officer came to this position for instructions, Colonel of the General Staff V.N. Dreyer. When I served in Tashkent, he commanded a company for qualifications, and then until 1906 he was an assistant to the senior adjutant of the district headquarters. The

son of artillery colonel Dreyer, who also served in Tashkent, Vladimir Nikolaevich led a rather scattered lifestyle, being a representative of the "golden youth" in Tashkent. Married to a beautiful young blond woman, though dim-witted, he soon left her, carried away by other women. Then Dreyer was transferred to the West, and I ran

into him again already in 1913, when he was a staff officer for assignments at the headquarters of the 14th Corps. In official terms, Dreyer had a good reputation as a capable staff officer, but his adventurous inclinations not only did not decrease, but even developed. When the Bulgarian-Turkish war broke out in 1912, he somehow got a job as a correspondent for Novoye Vremya under the Bulgarian army. Once in the environment of adventurous correspondents, Dreyer quickly felt himself in his field. By his nature, he was distinguished by a certain degree of impudence. For some reason, he was asked to leave the Bulgarian army and return to Russia. A tall, strongly built man, by nature a real military man, but not a modest one, he strove to advance at the expense of others and, on occasion, was not averse to embellishing his exploits in reports.

With extraordinary courage, Dreyer quickly assessed the situation, always preferring a fight, without going deep into whether it was expedient or not. Although Dreyer was sent on July 18 to act as chief of staff of the division, in essence, the entire burden of work on the headquarters remained with me. Dreyer was waiting for the opening of hostilities, but he was not interested in rough, staff work, and he did not like it.

By the evening of July 18, all parts of the division with rears were completing their mobilization. Border posts were reduced to foot and horseback hundreds. On the first day of mobilization, the 7th Rifle Regiment sent out teams to receive people and horses, and thus its companies found themselves without people.

When planning the mobilization in Poland, it was believed that up to 20% of the conscripted ages of the Polish population would not appear. Meanwhile, at the Czystochowa assembly point, a different picture was obtained: not only those subject to conscription, but also volunteers, appeared. Everyone had to be accepted, taken through medical commissions and transported to the right bank of the Vistula according to orders. There were not enough wagons, so part of the mobilized had to be sent in marching order to Piotrkow and already there they were put into military trains.

In the city of Czestochowa itself, the mobilization, of course, introduced some nervousness. The main street was crowded with people day and night, it was enough for a car to drive along the street, as everyone was on their guard. In general, everything went smoothly and order was not violated anywhere, although many Germans lived in the city and its environs. No special measures were taken against them.

The night and day of July 19 proceeded in the usual mobilization work. The senior military commander was clearly unable to cope with the work, as I was convinced myself when I went to the assembly point. It was decided to send him to help, or rather, simply replace him with a colonel from the headquarters of the 14th border brigade and give several doctors to speed up the examination of conscripts.

At about 5 pm, a report was received from Myslowice from the captain of the border guards that the bridge over the Cherna-Pshemsha River, connecting the Russian railway with the Austrian, had been blown up. Almost simultaneously, a request about this came from the district headquarters. They reported there that the captain was removed from command, which in reality was not done. An attempt to blow up the bridge at Sosnowiec, connecting the Russian road with the German one, failed: the Germans opened machine-gun and rifle fire. Obviously, that captain had an old red envelope with the inscription "Open upon mobilization announcement", and the contents of the envelope indicated the explosion of bridges. The second senior adjutant was in Piotrkow, and it was not yet possible to check whether he had replaced the package accurately.

From the point of view of diplomacy and propaganda, this blowing up of bridges, of course, mattered. In the German newspapers received through the agent of July 20, it was printed in bold print about "Russia's hostile actions against Austria", about the explosion by the Russians of the railway bridge across the Cherna-Pshemsha River, near Myslowice.

On the border with Austria, everything was calm. It's different in Germany. Already on the night of July 19, the reconnaissance units of the division and the border guards reported that bells were heard outside the German border and milestones were lit. This is how the Germans traditionally announced a war-threatening situation. On the afternoon

of July 19, this was confirmed by agents. My permanent and trusted agent, a Pole from Zavern, turned out to be liable for military service and was called up for mobilization. I ordered the military commander to transfer him to the headquarters of the 14th division for staffing, bought him a wagon and a couple of horses for traveling needs, replenished his wardrobe

in case of changing clothes. The day and evening passed slowly. I lay down to take a nap when, at about 11 o'clock in the evening, I was awakened by the duty officer at the headquarters. He brought a telegram from St. Petersburg, addressed to the head of the Czystochowa garrison. It read: "Germany has declared war on us. Sukhomlinov. Immediately reporting this telegram to the chief of staff and calling the division chief, he went to another telephone that connected me with the Herba-Prussian station, called the commander of the reconnaissance squadron of the 14th Hussars to the telephone and gave him the order to immediately cross the border and notify the second commander about the same squadron, stationed to the south, near the village of Konopiska, with an order to start reconnaissance with the border crossing. The squadron commander from the Gerba station asked me to wait an hour and a half, since it was

dark, there was a

forest all around, nothing was visible ... Having agreed, I returned to my room. So the war has begun! I have already spoken about the course of mobilization at the Czestochowa assembly point. In the rest of the districts, subordinate to the commander of the 14th Cavalry Division, mobilization proceeded normally. In fact, two days for mobilization were won. There was still July 20 to complete the work of the Czestochowa assembly point and send the 7th Rifle Regiment by rail. On July 19, an agent of the division headquarters, who visited Silesia, reported on the delivery of German infantry and artillery to Lublinets. Obviously, the entire 63rd German Infantry Regiment was concentrated in

Germany. What is the position of Austria, because of which the war broke out? Indeed, on the flank of the 2nd brigade of the 14th cavalry division hung the 7th Austrian cavalry division. Therefore, when the head of the division appeared at headquarters at night, I suggested that he ask the chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District, Oranovsky, about the position of Austria-Hungary. A telegram was sent, but the division headquarters never

received a response to it. According to the development of 1912, the 2nd brigade was supposed to go on a raid on Lublinets in order to gain time for mobilization. I reported to the head of the division and Colonel Dreyer about what forces we have before us now, in 1914, and not in 1912. He indicated that in Lublinets we would meet an infantry regiment with artillery, and from the flank we would be threatened by four squadrons of the 11th horse regiment, supported, possibly, by infantry. And since we had only one day left to spend in Czestochowa, and besides, to cover the landing in the echelons of the 7th Infantry Regiment, I found that the raid on Lublinets in these conditions was not advisable, it could only lead to battle for the sake of battle. Dreyer was vehemently in favor of undertaking the raid, as it is said to be in development. Novikov hesitated. Having asked permission to prepare the divisional headquarters for a speech, I left the office.

Dawn has come. Both of our reconnaissance squadrons crossed the border, and the first took the Herba-Prussian station with a fight, and the second collided with a German battalion stationed at the bivouac. When the patrol - 9 people with an officer - suddenly appeared in the clearing, a panic arose in the German battalion. With a cry of "Cossacks!" some rushed to run into the forest without guns, others to guns. Our junction was also frightened. He turned back and galloped for six miles until he overcame the border, which from now on did not matter, but out of habit calmed the people who found themselves "at home". According to the report of the reconnaissance squadrons, all the border villages were empty, abandoned

by the inhabitants. To the west of the village of Kozeglovy, the 2nd hundred of the 14th border guard brigade was stationed, which was supposed to cross the border and invade the estates of Prince Hohenlohe located here. However, this was not possible: the border guards met infantry rifle fire, apparently from units stationed in Beiten.

From the border units from Berdzina and Soskovets no reports were received.

Novikov's hesitation continued until a telegram arrived from General Oranovsky, the compiler of the development of the combat mission of the 14th Cavalry Division. The telegram suggested that all measures be taken "not to be subjected to a separate defeat." This order did not say anything about whether to undertake a raid on Lublinets or not. Novikov stopped hesitating and decided to take the 2nd brigade of the 14th division to the west of Czystochowa. To the north of the railroad, five hundred of the 14th Don Cossack Regiment were dismounted, and to the south - parts of the 14th Hussars with four guns. The disguised two guns of the 23rd cavalry battery were placed directly at the highway. The division headquarters was located in the village of Kavodzha, having only 50 people of the equestrian sapper team in reserve. At 9 am on July 20, two

brigades of the division with the 23rd cavalry battery set out to take up a position west of Czystochowa. In the morning, reconnaissance units clashed on German territory. At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon, our reconnaissance squadron, which occupied the station of the Prussian Coats of Arms, under the onslaught of an enemy cavalry squadron and a company of scooters, withdrew from the Prussian Coats of Arms and the Russian Coats of Arms. After a while, supported by one squadron of hussars, our squadron again occupied the Herba-Russian station and fought for the Herba-Prussian station.

At about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the headquarters of the division was in the village of Kavodzha, a courier from the Austro-Hungarian embassy in St. Petersburg was brought to its location from Czestochowa, carrying diplomatic mail and having the appropriate certificates for this. Since passenger trains to the south of Czystochowa were no longer going to the Austrian border, he decided to apply to the head of the garrison for a pass. The unclear position of Austria in the war and the unwillingness to let the courier through those stations where we had no troops led to the decision to send him towards the Germans, with whom hostilities were already underway. Therefore, on the form of the field book, I wrote him a pass through the battle lines, and the courier, along with the mail, was sent on a cart in the direction of Gerbov.

Until nightfall, the advanced units fought for the Prussian Coats of Arms and the Russian Coats of Arms. By nightfall, the hussars were forced to leave both stations and retreated to the village of Trapezura. The southern reconnaissance squadron of hussars, having found out that a German cavalry regiment, supported by infantry, had approached the village of Boropow, retreated to the village of Konopiska. From the 3rd and 4th cavalry hundreds of the 14th border guard brigade received a report that at about five o'clock in the evening large reconnaissance cavalry units of the Germans appeared in the Soskovets and Bendzina area,

which occupied these two points. To the west of Czystochowa, units of the 2nd Brigade remained in position after dark, posting guards and strengthening reconnaissance. At about 10 pm, the latter reported that the movement of German infantry began along the highway to Trapezura, which forced our squadron out of this village. The hussars withdrew, and the reconnaissance of the Cossacks came into contact with the enemy infantry advancing from Trapezur to the east. Lieutenant Teritsky, who was with an artillery platoon, on his own initiative, rolled out both guns onto the highway and fired two shrapnel shots along it. Traffic on the highway stopped, and the Cossack patrols approached the village of Trapezura itself, but were

met with rifle fire. At about two o'clock in the morning on July 21, an officer arrived at the division headquarters to communicate with the 7th Infantry Regiment and reported that all echelons had been sent, and the subversive teams of the district headquarters were starting to undermine the station structures. Indeed, soon several heavy explosions were heard in the rear of

The task of the 2nd brigade of the 14th cavalry division to cover the mobilization in Czestochowa and send the 7th rifle regiment was completed. You can start leaving. But the swampy terrain on the sides of the highway to the Arms made it difficult to withdraw from the positions of cavalry units and artillery. In addition, the enemy did not advance. Therefore, it was decided to wait until dawn, and then begin to withdraw. However, the order to send the carts to the east was given at night, and the carts set out without waiting for dawn. Leaving two squadrons of hussars on the western outskirts of the city as a rearguard, the division headquarters followed the cavalry column through Czystochowa at dawn.

To destroy the property remaining in the barracks, officers with teams were sent with orders to set fire to all military property. The apartments of the officers were abandoned to the mercy of fate. I have everything in my apartment. Orderly Ponomarenko locked her up and gave the key to the magistracy. Subsequently, he regretted that he had not turned off the meter: the Germans burned electricity at our expense, and then we would have to pay. I didn't have to pay, but I didn't receive anything either. There are only memories of the library, which he collected for 10 years.

At about eight o'clock in the morning on July 21, the column of the 2nd brigade, having crossed the bridge over the Warta, stretched to the east, covered by a rearguard of two squadrons with a platoon of heavy machine guns, not pursued by the enemy. The Germans already occupied the city, the 2nd hundred of the 14th border brigade had to break through. Having lost several people and leaving the convoy in the hands of the enemy, a hundred joined the brigade. The German patrols did not pursue the 2nd brigade further than the town of Mezhuv, and by 3 o'clock in the afternoon it retreated to the town of Koniecpol, where it settled down to rest. Here, in addition to the 2nd hundred, the brigade was joined by the 3rd and 4th cavalry hundreds,

departing from Berdzin and Soskovets. In other areas of the division, mobilization proceeded normally. On July 20, the commander of the 14th Lancers reported that he had set out for Opatow, sending a reconnaissance battalion to Staszow. Janson, the second senior adjutant of the division headquarters, was sent a telegram to Piotrkow to lead the convoys of the 2nd category of the division's units to Zvolen. On July 20, the 8th Rifle Regiment was sent by rail through Warsaw to the area of concentration on the right bank of the Vistula. With the departure from Czystochowa, all communication between the headquarters of the 14th division and the areas under its jurisdiction was broken.

Thus, the first task of combat use of units of the 14th Cavalry Division was solved. What are its results?

The work of the Czystochowa assembly point was carried out without interruption. The mobilization and dispatch of the 7th Infantry Regiment was also completed on time. What else remained unfulfilled? There was no raid on Lublinets. To provide it, the forces of not only the 2nd brigade and the 14th cavalry division, but more impressive formations would be required. Why? Because in 1913, on the border in the region of Silesia, German troops significantly strengthened their combat power.

The headquarters of our division closely followed the development of events. He managed to establish the following: 1) the 63rd infantry and 11th cavalry regiments of the enemy, supported by artillery, are advancing on Czystochowa; 2) the offensive was also led by the 2nd German Lancers (together with the 11th cavalry regiment, he made up a cavalry brigade) ... We knew

that during one of the diplomatic misunderstandings that once arose between Germany and Russia, Alexander III scared then still young Wilhelm II, that he would flood Germany with Cossacks. Many acts showed that the fear of the invasion of the Russian cavalry did not leave the Germans and Austrians even in 1914. Meanwhile, since 1907, the two headquarters of the cavalry corps located in Warsaw, and the formations of the Russian cavalry were cordoned along the border, and the 5th Cavalry Division was redeployed to the Volga region back in 1910. And yet the German and Austrian general staffs continued to be alarmed that the Russian cavalry was preparing to invade their countries. This is evidenced by official documents of the Reichsarchive. In one of them, in particular, it is said: the Upper Silesian industrial region can be defended on the condition that hostilities are transferred to Russian territory. Further in the same document it is noted: "On July 21, the Border Troops of the 6th and 5th Corps occupied Czystochowa and Kalisz. The military units

intended for use in the West were soon replaced by units of the landwehr corps ... Russian troops everywhere left their permanent quarters, retreating to the Vistula. They are thoroughly destroying railways, especially they destroyed the Czystochowa railway station, they blew up the bridge over the Warta, they put out of action all the bridges on dirt roads." (Reichsarchiv. World War 1914–1918, vol. 2, p. 147). So the former commander wrote in high spirits

Reichswehr Gaye. A little later he had to cry.

Interestingly, against the 14th Cavalry Division, consisting of 24 squadrons and hundreds, 10 regiments of border guards, 8 machine guns and 6 horse guns on the left bank of the Vistula, 79 infantry battalions with artillery, 36 squadrons with 12 horse guns with a battalion of scooters were sent. As can be seen from the comparison, the forces are far from equal, which is not

expected all command instances of the Russian army from the supreme commander to the head of the 14th cavalry division inclusive.

It must be considered fortunate for the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division that he did not suspect about the forces that were moving against us. True, these were mostly landwehr troops, but they could crush them with their numbers.

Let's return to the 2nd brigade of the 14th cavalry division, located on July 21 for the night in the Kopetspol area. The brigade had 11 squadrons and hundreds of Cossacks with 8 machine guns and 6 horse guns, in addition, it had 4 mounted hundreds of border guards of the 14th brigade. Separate officer patrols conducted reconnaissance towards Mezhuvo and Januv to the west, being in contact with small German cavalry patrols.

What was being done on the Austrian frontier was unknown. We have not yet received an answer from the district headquarters about the position of Austria. The question to be decided was in which direction the 2nd Brigade of the 14th Cavalry Division should move.

According to the mobplan, the division was tasked with covering the mobilization of the assembly point in Endrzejów. In this spirit, I made a proposal to the division chief and chief of staff. The latter believed that we needed to stay in Konetspol and wait for the German offensive. While the authorities were making a decision, I asked permission to blow up the railway bridge across the Pilica River near Koniecpol. Stocks of explosives in the division were limited, but still managed to undermine one of the abutments of the bridge and bring down one span into the water. Finally, in the evening, after conversations between Novikov and Dreyer, it was decided to move to Włoszczowa, and from there to Jendrzejów. Leaving the reconnaissance units on the Pilica River, the brigade moved on the morning of July 22 to Vloshchova.

When by the evening of July 22 the headquarters of the division arrived in Endrzejow, it turned out that the military commander, when war was declared on Germany, fled to Radom with his entire apparatus, disrupting the mobilization. Was going to "evacuate" and the local administrative authorities. Having sent a report about the failure of mobilization in Endrzejów to the district headquarters, I ordered the district chief to remain where he was, on pain of being shot. The divisional headquarters in the evening sudden

hundreds of foot border guards, with whom the commander of the 15th border brigade appeared, who reported that he was withdrawing to Kielce with the whole brigade. Soon a report came from the commander of the 6th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Gatenfeld: in view of the German offensive from Czystochowa to Kielce, Konskie, he considers his situation critical.

The story was

repeated with the county chief of the Endzheyuvsky point, who fled to Radom because of some rumors about the German offensive. Now the commander of the 6th Infantry Regiment had exposed the Austrian border for 90 versts and was ready to flee from Kielce himself. I had to take emergency measures. Reconnaissance was sent to the front of Pshedbuzh, Koniecpol from the brigade's cavalry units, in addition, a car with an officer, five armed soldiers was sent to Pshedbuzh with the task of driving until it collides with the enemy.

On July 23, the 2nd brigade with border guards, having made a 37-verst crossing, settled down for the night to the west of Kielce, covering the city. The confused and pale commander of the 6th Infantry Regiment appeared sadly at the division headquarters. He received a good scolding from Dreyer for exposing the Austrian frontier. The 6th Infantry Regiment was completing its mobilization and on the morning of July 24 could march on Radom, which it was ordered to do. In order not to leave Kielce and at the same time to cover the withdrawal of the 6th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Brigade of the 14th Division on July 24 had to remain on the daylight west of

Kielce. Finding that in wartime conditions a beard is a luxury, I went to the hairdresser's, from which in half an hour I came out already a "young" man. None of the division officers, including Novikov, recognized me. On the morning of July 24, the

6th Rifle Regiment with four hundred foot guards of the 15th Brigade set out along the highway to Radom. On the same day, an order was sent to the commander of the 14th Lancers Regiment to begin withdrawing from Sandomierz along the left bank of the Vistula to the north of two hundreds of foot border guards of the 16th brigade to the garrison of the Ivan Gorod fortress. On the same day, a Cossack hundred arrived from near Seradz. Now the 2nd brigade consisted of 12 squadrons and hundreds, 8 mounted hundreds of border guards, 8 machine guns and 6 mounted guns

On July 24, in Cologne, an answer was received from the district headquarters: Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia that day. Now the situation was quite clear.

To cover the march of the 6th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Brigade of the 14th Division on July 25 moved to the town of Sukhednev, making 40 miles along the highway northeast of Kielce. The sent intelligence did not confirm the rumors about the German advance from Czÿstochowa to the east: there was no one in Przedbuzh, and the advanced units of the Germans were located across the Pilica River to the west of Wÿoszczowa. Now the direction from Opatuv to Ilzha became more dangerous, so the 2nd brigade of the 14th division on July 26 moved to the village of Brody (southeast of Sukhednev), making 35 miles and covering the direction from the south to Radom through Ilzha.

A lieutenant of the 3rd Cavalry Division of the Austrians, taken prisoner by our officers' detachment, showed that the 1st Austrian infantry was advancing directly along the right bank of the Vistula. The lieutenant knew the theater of operations on the right bank of the Vistula well and did not highly appreciate the defense capability of Ivangorod. Compared to our cornets (lieutenants), this very young officer gave the impression of a more literate person in military affairs. The merry fellow, having drunk vodka with the liaison officers, soon forgot that he had been taken prisoner, and sincerely asked for his blunt saber to be returned to him after the war. His testimony differed from the scheme of deployment of the Austrian armies available at headquarters, where instead of the 3rd Cavalry Division, the 2nd Cavalry Division was shown, and there were no infantry units along the right bank of the Vistula. An even greater doubt in me was aroused by an intelligence report about the concentration of an entire Austrian corps in the area of Zhabno, Debica. I took out the schematic, checked myself again, and then hesitated for two hours whether or not to report it to the corps. It was quite clear what responsibility I was taking on by reporting a change in strategic deployment. Therefore, having decided nevertheless to report on the concentration of the corps in the Zhabno, Debica area, I also expressed my assumption that this, apparently, was the 1st or 5th corps. In 1930, in the archives in the files of the 4th corps, I saw the intelligence report of the corps with this report.

The task of covering the mobilization and withdrawal of units of the 2nd Infantry Brigade to the right bank of the Vistula, the command of the 14th Cavalry

divisions could be considered completed, with the exception of the disruption of the work of the Endzheyuvsky assembly point.

On the left bank of the Vistula, only one 7th cavalry division operated from the side of the Austrians, which did not advance further than Mezhuv with its main forces. Being in Ostrovets, the 14th Russian cavalry division stood in the direct path of the offensive of this division.

What should be noted from the enemy? This is a firm control of their units, while the 14th Cavalry Division was not only not led, but it was not even oriented in what was being done on the right bank of the Vistula. Neither the headquarters of the district, nor the headquarters of the 14th corps made themselves felt ...

14th CAVALRY DIVISION DURING THE CONCENTRATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES

By the evening of July 28, the 14th Cavalry Division, without the 14th Dragoon Regiment, but with ten hundred border guards, remained alone on the left bank of the Vistula, south of the mouth of the Pilica. She conducted reconnaissance on a 150-kilometer front, without having at her disposal not a single plane.

Continuing to consider itself subordinate to the headquarters of the 14th Army Corps, the division headquarters still continued to send telegraph reports to him in Lublin. For the modern reader, the conditions of control and the means for this that existed in the division will not be clear. The division headquarters had at its disposal a cavalry sapper team, which had both communications equipment (telephones, Morse devices) and subversive equipment. The division, of course, did not have radio communications. With mobile operations, it was out of the question to deploy wired telephone communications with a limited amount of wire. The experience of including low-power Morse divisional apparatuses in the government network gave the most negative results. It was necessary to look for a way out of the situation. First of all, under pain of wartime trial, it was confirmed to all government telegraph stations, large and small, that they had no right to remove the apparatus without the permission of the divisional headquarters, with the exception of a clear threat of their capture. All patrols and reconnaissance squadrons were ordered to base on this network. In addition, the division headquarters took an ordinary Morse government apparatus, which he carried with him in a car and could be plugged into any government wire anywhere. Then, usually, to collect reports, a collection point for reports was thrown forward, connected with the headquarters of the division by the available four motorcycles, cars and ordinary equestrian flying mail. Communication with the regiments was maintained by the officers required of them to communicate with five

messengers. In addition, the headquarters had with them the so-called officer combat patrols for short reconnaissance. When leaving Czeszochowa, the headquarters requisitioned up to six cars.

That's all the controls of the division headquarters. Officers for communications were also attracted by me to write orders for parts of the division under my dictation. In addition, I had a gig with operational affairs and two senior clerks. Heavy typewriters were discarded—everything was handwritten on letterhead. I had to keep a combat log. At first I led it and even wrote everything down in ink. Then the combat events were so captivating that I abandoned the magazine. Decided to fight rather than write history. For the reconnaissance squadrons and individual officer patrols sent by the division headquarters, I wrote a written instruction for each and called the squadron commanders and the chiefs of the patrols to explain the task to them. At the end of the reconnaissance, the commanders of the reconnaissance squadrons and the

chiefs of the patrols came to me and had to personally report on the work carried out.

It was bad with the domestic side at the headquarters. We didn't have a canteen, everyone hunted for food for themselves. They ordered lunch in taverns, and mostly sat on bread and

canned food. A new divisional doctor arrived in the division, who advised us not to eat too much in the morning, since if we were wounded in the stomach, there could be peritonitis. Foolishly, at first we really abstained from the morning meal, but then, since every day and hour it was possible to be injured or even killed, we decided not to follow the doctor's advice.

There was no cash box at the headquarters of the division according to the state, but there was state money. I had to divide them between the division chief, the chief of staff and me and carry them in my pockets. I kept the ciphers in my saddlebag. In a word, with the modern organization of office work, we had a disorder at the headquarters of the division, but it was not up to that then: there was an enemy nearby, and quite a strong one. By the evening of July

28, the situation for the headquarters of the division was drawn as follows: the agents established that Mezhuw and Endzheyuw were occupied by detachments of three types of troops; the concentration of the army corps in the Zhabyu, Debica area and the crossing of its advanced units indicated the possibility

his advance towards Kielce; the concentration of up to a division of cavalry at Rakhuv and Laguva also had, apparently, the goal of advancing on Kielce; finally, from Czestochowa, the German offensive paths led either through Wloszczowa on Kielce, or to the north on Konska, Skarzysko.

From all of the above, it followed that the Kielce, Skarzhisko region was the central one, through which the best offensive routes to Ivangorod passed. Therefore, after a

meeting at the headquarters of the division, it was decided again located in the area southwest of Suchedniuv.

On July 29, having left a reconnaissance squadron from the lancers regiment in Opatow, the division, having traveled 50 kilometers, settled down to the south-west of

Sukhedniuv. On July 31, a telegram was received from Ivangorod from the commander of the 14th Dragoon Regiment, Colonel Senchi, that he, having withdrawn from Kalisz and Lodz with the 1st Infantry Brigade, plunged into trains and follows the railroad through Ivangorod to join the division. Finally, the whole division gathered.

Until August 1, intelligence did not provide new data on the discovered area Rakhuv, Lagow enemy cavalry. But to

At 12 noon on August 1, the desired information was received: on July 30, an agent in Mohog discovered units of the 7th Austrian Cavalry Division with artillery settled down to rest. On the morning of July 31, the enemy cavalry moved east, apparently to Pinczow, where the cavalry from the yagów region, consisting of the 10th and 12th dragoon regiments of the same division, manned by Czechs and Germans, also pulled up.

To check the data on the concentration of the enemy cavalry in Pinchuv, a reconnaissance squadron of Yesaul Bykadorov was sent there through Moravice. On the night of August 2, both the hundred and the agent confirmed that the vanguard of the Austrian cavalry division was occupying Kie, having a sentry guard to the north of this place, while the main forces of the division were concentrated in Pinchuv.

By the morning of August 2, the 14th Cavalry Division, although reinforced by poorly trained border guards, was inferior in strength to the enemy, especially in artillery, but on August 2 the 14th Dragoon Regiment was supposed to arrive, and then its forces would almost be equal to the Austrian. The division was entrusted with the task of conducting reconnaissance, but, v

on the other hand, it was supposed to impede the reconnaissance of the enemy, and therefore it was decided on August 2 to give the 7th Austrian cavalry division a battle near Kielce, first defensive on the heights north of Kielce, and then, with the addition of the 14th Dragoon Regiment, go on a counterattack. The area south of the village of Szydlovets was an open plain on which Kielce was located. By the evening of August 1, the hussars in the area of the village of Belogon replaced the ulans. By 8 a.m. on August 2, the division headquarters became aware that the Austrian 7th cavalry division was moving from Pinchuv along the highway to Kielce, and from 6 a.m. its vanguard had pushed a hundred reconnaissance Cossacks near the village of Moravice. The last volley forced the enemy's vanguard to start deploying for battle, but ... the Cossacks were no longer there. Quickly retreating two miles along the highway, Bykadorov set up an ambush from the flank in the forest, and as soon as the Austrian vanguard approached the distance of long-range rifle fire, he again met him with volleys, forcing him to deploy to the flank. While the enemy was doing this, Bykadorov was already far ahead, now occupying a position from the front to meet the Austrians. With such a maneuver for twelve kilometers, the reconnaissance hundred delayed the movement of the enemy cavalry for six hours, and its advanced units appeared on the southern outskirts of Kielce only by 12 noon.

By this time, units of the 14th Cavalry Division occupied a position north of the city along the Piaski-Shydlovets line. In the center, from the highway to Skarzysko and further east, there were ten mixed hundreds of border guards, with artillery with its four guns taking up an open position (according to the traditions of peacetime horse artillery), and two guns located in the forward line with the aim of shelling the exits from the city. To secure the right flank, the hussar regiment, leaving a squadron near Korchuvka, retreated to the village of Pyaski by 10 o'clock in the morning. The head of the 14th division decided to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy cavalry with a blow to the flank, for which the 14th uhlan regiment was located behind the flank of the dismounted border guards. A Cossack regiment, which was in reserve south of the village of Dombrowi, approached him at the right time, and the squadrons of the 14th Dragoon

shelf.

Such were the measures taken by the division headquarters in preparation for the first battle with regular enemy units.

The first battle for each serviceman in particular and for the unit as a whole is a great event in life and predetermines further behavior for a certain period in the course of the war. Therefore, there was a tense situation throughout the division. The division headquarters was located behind the center of the dismounted units right there, in the village of Shidlovets. Telephone communication was established with all shelves and a battery at the nearest height. At about 12 noon, battery observers

discovered that a large column of enemy cavalry was approaching the northern edge of the forest. The senior officer on the battery, out of peacetime habit, asked if it was possible to open fire. He received permission, and the battery fired at the head of the column with rapid fire at the maximum sight. Unexpectedly coming under artillery fire, the Austrian cavalry hid in the forest. Subsequently, through the captured officers of this division, it turned out that the head of the division, General Korpi, was immediately wounded. In less than 20 minutes, at least three enemy batteries fell on the batteries and the heights occupied by

dismounted units. The four guns standing in an open position immediately ceased fire. Only the relatively harmless firing of the Austrian artillery made it possible to roll the battery without great losses and take a closed position. At about 4 p.m., approximately before a company of enemy scooters with a platoon of dragoons, they drove through the city and headed for the heights near the village of Shidlovets.

They were ordered to bring them into machine-gun range. When the entire company of scooters left Kielce and approached 100 meters to the occupied position, two guns and four machine guns opened fire on it. The whole company, leaving their bicycles, losing their dead and wounded, fled to the city.

The enemy artillery again brought down the fire of three batteries on positions of the 14th division, but the cavalry did not reach the plain.

Expecting to meet the Austrians with a counterattack, the 14th Cavalry Division, waiting for the approach of the 14th Dragoon Regiment, also did not want to go under the destructive artillery fire of the enemy. By the evening of August 2, the artillery duel had ceased.

The 14th Dragoon Regiment was fully concentrated. With the onset of darkness, the units remained in their places, pulling up kitchens and wagons with grain fodder. At the front, close reconnaissance was carried out, and on the heights near Shidlovets, small searchlights were set up, which were available in the regiments of the division and found their use for the first and last time.

At dawn, it was decided to attack the Austrians from the east with the 1st brigade, leaving behind it the Cossacks. After a tiring day, the division headquarters settled down to rest in the village of Dębrowka. The governor of Keltsevo arrived there and demanded a meeting with the chief of staff. Dreyer sent me to find out what he needed. This naive official asked if he could now return to Kielce. What was the answer? I advised him to wait until dawn, watch the battle if he wished, and then decide on the solemn entry into Kielce. Of course, he refused all this and preferred to go back to Radom. Early in the morning, the division headquarters again moved to the village of Shidlovets. A thick fog

still hung over the battlefield. Two squadrons of lancers and dragoons, sent forward to the east of Kielce, started a skirmish with enemy patrols, but their main forces were no longer found. The captured prisoners testified that the division withdrew to the south at night. Thus, the first clash of two cavalry divisions, which had been standing on the border against each other for decades in peacetime, ended with a firefight. The reason for the withdrawal of the 7th Austrian division remained unclear. The 7th division was followed by enemy infantry. It was necessary to block her way on the line Ilzha, Solets.

Therefore, they decided, leaving one squadron in the Kielce region, to move the main forces on August 3 to Ilzha. By the evening of August 3, the division settled down for the night in the Ilzhi area. The first battle of the 14th division, although it did not give the desired results, served as a good school for

her. The regiments spent the whole day under fire from three batteries, suffering negligible losses. In other words, the division was shelled. Concerning the command of the 23rd cavalry battery, conclusions had to be drawn. Lieutenant Colonel Artsishevsky, the battery commander, knew neither artillery tactics nor shooting. He was offered to supply artillery, and the battery was entrusted to a senior officer.

From the squadron of lancers left in Opatow on August 3, information was received that the infantry from Sandomierz was slowly moving along the left bank of the Vistula to the north and had not yet reached Zawichost. It seemed possible to meet the Austrian infantry not on the line of Ilzha, Solets, but much to the south, so on August 4, the 14th division descended south to the Ozharuv area. As soon as the close patrols of the division reached Ozaruw, the Austrian infantry again withdrew to the Sandomierz

tete-de-pon. Being in the main direction of a possible enemy infantry offensive near Ozharuv, the division could not move further south, having enemy patrols on its flank and some units that occupied Sandomierz. It was impossible to give up Ivan-Gorod, so the 14th Cavalry Division in two marches - on August 5 and 6 - concentrated south of Zvolen and conducted reconnaissance at the front of Shidlovets, Skarzhysko, Ostrovets, Sandomierz, stretching about 100 miles.

THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE OF GALICIA[16]

More than two weeks have passed since the declaration of war. The 14th Cavalry Division carried out the combat mission assigned to it back in peacetime by the Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Military District: it conducted reconnaissance of the enemy advancing along the left bank of the Vistula River and covered the approaches to Ivan-Gorod, which was hastily fortified. Let's dwell a little on the command of the division. The head of the division, General Novikov, was essentially the chief of the division and had no intention of holding control of the units in firm hands. He was glad to transfer these functions to the more active, and, moreover, with a certain degree of impudence, the chief of staff of the division, Colonel Dreyer. Novikov himself always agreed with the proposals of his chief of staff, and in difficult times he only kept silent and sighed. Novikov was especially silent when it came to a collision with the enemy or in anticipation of one. But on the other hand, when the columns of the division went to sleep, the "cavalry" heart of the general spoke, and he shouted at the soldiers, completely unaware that these soldiers had made a 45-kilometer transition, and those of them who were still in reconnaissance or patrols, sat in the saddle for almost a full day. In such cases, I, fearing not to restrain myself, always left for the tail of the division headquarters column, so as not to listen to Novikov's shouts when "putting things in order". Novikov took little interest in the situation and even gave his maps to the heads of the sidings. When I reported that the stock of maps at headquarters was limited, Novikov looked at me in surprise and said: "Well, please tell me, what do I need maps for when I have two officers of the General Staff!" Now, perhaps to the reader this will seem like an anecdote, but meanwhile it is a

fact. The leadership of the fighting was actually in the hands of the division headquarters. Usually, when he came to the lodging for the night, Dreyer came into my room, and we discussed what to do the next day. Then he went to Novikov to report to him about the decision, and I sat down

write an order, giving a preliminary order on the time of the performance of the regiments of the division. When I brought an order to Novikov, he usually signed it without reading it. The intelligence organization lay entirely on me.

During the fighting, Dreyer went forward to the troops, taking with him part of the orderlies, and I stayed with Novikov and received reports from the regiments, which had to be given instructions. But after the first battle, I began to travel with Dreyer, since, in fact, it was from there that it was necessary to give orders on behalf of the head of the division. The latter remained at the command post.

Of the brigade commanders, Colonel Sencha was the most trained and able to act independently. As for the commander of the 2nd brigade, Colonel Dabich, he was weak in tactics, so the division headquarters had to always be with this brigade in order to eliminate all friction in time. The commander of the border brigade, Colonel Balaban, was also a poorly trained commander, but since the border guards were attached to one or the other cavalry brigade, the importance of Balaban was reduced more to the role of an administrator,

than tactics.

From the very beginning of the war, as soon as the division assembled as a whole, it never went in one marching column, but, as a rule, moved in two columns, between which, depending on the situation, the 23rd cavalry battery was divided, and the brigades were attached to two or four guns. From July 21 to August 6, inclusive, the division traveled about 480 kilometers, which, on average, without day trips gives 28 kilometers a day. The condition of the personnel was good, the soldiers and officers were drawn into camp life. The contentment of the horse staff went smoothly at the expense of local funds, and the horses were in strong bodies, having lost excess fat in peacetime. The blood and half-blood horses of the officers, despite the field conditions, served well.

By the evening of August 6, at the headquarters of the 14th division, there was information only from their reconnaissance units that the enemy was pushing them from Opatuv to Ostrovets and occupied Skarzysko with horse units. Suddenly, through the telegraph station in Radom, the division headquarters began to receive reports from the 5th cavalry division, which was located north of Nowe Miasto and reported on the German offensive from Sieradz and Czestochowa to the east, passing

who were approaching Piotrkow and Konsk. The complete silence of the headquarters of the 14th corps in Lublin, to which the 14th cavalry division considered itself subordinate, forced the chief of staff Dreyer to leave by car through Ivan-gorod to Lublin. On August 7, even before Colonel Dreyer returned to divisional headquarters, two telegrams were received indicating the combat mission of the 14th division. The first telegram from the commander of the 14th Corps spoke about the transition on August 10 of the 4th Russian Army to the offensive and about the task assigned to the 14th Cavalry Division in connection with this to ensure the right flank of the army on the left bank of the Vistula and about crossing to the right bank of the Vistula in the Sandomierz, Baranow sector for joint operations with the 13th Cavalry Division.

The second telegram from the commander of the 14th Corps reported on the clash between units of the 13th Cavalry Division and the 18th Infantry Division with enemy infantry near Krasnik, as a result of which the Austrians, having suffered significant losses, retreated. It was noted that enemy artillery fired high gaps. All this was not new for the 14th division, which experienced such artillery fire on August 2 near Kielce. Finally, the head of the 13th cavalry division, General Tumanov, welcomed the neighboring 14th division with the common task of completing the infantry attack with a dashing raid across the San River. All the telegrams were transmitted to Radom without a cipher and, of course, caused a sensation first among the telegraph operators, and then among the visitors of one of the restaurants, from where one of the communications officers of the headquarters received this information, having met at dinner a Pole he knew - a landowner. One can be surprised at the simplicity of the manners of the headquarters of the 14th Corps, but what can you do, such were the customs in the old Russian army! Another thing was doubtful: in the presence of the headquarters of the 4th Army in Lublin, the order was received from the headquarters of the 14th Corps - to whom is the division subordinate? There was nothing to be surprised at, because the army headquarters was formed from the "rear" Kazan district, where the officers of the General Staff served for their own pleasure, and not for business. It is a shame, of course, for such an army chief of staff as Gutor to forget that a whole division is subordinate to him, and, moreover, the only one, on the left bank of the Vistula. However, Gutor, as having not justified himself in the post of chief of staff of the army, was soon removed.

Tasks were determined by the purpose of the offensive to the south, crossing the Vistula. But what about the west, where the Germans were advancing? How to transport the division across the Vistula? It would seem that the transfer of 4,000 horses across such a river, even higher than Sandomierz, was not an easy operation and required crossing facilities. This should have been well known to both the headquarters of the corps and the

headquarters of the army, but no one thought about it. On the night of August 8, Colonel Dreyer returned to the division headquarters, and it became known that the 4th and 5th Russian armies were deployed on the right bank of the Vistula, that the 4th army consisted of the 14th, 16th and grenadier corps, 13th and 14th Cavalry Divisions, 3rd Don Cossack Division and the Separate Guards Cavalry Brigade. Dreyer confirmed the mission of the 14th Cavalry Division received through the corps. He also said that the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment with two batteries of the 18th Artillery Brigade was subordinate to the division. Parts of the 14th Cavalry Division had not seen their infantry since July 20, and therefore, with undisguised pleasure, looked at the approach of the Tula. Due to the illness of the commander of the 72nd Infantry Regiment, his assistant for the combat unit commanded - tall, elderly, calm colonel.

So, on August 18, a great battle was to begin, which later in history it was called the Battle of Galicia.

How was the situation at the front of the 14th division by this time? Telegrams from the head of the 5th Cavalry Division reported that the Germans were continuing their movement eastward and on August 9, Piotrkow was occupied by three regiments of cavalry and up to a brigade of infantry, the advanced patrols of the Germans were on the line of Nowe Miasto, Opoczno, Przysucha. The reconnaissance of the 14th Cavalry Division had not yet come into contact with the German patrols. Obviously, in connection with their advance, the Austrian cavalry also became active, striving to get in touch with the Germans. On August 9, up to the Austrian cavalry regiment, the reconnaissance squadron of the 14th division from Ilzha was pushed back, which retreated north to Nedarchev and found out the location of the main forces, apparently, the 7th cavalry division of the Austrians. In the south, the Austrian infantry offensive developed slowly, and its units were found only in the Opatow region and north of Sandomierz. The task assigned to the division required, on the one hand, an energetic

moving south in the direction of Sandomierz, crossing the right bank of the Vistula to the west of this point and hitting the flank of the Austrian army, which was delayed beyond the San River. On the other hand, the task fell on the division to secure the flank of the army on the left bank of the Vistula from the west. In reality, on the left bank of the Vistula, the 14th cavalry division, when moving south, would have on its flank the entire 7th cavalry division of the Austrians, located on August 9 only 25 versts from the path of movement of the 14th division.

The Germans were still far away, but clearing their flank to the west of the Austrian cavalry for the 14th division was necessary. Thus, the initial strike against the 7th Austrian cavalry division was necessary for the 14th Russian cavalry division to ensure its operations in the south. So it was decided on August 10th. However, it was necessary to think about covering

such a point as Radom from the west from the raids of the German cavalry, which was only 35 miles to the west. To accomplish this task, a detachment consisting of one battalion of the 72nd Infantry Regiment and one hundred border guards was sent to Radom on the morning of August 10. Radom still continued to live a normal life, the administration was in place. The battalion commander was supposed to send reports to the master's court of Sytsyn by telegraph through Zvoleyav. By the evening of August 9, the

reconnaissance squadron of dragoons noticed only in general terms the guarding of the Austrian cavalry along the line of Valentynov, Vulka-Mazyarska and further along the Ilzhanka River; behind the squadron were the main forces of the Austrians. Without waiting for the results of further reconnaissance, the headquarters of the 14th division decided to make up for them with a surprise attack. The swampy valley of the Ilzhanka River contributed to the defense of the enemy, and, moreover, from experience near Kielce, the headquarters of the 14th division already knew that the modern battle of two cavalry divisions did not develop as quickly as it seemed in peacetime. Meanwhile, it was necessary to finish off the 7th Austrian Cavalry Division in order to quickly turn to solving the main tasks in the south. Therefore, the 72nd Infantry Regiment, consisting of three battalions with artillery, was also involved in the attack of the 7th division. However, waiting for the approach of the infantry would enable the enemy either to fortify itself more strongly a

to retreat. Either one or the other was not in the interests of the 14th division. Therefore, it was decided, suddenly starting a battle with horse units, to wait for the approach of the 72nd Infantry Regiment, directing it in the most important direction. At four o'clock in the morning

on August 10, the 14th Cavalry Division, in two columns, brigade-by-brigade, set out from its area of location and moved to the south-west to attack the enemy. At the same time, the 72nd Infantry Regiment with two field batteries moved from Tsepelyuv in the general direction to the city of Ilzha, approaching it from the east. Given the inaccessibility of the Ilzhanka River east of the city, the 1st brigade of the 14th division was sent there, which would later be supported by the 72nd infantry regiment. The 2nd brigade, with nine hundred border guards, had the task of attacking the enemy's security center from the village of Khvalovyce to Malene and Jedlyanka and breaking through its defenses.

At nine o'clock in the morning, the 2nd brigade with border guards occupied Khvalovyce, and the 1st brigade - Pilatka. Moving west from Pilatka, the dismounted units of the 1st brigade approached Ilzha from the east. After the occupation of the 2nd brigade of Khvalovyce, the border guards, without waiting for the opening of fire by the 23rd cavalry battery, carried away by their commanders, rushed to the crossing over the Ilzhanka near the village of Malene. Met by rifle fire, they were forced to dismount and, reinforced by one squadron of hussars, advanced on foot. Having quickly dealt with the enemy, who had settled in Malena, and captured the crossing, the border guards, already on the western bank of the Ilzhanka, continued their offensive against the Krzyzanowice manor. Here the Austrians, having settled in stone sheds and a house, put up stubborn resistance. Meanwhile, the 2nd brigade with the 23rd cavalry battery advanced to the crossing near the village of Yedlyanka. The crossing was bad and delayed the movement of the Cossacks, who were marching at the head of the brigade (especially the 23rd cavalry battery). However, with the crossing at Yedlyanka, the 14th Don Cossack Regiment, leaving one fifty Cossacks in cover at the battery, rushed to the Krzyzanowice manor's yard to assist the border guards. The 23rd Cavalry Battery took up a position north of Hill 203.4[17], preparing to open fire. Hussars also got involved in the battle for Krzyzanowice.

By 9.30, when the headquarters of our cavalry division arrived at a height of 203.4, he already found all the units of the 2nd brigade deployed; at the brigade commander

not a single squadron remained in reserve. It became clear that only advanced units were fighting, and the main forces of the Austrians had not yet been drawn into it. The commander of the 1st brigade was ordered to send the 14th uhlan regiment here, and with the approach of the Tula people, follow to Yedlyanka with the 14th dragoon

regiment. By the time the order was received, Colonel Sencha with units of the 1st brigade, having taken a height of 246.3, continued the attack on Ilzha. The lancers withdrew to the horse-breeders and moved at a

trot to Yedlyanka ... When Dreyer and I returned to the division headquarters, we found the 14th lancers regiment that had already arrived. The 14th Dragoon Regiment was crossing at Yedlyanka. The master's court Krzyzanowice was taken, the border guards and the Cossacks attacked the village of Krzyzanowice.

By one o'clock in the afternoon, the 1st brigade was behind the height of 227.0, to the east of it, ready to attack. The horses of the squadron commanders were excited, and the dragoons and lancers, who got up early in the morning, sitting on horseback, bent over their manes, quietly dozing, waiting for the command to attack and not paying attention to the shells flying over their heads. The division headquarters stood at a height of 227.0 and could not see where the enemy was retreating. The combat patrols sent forward have not yet returned. The 23rd cavalry battery, east of Starosedlice, dismounted and fired at the enemy convoy moving far to the west.

The 7th Austrian division, obviously, did not want to accept the battle and, having lost up to three squadrons killed, wounded and captured, withdrew into the forests in a southerly direction to Vezhbnik (Starachovice). The report received from the commander of the hussar regiment confirmed this. The Tilians occupied Ilzha and went out to the west of it. Having sent two squadrons of lancers to the south from Ilzha for pursuit, the head of the division decided to interrupt the battle, since it was necessary to go east to complete the main task - to attack the enemy infantry advancing north of Sandomierz. The day of August 10, although the 14th Cavalry Division did not bring decisive success, but the fairly battered 7th Austrian Cavalry Division was no longer capable of bold and active actions. Having ordered the cavalry units of the division to occupy the surrounding villages, and the 72nd

Infantry Regiment - Ilzha, posting outposts to the south, the division headquarters went to Ilzha.

It was necessary to think about a further plan of action, or rather, about concretizing it. In a telegram to the head of the 5th cavalry division, so far only the German cavalry units were advancing. The reconnaissance of our hundred border guards has not yet come into contact with the enemy cavalry units west of Radom. In the south, our reconnaissance squadron was pushed from Ostrovets to Tarnow, and then had to withdraw under pressure from the Austrian infantry units north of the Kamenna River. Thus, in the west, nothing serious has yet threatened. In the south, along the Vistula, from Sandomierz, the enemy infantry advanced in exactly the direction in which the 14th division was supposed to operate in the south. It was necessary to stop the advance of the enemy infantry, and then try to break it or push it back. This formed the basis of the decision. On August 11, the division, together with the Tultsy, moved to the Janur Selecki area, Lipsko, preparing to strike the enemy infantry across

the Kamenna River in the morning. The Austrian infantry, apparently, was going to cross to the right bank of the Vistula and hit the flank of the 4th Russian army. We had no information about the position of this army either from the headquarters of the army, or from the headquarters of the corps, or from our patrol, sent on August 4 to the headquarters of the 13th cavalry division. It was decided on August 12 to start the battle first with the cavalry, and then throw the infantry that came up in the direction that would be revealed as the most important.

At six o'clock in the morning on August 12, the 14th division moved in three columns to the mouth of the Kamenna River: on the right, the 2nd brigade and border guards with the 23rd cavalry battery, on the left, the 1st brigade with the 4th field battery. The 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment with the 5th Battery followed through Dzyurkow on Sadkowice for a decisive attack along the Vistula at the point of a probable crossing at Jozefow. The head battalion of the regiment, for faster support of the dismounted units of the 1st brigade, was put on carts, and the numbers of the 4th field battery were placed on limbers, charging boxes and gun carriages. A squadron of lancers was sent to Senno to secure the right flank of the division. The close cavalry reconnaissance of the division, which quickly came into contact with the enemy, confirmed all previously available data, both about the location of the enemy and about the terrain. The left flank of the Austrian infantry was determined in the area of the villages of Zembozhin, Koscielny. By nine o'clock

divisions, passing the line Maruszow, Slushchin, continued to move: the 1st brigade to the village of Pavlovska-Wola and the 2nd brigade to the village of Zembozhny. Having deployed behind the height of 202.0, units of the 2nd brigade and border guards on foot, with the support of the 23rd cavalry battery, which took up a position behind the height of 174.3, launched an attack on Chekazhevice and Zembozhin. By this time, with excellent fire support from the 4th field battery (8 guns), the dismounted units of the 1st brigade were already fighting for the village of Pavlovska-Vola and the crossings across the Kamenna River. Having quickly driven back the Austrians and captured the crossings, the lancers and dragoons continued their advance on the enemy's main position. However, the attack was slowed down by open terrain and heavy enemy fire. The dismounted units had to gain a foothold, because the enemy

brought reserves into action. With impatience the headquarters of the division was waiting for the approach from Sadkovice of the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment with a battery. At about 12 o'clock in the afternoon, his head battalion arrived on carts to Pavlovitsa and immediately received orders to support the attack of the 1st brigade. Quickly turning around, the Tilians unceasingly launched an offensive through the village of Pavlovska-Vola to the main position of the enemy. With the approach of the Tilians, units of the 1st brigade resumed the attack, heading for the villages of Tsishptsia and Pshevozova. With the assistance of the fire of the 23rd battery, the 2nd brigade and border guards, repulsing the outposts, occupied the villages of Chekazhevice and Zembozhin, crossed the Kamenna River, developing an offensive against the village of Janow. The energetic attack of the head battalion of the Tuls and the coverage of the Austrians from both flanks forced them to quickly begin a retreat to the south, before the approaching two battalions of the 72nd Infantry Regiment were brought into battle. Having forced the enemy to leave Tarnów, parts of the 14th Cavalry Division

stopped, and only small cavalry units were sent to pursue south. During the day of the battle, reports were received at the division headquarters: 1) from the guard squadron of the lancer at Senno, who at about 12 o'clock in the afternoon, with a dashing attack on horseback, overturned the squadron of the 7th cavalry division near Astravets and captured an officer, commander and 10 soldiers; 2) from the officer's patrol - about the movement to the enemy infantry division on Ilzha from the northwest; 3) from the sidings in the Radom area

the head of the 5th cavalry division, which, near Nowe Miasto, defeated up to a regiment of enemy cavalry, supported by scooters. From Vezhbitse and Ilzha it was not far to Ivangorod. Any movement to the

south of the 14th Cavalry Division completely exposed the direction to Ivangorod. What was going on on the right bank of the Vistula was a mystery. I had to decide the question: either go south, or return to Ivangorod. I was fascinated by the desire to use the success of the first battle near Tarnow. The division headquarters, not without internal hesitation, decided to lead our units to the former area (Zvolen) and cover the approaches to Ivangorod. To make such a decision meant to abandon the offensive goal set by the army. But we didn't see any other way. This decision was made by the head of the division.

By midnight on August 12, the cavalry units of our division were already in the Zvolen, Sytsyn area. They captured 50 Austrians, and they themselves lost 15 soldiers killed and wounded in the battle near Tarnow, the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment withdrew to the Lipsko region by the evening of August 12, and on August 13 moved to Tsepelyuv. In the Tarnow region, a reconnaissance squad of the 14th Don Cossack
shelf.

So, the attack on Sandomierz was postponed. The problem was solved how to cover the approaches to Ivangorod, which the Germans wanted to capture.

Let's see what happened in the units and headquarters of the enemy. On August 7, the army group of General Kummer remained on a wide front (from Endzheyuv to Stopnitsa). The 7th Division advanced from Opatow to the north to monitor the highway from Ivangorod to Radom (Konrad did not rule out the possibility of a Russian offensive on Cologne). On August 7, Konrad received news of the withdrawal of the 8th German Army from the Gumbinen battle. (The battle of August 6-7, 1914 in the Gumbinen region (East Prussia) between the 1st Russian and 8th German armies. The battle ended with the defeat of four German divisions and the general withdrawal of the 8th German army deep into East Prussia. - B. Sh.) The 8th Army withdrew to the Vistula. This forced Konrad to accumulate more forces to strike in the area between the Vistula and Vepshem. To this end, on August 8, he again urged Kummer to move faster to the east. A telegram sent by Konrad to General Kummer said: early in the morning of August 8, the pilot established

the concentration of three to four infantry divisions in the area of Lublin, and the eastern lines of Lublin, Krasnystaw, Tarnow - from four to five divisions; information that part of the forces is being transferred from Krasnik to the west is unlikely; on the section of the Vistula from Zawikhost to Warsaw - no new bridges and preparations for the crossing; the army group, together with the 7th cavalry division, must reach the Annopol, Jozefow sector as quickly as possible. On the same day, Konrad ordered the 1st and 4th armies on August 9 to linger in the areas reached and conduct enhanced

reconnaissance. On August 9, around midnight, Konrad received the following request from Kummer: "The 7th Cavalry Division is today (presumably) with the main body in the Ilzhi area. The command of the Krakow Army Group asks for consent to take a general direction to Ostrovets, Senno, in order to get closer to the left German column going to Radom. At about four o'clock in the morning, Konrad answered Kummer's question: "Approaching the German southern column is of secondary importance, the main and first task is to reach the Jozefow, Annopol sector. The solution lies on the right bank. State the position and assumptions. On August 9, Konrad

gave a general directive on the transition on August 10 to the offensive of the 1st and 4th armies and the concentration of the 3rd army and the group of General Keveng in the east. At the same time, the following order was sent to Kummer by radio: On August 10, the 1st Army takes possession of the heights north of the Toszew lowland, east of the Vistula. The first task of an army group is to advance in the direction indicated to it. Contact the headquarters of the 1st Army, which is located in Nisko, through the finished bridge at Sandomierz. State and assumptions inform. Bridge facilities in Tarnobrzeg and Jadbrzez are prepared. In addition to this telegram, Konrad sent a confirming radiogram to Kummer: the advance of the German Landwehr Corps through Radom against Ivangorod and Novo-Alexandria (Pulava) is quite expedient, since it can divert significant enemy forces. For the army group, the main direction remains unchanged, advancing to the Vistula and crossing it. Sandomierz has our tête de pont (bridgehead). In his memoirs, Konrad explains that his main idea is the 1st and 4th armies, together with the Kummer group and the Woyrsch corps

attack the Russians, covering themselves against them in the east with the 3rd Army, and part of it should also participate in the offensive of the 4th Army. On August 10, Konrad again hurries Kummer on the radio with an advance to the Vistula: "The left flank of the 1st Army is today at Annopol, where the bridge will be built. The bridge near Zavikhost is ready today. Advance the maximum possible number of forces to the crossing over the Vistula in the direction of Zavikhost and Annopol, leaving the main forces of the 7th Cavalry Division and the 101st Brigade on August 10 on the left bank of the Vistula. 110th Landsturm Brigade on the left bank of the Vistula near Lyasotsyn. Kummer replied that he could only bring the 106th division to Astravets, the rest of the troops needed rest. The approach to the Vistula was impossible before August 15, the 7th Cavalry Division

was in Ilzha on August 9. The 1st Army reported its offensive on Krasnik, about pulling up the 101st Landsturm Brigade across the Mnishek to Ksenzhomozh (on the right bank of the Vistula) and the 110th Landsturm Brigade south of the Kamenna River (on the left bank of the Vistula). On August 11, Konrad learned from aerial reconnaissance that the Russians had withdrawn from Krasnik and Uzhenduv in a northeasterly direction. On the left bank of the Vistula, it is listed at Konrad, on August 9, the 7th cavalry division threw back several hundreds near Ilzha (Cossacks. - B.Sh.), but on August 10 these hundreds were reinforced and attacked the 7th cavalry division, which was supposed to withdraw on Skarzhisko-Kosypelna (to the west of Ilzha. - B.Sh.). On August 11, the 4th division of the German Landwehr was on the march from Konskie to Szydlovets.

On August 11, the Veitsekhovsky brigade of the 106th division reached Stara Slupi. Conrad regarded the successful battle of Krasnik as a good start, but believed that the main difficulties were yet to come. On August 11, Conrad ordered all armies to move forward. Kummer's army group was instructed: first of all, to cross the Vistula at Zavikhost and advance to the left of the 1st Army, entering into its subordination ... The German Landwehr Corps holds the direction of Ivangorod and provides protection from an attack from the north. At 7 pm on August 12, Kummer

reported that on that day the troops of his group should reach: the 100th brigade of the Landsturm - Jakubovitse; 95th Lands

106th Landsturm Division - with one brigade - Ostrovets, the second - Vezhbnik;

7th Cavalry Division - Wonzhotska. The

body is very tired. The German 4th Landwehr Division on August 11 was (presumably) in Shyadlovets. On August 13, Konrad received reports that, on the left bank of the Vistula, the 110th Landsturm Brigade of General Terten had been driven back south of Tarnow. On the night of August 13, Kummer's group, with part of its forces, went to support, reaching the Yakubovice-Ostrovets line.

This is how Konrad, the former chief of the general staff, describes the events. Historians from the Austrian official circles do not disagree with Konrad in their assessment of the events described, but they give a number of the following, in our opinion, interesting additions. On August 12, General Terten, commander of the 110th Landsturm Brigade, sent a report to the commander of the 1st Austrian Army. It can be seen from the report that this commander did not know that on August 12, the 110th brigade, under the influence of artillery fire from the 14th Russian cavalry division, retreated in considerable disorder to Lyasotsin ... Fortunately, the army group was already close to eliminate the consequences that could arise after this panic.

On August 10, the 7th Cavalry Division was pushed back across the Kamenna River by our 14th Cavalry Division, reinforced with infantry. Only after she received the support of the brigade of the 106th division of the Landsturm, she managed to return to the Ilzhi area again. Kummer's army group intended to make a day trip on August 13, but this intention was not realized: Kummer was frightened by the failure of the 110th Landsturm Brigade, which was unable to cross the Vistula at Zavikhost on August 13 and hurried to the area north of Lyasotsin. During the night, Kummer raised the 95th Division and a brigade of the 106th Division for the march. The 14th Russian cavalry division "happily" felt the threat of "its old enemy" - the 7th cavalry division - from the Ilzha and moved away from the mouth of the Kamenna. Only on August 14 was Kummer able to give his units a day's rest. The "old enemy" of the 14th Russian cavalry division (7th Austrian cavalry division) really planned to set up a "Sedan" of the 14th division near Ilzha. According to the historian of the landwehr corps Gaye, the 7th cavalry division believed that on August 12 there was one Russian under Ilzha

a cavalry division with an infantry brigade and artillery, which could be surrounded by the Landwehr units of Woyrsch's corps. The 4th Landwehr Division, with full readiness, hurried through Shidlovets to Ilzha to attack the Russians from the north, while the 7th Cavalry Division, reinforced by a brigade of the 106th Landsturm Division, should envelop them from the south. "So the joyful and enthusiastic Austro-Hungarian and German fighters hurried forward early in the morning of August 13 to for the first time consolidate the brotherhood in arms in joint actions against the enemy," writes Gaye in high spirits. - However, by noon on August 13, it turned out that Novikov, as had often happened, had left in time, this time to Zvolen. He was well aware that the troops of the landwehr corps were constantly in readiness for combat operations. All day and night we had to expect sudden attacks from the front - or from the flanks, or from the rear - shelling of bivouacs, shtetls or camp colonies. As soon as parts of the corps deployed in front of Novikov for battle, he quickly disappeared, and only the fires set by his Cossacks in the villages or the burning of sheaves of bread indicated the direction of his movement. When on August 13, continues Gaye, the situation near Ilzha became clear, Kummer's troops were

ordered to go to the Vistula to cross to the right bank, where the main battle with the Russians took place. The 4th division of the Landwehr went to Wierzhbitsa, where it remained for the next few days, conducting reconnaissance in the direction of the Vistula. The Austrians (7th Cavalry Division with a brigade of the 106th Landsturm Division) and the Germans believed that the 14th Cavalry Division with the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment were near Ilzha from 10 to 13 August. The Austrians and Germans had to attack the empty city: in Ilzha on August 13 there was not even a Russian officer's patrol. In the meantime, as noted above, the 14th Division forced the 110th Landwehr Brigade to retreat towards Lyasotsin. This frightened the entire Kummer army group. Gaye admitted that the 14th Cavalry Division was indeed in the Zvolen area on August 13th.

So the active actions of the 14th Cavalry Division fettered the Austrians and Germans. I must say frankly: at that time I did not imagine that one and a half infantry divisions and the entire 7th Austrian cavalry division were concentrated in Ilzha, and that on August 12

in the battle near Tarnów, the enemy delivers a strong blow to ... an empty place.

Let's return to the Landwehr Corps. His 3rd Division continued to march in two columns. On August 9, she occupied Zhgów with the left column, and Piotrków with the right. On August 10, Volbuzh was occupied. On August 11, one column was in Tomaszow, and the other in Sulejów. The convoys of the column that owned Sulejów captured the landed pilot of the guards flight detachment. He confirmed the available information about the advance of a new, 9th Russian army near Warsaw, which included the guards corps. On August 11, the corps commander, in view of a possible attack from the north, had to decide whether to turn to the northeast and first clear his left flank or go to Radom. Woish decided on the latter. The commander of the 8th Army reported that the 21st Landwehr Brigade was advancing near Wroclaw to cover the rear of the corps in the area of Piotrkow and Radomsko. Gaye writes that daily crossings had to be gradually increased to 25 versts, and until August 13 the 4th division of the Landwehr had only two days, and the 3rd division until August 17 - only three days. There were stragglers and sick people (for example, on August 14, in the 4th division of the landwehr, there were about 200 sick people for every battalion of 1,000 people). By August 13, the Landwehr division reached Gelniuv, where both of its columns joined (45 versts west of Radom), and the 4th division concentrated in the town of Wierzbitsa (20 versts southwest of Radom).

We left the 14th Cavalry Division around midnight on August 12, returning to the area of Zvolen, Sytsyn with guards posted along the Janow, Tchov-Vybranze, Kazanow line and further southeast along the Ilzhanka River to the Vistula. On August 13, it was decided to give the division a day break and wait for the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment to approach Tsepelyuv from Lipsko. On the morning of August 13, the regimental commanders were once again ordered in writing to demand from the patrols to take up battle with the enemy, to boldly attack him. It was explained to the heads of the patrols that they would be severely punished for any evasion from the battle. I have already noted that the commanders of reconnaissance squadrons and the chiefs of officer patrols came to me with a personal report after the reconnaissance. I listened to them carefully, and then demanded to confirm what was said with concrete evidence (captured enemy soldiers,

captured documents, shoulder straps of enemy soldiers, officers killed by us, etc.). If no such evidence was presented, then I explained to the heads of the patrols that it was inconvenient for me to report on their dashing intelligence, which means that they could not count on praise and awards. In this way, I achieved that without concrete evidence of the feats of deeds, the heads of the patrols and the commanders of the squadrons would no

longer appear to me. I must say that it was a sentry guard in the cavalry. Usually it was an outpost with a force of one platoon. If we take into account that some of the people of the platoon remained horsemen, then to repel the enemy at the outpost, at best, there were 15-16 rifles. Thus, the sentry guard did not have much stability. It was more a measure of moral order than a significant fire barrier. However, neither the Austrian nor the German patrols could break through such guards. This is also explained purely psychologically. If the horse patrol was met with rifle fire, then the head of the patrol in most cases decided that he had come across infantry, which was strong in fire, and it was unthinkable to attack it in horse formation. So they looked at it in the Russian, Austrian and German cavalry. I had to fight this and push my patrols forward. On the morning of August 13, I snuck in the head of the officer's section, who had appeared, for a report based on rumors from local residents about the appearance of an infantry division near Ilzha. As it became known, on August 13, one cavalry and one and a half infantry divisions concentrated there. I have not seen this officer since November 1914. Now I would most sincerely apologize to him for my insult and shake his hand with a sense of respect. Rumors were ahead of the pace of advance of the German and Austrian troops. That's why I didn't believe any rumors. Reconnaissance thrown out to the west by hundreds of mounted border guards in Radom came into contact with German horse patrols. Operational reports and officers of the 5th Cavalry Division spoke about the advance of the latter to the east, and many different numbers of regiments were given. The intelligence sent to Wierzhbitsa has not yet provided any data. The head of the officer's patrol from the Cossack regiment, who left Ozharuv on August 4, arrived through Ivangorod to the 13th cavalry division. Reporting on the situation on the right bank of the Vistula, he said that he was an eyewitness

the battle near Krasnik and the withdrawal of not only the 13th cavalry division, but also the 14th corps to Lublin. A new situation was emerging. It turned out that the 14th Division did the right thing when it retreated to the north on August 12, and did not pursue the Austrians in the south, as indicated in the task of the 4th Army. The reconnaissance hundred of Cossacks left at Tarnow reported that the Austrian infantry was again advancing from Lyasotsin to the Kamenna River and was pushing the hundred, which was forced to retreat to the northern bank of the river. The enemy is again building a bridge against Yuzefuwa. From Ivangorod, a message arrived that on the left bank of the Vistula, in the region of Ivangorod, the 8th Cavalry Division, brought here by rail from Chisinau, was located, the patrols of which were advancing to Radom. The outposts in Kazanow, due to the proximity of Vezhbina, were reinforced and consisted of two squadrons of lancers, a company of the 72nd Tula regiment and two machine guns from the 14th division (Kazanow was the junction of the best roads in this area). All day on August 13, the telephone wire of the division headquarters with Radom worked, but by the evening it was damaged. At about two o'clock in the morning on August 14, the officer on duty at the headquarters of the division woke me up and reported that one of the two motorcyclists attached to the mounted hundred of border guards in Radom had brought bad news. I ordered to bring this motorcyclist to me. A hussar entered without a cap, without a belt and without a weapon, and immediately began to say passionately: "What was there! Oh what was there! What was there!" Finally, I got tired of this chatter, and, sternly shouting at him, I ordered him to tell how he fled from Radom. The hussar immediately came to his senses and said that the battalion of the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment fled in panic to Ivangorod, and the border guards remained in Radom. When asked why he was in such a disheveled form, the motorcyclist reported that he, having abandoned the motorcycle in the dark, rode on a riding horse. After scolding him for abandoning his car and the second motorcyclist, I got up and went to report what had happened, sending an officer in the car to find out the situation there. Returning the next morning, the officer, according to the commander of hundreds of border guards, reported the following. Border patrols all day on August 13 west of Radom engaged in skirmishes with German patrols and drove them back. The governor and all the police were still in the city, but rumors were already spreading about the imminent approach of the Germans, and this alarmed the population. The battalion commander of t

city and to the east of it, take a position, and ordered the border guards to remain west of the city. Having learned about the movement of the battalion, the governor left the city, and the police followed him in carts, being ahead of the battalion column. When the police drove into the forest at nightfall, they met horse patrols coming along the sides of the road to Radom from the east. Mistaking them for the Germans, the police opened fire and shouted "Germans!" fled to the east. Their shots and shouts were also transmitted to the battalion, which panicked and also fled in the direction of Ivangorod. The border guards remained in Radom, on its western outskirts.

On August 14, our patrols ran into a German outpost to the east of Wierzbica. Thus, on August 14, at the Wolyanow front (11 km west of Radom), Wierzbica, reconnaissance of the division established the approach of Woyrsh's cavalry and infantry.

Reports were received from Ivangorod about the transition of the 8th Cavalry Division to the Zvolen area, where it arrived at about three o'clock in the

afternoon. On that day, the division headquarters was at the command post in the forest southwest of Sytsyn, and the brigades were to the north and south of this point in readiness to support the outposts. At about two o'clock in the afternoon, a cart drove up to the forest where the headquarters of the division was located, on which, in addition to the peasant driver, an officer and a non-commissioned officer were sitting. I went to the edge of the forest and asked the officer who he was. "I am an officer of the 8th Hussars Lubensky Regiment ... this is all that remains of my patrol," the arriving officer answered me with a gloomy look. When I asked him where it happened, he said that, approaching Radom on the evening of August 13 and stopping in the forest, he found himself surrounded by infantry and his entire patrol was destroyed. Realizing that the patrol was the reason for the panic of our battalion, I advised him to go to Zvolen,

where he would find his regiment and, apparently, his patrol. By the evening of August 14, the division chief and the chief of staff were summoned to the chief of the 8th cavalry division, General Zander, in Zvolen, as a senior in rank. In the evening, a telegram was received from the commandant of the Ivangorod fortress, the former commander of the 2nd brigade of the 78th infantry division, which included the 72nd Tula infantry regiment

fugitives from Radom", meaning by this the battalion of the 72nd regiment. They asked where to put them. There was no chief of division with the chief of staff, and I boldly answered the general with a telegram with my signature that the fugitives were not "ours", but "yours" (as the commander of the Tula brigade), and asked him to gather them and send them to Zvolen. By the evening of August 15, the battalion was already in Zvolen and, after a good suggestion, was sent to Ciepielów to join the regiment.

By nightfall, the head of the division and Dreyer returned from Zvolen to headquarters. They gave some news. At the direction of the Southwestern Front, the 3rd Caucasian Corps of General Irmanov, to which the 8th and 14th cavalry divisions are subordinate, should be unloaded in Ivangorod. This reinforced corps is to advance west and southwest of Radom. Until the arrival of General Irmanov, the head of the 8th cavalry division, as a senior in rank, takes command of both cavalry divisions. Once Zander commanded the 5th Cavalry Division, in which Novikov was the brigade commander. Accustomed to considering Zander as his commander, Novikov had nothing against putting the control in Zander's hands. Dreyer looked at it differently, describing Sander and his chief of staff, Colonel Odnoglazkov, rather sharply about their inability to command. Meeting both a few days later, I had to admit that Dreyer was right. Both Zander and his chief of staff were not very active and had little knowledge of cavalry tactics. They, of course, could not independently cope with the solution of problems on the left bank of the Vistula. They were afraid of the foot battle of the cavalry and all waited for the moment when it would be possible to attack in the cavalry, and since this did not occur, they preferred to remain inactive, recouping on artillery fire. The day of August 15 passed in anticipation of the approach of Woirsh's troops and reconnaissance. The number of mounted German patrols increased, but nowhere could

they penetrate the division's outpost line. A reconnaissance detachment in the south, from the Kamenna River, reported on the crossing of the Austrians at Jozefow to the right bank and on the advance of the advanced infantry units on the left bank of the Vistula to the line of Glin, Pavlowice. What was being done on the right bank of the Vistula in the region of Lublin was unclear.

So, the enemy (the Germans) was only one transition away from the outposts of the division at Kazanow. Around one o'clock on August 16, Novikov received an order from the head of the 8th Cavalry Division: with the 14th Cavalry Division and the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment, move to the Kamenna River, attack and push back the Austrians crossing to the south to the right bank of the Vistula. It was necessary to make a 37-kilometer transition to the south, and then conduct combat operations, having, as indicated above, at least a German infantry brigade in one transition. The question arose of who would cover the flanks and rear of the division during the operation in the south (the 1st Cavalry Division did not take on this task). It was decided to leave the outposts of the 14th division and the 72nd infantry regiment on the former line - Janow, Kazanow - and on August 16 to reach the Dombrovka, Wola-Soletska, Katazhnitsa area, that is, to make a transition for the infantry at 10, for cavalry 16 kilometers away, and on August 17 attack the enemy. At 3 p.m., elements of the division and the 72nd Infantry Regiment moved south and spent the night in the area indicated above. According to reconnaissance, the enemy occupied the same position across the Kamenna River as on August 12, sending only forward infantry units to the north. Leaving the same plan of action as in the first battle near Tarnow, the headquarters of our division by 10 o'clock in the evening gave all orders for the second battle. At 6 o'clock in the morning on August 17, the units moved: the 2nd brigade with border guards and the 23rd cavalry battery across Lyansko <? > on Slu<? >, the 1st brigade with the 4th field battery - on Sadkovitsa and the 72nd infantry regiment with the 5th battery - on Kolets and further on Sadkovitsa, and the battalion that fled from Radom was in the forefront (he was ordered to wash away his shame with blood).

Repelling enemy infantry reconnaissance from Sadkowice, the 1st brigade quickly occupied the village of Pavlovice and, with fire support from the 4th field battery (8 guns), dismounted units launched an attack on the village of Pavlovsk-Wola. The 2nd brigade with border guards concentrated unhindered behind the height of 202.0 and, placing a battery north of the height of 174.3, sent dismounted units to attack the villages of Zambozhny and Chekazhevice, occupied by the outposts of the enemy. Shooting down the advanced units of the Austrians and capturing the village of Pavlovsk-Wola was not as easy as in the battle of August 12. At eleven o'clock in the morning, with the support of artillery fire, the enemy himself launched a counterattack, thick lines of his infantry appeared on a height west of Pavlovsk-Wola. The enemy artillery was inferior to ours in terms of firing range. The weak dismounted units of the 1st brigade (about two infantry companies. - B.Sh.), instead of an offensive, had to go on the defensive for the time being and hold on to the captured positions until the Tula approach. The 4th field battery of the 18th brigade came to the rescue, repeatedly sweeping away the chains of the Austrians from a height with its well-aimed fire. Having occupied the villages of Chekazhevice and Zambozhin, units of the 2nd brigade fought for the crossings over the Kamenna River, but the enemy stubbornly held on to the edge of the forest south of the river.

At about 12 noon, the 5th regimental battery joined the 23rd cavalry, approaching with tulets, which began to deploy south of the village of Pavlovice. The Austrian battery, which occupied a position south of the village of Janow, decided to move to a new position, closer to the infantry units. Noticed during the move, this battery was covered by the fire of twenty-two guns, in some 15 minutes only crumpled guns, overturned charging boxes remained from it; people were seen running in all directions. In order to seize the guns, the division headquarters sent for this purpose its last cavalry reserve - two hundred Cossacks, sending them west of Chekazhevice to the rear of the Austrians. And three battalions of Tula led a decisive attack from the village of Pavlovice to Pavlovsk-Wola, which the 1st brigade of the 14th division began to cover from the left flank. Despite the strong rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire of the enemy, the attackers quickly moved forward. By 3 o'clock in the afternoon, having taken up to 30 prisoners, the Tula and the 1st brigade threw back the Austrian infantry, stubbornly

defending the Kamenna River. To delay the movement of the Cossacks on the southern bank of the Kamenna River, the Austrians brought their cavalry to the battlefield. At about two o'clock in the afternoon, a deployed cavalry regiment appeared on the crest of the height, south of Janow, which, suffering losses from artillery fire, began to descend from the height to the broken battery. Then, unable to withstand the artillery fire, the Austrian cavalry regiment, reorganized into an open formation, hid in the copses north of Tarnow. The regiment's maneuver was incomprehensible, but its appearance suggested that other cavalry units of the 7th Austrian Cavalry Division could be here. Since the command of the 14th

Cavalry Division no longer had any cavalry units in reserve, two hundred Cossacks were ordered to return from the southern bank of the Kamenna River to secure the right flank of the division, and up to two squadrons were withdrawn from the chains in order to put them on horseback.

By three o'clock in the afternoon it became clear that the enemy was putting up stubborn resistance, that his forces exceeded the strength of one infantry brigade supported by units of the 7th Cavalry Division. The main position of the enemy was located on the command heights. The battle could drag on, because the head of the 14th Cavalry Division did not have sufficient forces to build up strikes. There was no need to rely on the stubborn resistance of the 8th Cavalry Division at Zvolen, it was necessary to rely primarily on our own forces in order to cross to the right bank of the Vistula. The fires on the right bank of the Vistula convinced the army headquarters that the battle was not near Krasnik, but near Lublin. In this situation, the command of the division decided to withdraw from the battle in their area south of Zvolen. In accordance with this, having ordered the Tultsy to pick up their wounded and killed by five o'clock in the afternoon and retreat to Volya-Soletskaya, the 14th cavalry division covered the exit of the infantry from the battle until 6 o'clock in the evening, and then itself moved north to the Sytsyn area and about an hour night of August 18 was in place.

A cursory survey of prisoners (up to 30 people) gave valuable information. We learned that about two divisions of the Landsturm of the Kummer group (allegedly the 95th and 106th) were crossing to the right bank of the Vistula near Jozefow; The 13th, 15th and 31st regiments of these divisions took part in the battle near Tarnów on 17 August. The divisions have old guns and new ones.

howitzers - a total of 12-16 guns per division. The 7th Austrian Cavalry Division was also located here. The outposts of the

14th Cavalry Division repelled enemy attempts to break through the defenses with mounted reconnaissance units. The communications officer of the headquarters of our division, located at the 8th cavalry division, reported that on the morning of August 17, the 8th cavalry division moved in one column to Radom along the highway from Zvolen, and from the outskirts of the city its advanced units were met with rifle fire. Supporting these dismounted units with two dismounted squadrons, the head of the 8th cavalry division with the entire division and artillery stood idle near Radom, and then in the afternoon retreated again to the Zvolen area. Finally, the reports of the 5th Cavalry Division said that the advance of the 3rd Landwehr Division from Piotrkow to Skierniewice and Warsaw was documented. The 4th division of the Woyrsh corps moved through Radomsko, Konsk to Radom and Ivangorod.

The head of the 14th Cavalry Division did not receive any instructions from Sander, and therefore, on the night of August 18, Dreyer went to Lublin, to the headquarters of the 4th Army, in order to navigate the situation on the left bank of the Vistula. By 12 noon on August 18, the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment approached Tsepelyuv. The head of the 14th Cavalry Division was ordered to send an infantry regiment to Zvolen at the disposal of the head of the 8th Cavalry Division. By the evening of August 18, the Tulians took up positions west of Zvolen, along with the 8th Cavalry Division, preparing for the defense. What part the 14th Cavalry Division was to take in this defensive battle, General Sander did not indicate. To tell the truth, the headquarters of the division did not think about this either, believing that it would be a maneuver to hold back Woirsh's infantry. Meanwhile, at Kazanow, the outposts of the 14th division on August 18 had already repulsed the attack of the German infantry. The reconnaissance established that at Nedarchuv for the night there was up to an enemy infantry brigade with artillery.

By the night of August 18, Dreyer returned to the divisional headquarters. He informed about the fighting on the right bank; announced that all leadership of the cavalry and the 72nd Infantry Regiment was passing into the hands of the head of the 14th Cavalry Division. At about

seven o'clock in the morning on August 19, when the division was stationed north of Sytsyn, an airplane flew over it heading from the southeast to the northeast.

west. Parts of the division, seeing the first aircraft, opened fire on it with 3,000 rifles. A breathless border guard rode up from the outpost and reported that a plane had landed west of Tiun, Vybranets. After 45 minutes, a captured lieutenant pilot was delivered to the command post of the division headquarters. When asked where and where the plane was flying from, the lieutenant replied that it had taken off from Krasnik, where the 1st Army was stationed. He flew to Radom to Woish for communication. Having examined the documents of the prisoner, I did not find anything interesting in them. The orderly officers surrounded the captured lieutenant and examined his suede jacket. One of the officers, feeling the collar of the jacket, found that something was sewn up there. I took a penknife out of my pocket and silently offered it to the lieutenant. He took off his jacket, ripped open his collar, and handed me a letter from the commander of the 1st Austrian Army, General Woyrsch. The letter stated that Kummer's army group had been transferred to the right bank of the Vistula on August 16 and 17, and that for the final defeat of the Russians near Lublin, the transition of the Woyrsch corps to the right bank of the Vistula was desirable. From the 17th, the main forces of the — , and the smaller part of them Kummer Army Group in the battle near Opole [18] on the left bank of the Vistula River on August 17 were attacked by the Russians (probably the 14th Cavalry Division), but the attack was repulsed. It is advisable to send the Prussian corps to Solec, Jozefow and the east coast to link up with the 1st Army. This important message was

immediately sent to the headquarters of the 4th Army. At about twelve o'clock in the afternoon, a telegram arrived, stating that the 8th Cavalry Division and the 72nd Infantry Regiment were subordinate to General Novikov.

We will stop there for now and see what actually happened on the side of the enemy. Konrad doubted the possible strike of the 8th German army on the settlement of Sedlice. Therefore, wishing to use the success achieved at Lublin, he again hurried Kummer by telegram on August 13 to cross the Vistula.

The 1st Army, using its success, did not intend to attack the Russian 4th Army from the front in a strong position, but sought to cover both of its flanks: the eastern one with parts of the 5th Corps and the left one with Kummer's army group. On August 15, Kummer reported to Konrad that at 4 p.m. the crossing of parts of his group to the right bank would begin.

Vistula, and the main forces of the group by the evening of the same day will approach the area south of Opole. The command of the group, Kummer reported, would be in Tarnow early in the morning of August 15. On August 16, the commander of the 1st Army informed Konrad that he ordered Kummer to advance through Opole, Nezabitow and pursue the Russian troops on the western wing. At the same time, Dankl insisted on subordinating to him the German Landwehr Corps, which would reach Radom on 16 August. The commander of the 1st Austrian Army proposed on August 18 to send the southern column through Zvolen to the Vistula, so that it would cross the Vistula on both sides of Kazimierz. On August 18, Dankl reported that although Kummer's group occupied Opole on August 17, its attack to the east was not successful, so Kummer was strengthening his positions. The Landwehr Corps was ordered to join the 1st Army. The order of the headquarters of the 1st Army, apparently, did not reach the landwehr corps. Therefore, Konrad, through the German representatives, transmitted the following message: on the western bank of the Vistula, on August 17, the battle continued. Led by General Novikov, later a well-known leader of the cavalry, the very 14th Cavalry Division attacked the 110th Landsturm Brigade, active which had again advanced to the mouth of the Kamenna River, in order to keep it away from Ivangorod. Crossing the Vistula, the second brigade of the 106th Landsturm Division, Konrad reported, rushed to the rescue with its artillery in order to drive away Novikov's annoying cavalry.

In official books on the history of the war published in Austria, it is noted that the transition of the army group Kummer was delayed several times. These books describe the battles of the warheads of the Kummer group with the warheads of the 18th Russian corps, which did not have time to destroy the Kummer crossing at Jozefow. The commander of the 1st Austrian Army had no illusions about the combat effectiveness of Kummer's troops and sought to reinforce them with a landwehr corps. The 4th division of this corps should already begin the crossing on August 20. Covering the crossing was again assigned to the 110th Landwehr Brigade and the 20th Brigade of the 7th Cavalry Division with two horse batteries.

Now let's turn to the landwehr corps of Woyrsh, on which so Dunkl had high hopes.

The chronicler of the landwehr corps tells us that after the 14th Russian cavalry division failed to encircle the 14th Russian cavalry division in the Ilzha region on August 13, the 4th landwehr division, together with the corps headquarters, moved to the Vozhbitsa region, and from there on August 16 to the Skaryshev region. On August 16, the 3rd division of the Landwehr, after a short battle (obviously with the border guards. - B.Sh.), entered Radom. Woyrsch moved here with his headquarters. That evening, in the French-style office of the governor, sat Woyrsch and his chief of staff. Being completely unoriented in the general situation, they wondered how they should act.

According to Gaye, for several days the landwehr corps had actually been surrounded by strong detachments of Russian cavalry. His connection with the command of the Austrian and German troops was paralyzed. The situation was not clear, and the corps commander decided that until August 19, parts of the corps would rest. Next, Gaie

discusses the possibilities of using the corps. These

The possibilities, in his opinion, are as follows.

Firstly, the corps should go east and southeast through Zvolen to Novo-Alexandria or Kazimierz in order to provide direct support to Dankl's units. Further, Gaye argues as follows: it was possible to reach the Vistula in two days, but the question was how to transport the troops. The bridge was to be built by the Austrians or sappers of the corps; it should be taken into account that the Russians from Ivangorod would probably try to disrupt the construction of the bridge. Woyrsch considered it his task to help the Austrians, but he could not link his fate with the Austro-Hungarian troops, because he was subordinate to the command of the German 8th Army and therefore had to contribute to the operations of this army. special attention of command Second,

corps

focused on the fact that it would probably have to help the German 8th Army with a blow to the north or northeast, while it would pursue the Russians through the Narew. From August 18, the 8th Army successfully fought the Russians in East Prussia, but it was not known how it ended. Moltke and Konrad, even in peacetime, discussed joint actions, during which a strike of the 8th German army in a southerly direction was not ruled out. In this case, the landwehr corps, with a blow in a northerly direction, would contribute to

fulfillment of the task of the 8th Army and at the same time would ease the burden of Russian pressure on the Austrians.

Thirdly, by August 17 it was not excluded that the corps could operate in the north-western and western directions. Already on August 11, there was information about the concentration of Russians west of Warsaw, and on August 12, the Caucasian Cavalry Division occupied Lodz. On August 13, a pilot reported on an artillery battle near Opatow, east of Kalisz. On August 15, one cavalry division advanced from the north towards Radomsko. All these considerations had not yet been summed up when on August 18 at 9.30

the pilot reported the movement of Russian divisions south of the highway from Zvolen to Radom against the 4th Landwehr Division at Skarszew (in our opinion, this was the offensive of the 8th Cavalry Division on August 17 on Radom. - B.Sh.). At 10.15 this information was again confirmed by aerial reconnaissance. The entire landwehr corps, which was on the day, was alerted, the 4th division took up a defensive position northeast of Skarshev. The 3rd division gathered north of the main highway to Zvolen to cover the enemy. The corps commander at 10 o'clock in the morning was on the western outskirts of Radom. The equestrian reconnaissance sent to Zvolen traveled only 5 kilometers and could not break through the strong curtain of the Russian cavalry further. The airplane damaged the propeller during the second landing. At about four o'clock in the afternoon, the 4th division of the Landwehr reported that the Russians had again retreated to Zvolen, and the corps stopped on the Odekhov-Klvatka line. The headquarters returned to Radom at 6 pm. Two telegrams were received here. The first from Dankl, transmitted through Kielce. Dankl asked to start a hasty march on Jozefow. Such a request was incomprehensible, since the liaison officer with the Kummer group pointed to New Alexandria. No explanation was given in the telegram. The second telegram from the commander of the 8th Army announced the victory at Tannenberg and ended like this: "The Austro-Hungarian High Command informed me that the Landwehr Corps was subordinate to the 1st Army and should cross the river. The army command of the 8th army agrees with this. The telegram did not say anything about the consent of the 8th Army to the subordination of the Landwehr Corps to the commander of the 1st Army, although these same telegrams did not indicate that the 8th Army was counting on the assistance of the Landwehr Corps. In a word, the ambiguity

the Austrians and the fear of falling into retreat with them led Woyrsch to the conclusion that it was expedient to leave the corps west of the Vistula. The command of the landwehr corps on the evening of August 17 once again asked the commander of the 8th Army about the general situation, considering it wrong that the corps was

subordinate to the 1st Army. I showed how unwilling Woyrsch was to submit to the Austrians and how valuable time was wasted in a difficult situation for the Austro-German command. It turns out that when it came to personal prestige, there were such tensions not only in the Russian, but also in the vaunted German army. It was

decided on August 19 to give another day of rest to the troops of the corps, and only the 18th Landwehr Brigade received the order to start moving from Konsk to Shndlovets.

Two Austrian officers who arrived on August 19 reported on the general situation: the 2nd and 3rd Austrian armies retreated near Lvov, the 4th army near Komaruv was fighting a successful battle. The 1st Austro-Hungarian Army pushed the enemy back from Krasnik to Lublin, where they could not break through the reinforced position of the Russians. On its western wing, Kummer even received a retaliatory blow. On the eastern wing, the 10th Corps is fighting together with the 4th Army. Landwehr Corps should help him. With his approach, the general offensive of the 1st Army will begin. Now all doubts about the correctness of the decision of the corps commander fell away. Of course, it would be better to strike through Nowo-Alexandria or Kazimierz, but since the commander of the 1st Army several times expressed the desire to go to Jozefow, the corps will take this direction. The possibility of using the corps on the eastern flank of the Dunkl's army is not ruled out. After lunch on August 19, the corps officer for communication with Kummer reaffirmed the desire of the 1st Army to send a corps to Jozefow. Finally, late in the evening, the official consent of the commander of the 8th Army came to the passage of the corps across the Vistula. So, slowly, the

landwehr corps of Woyrsh moved to the aid of his ally. In these notes, the reader should not look for the history of the Battle of Galicia. I am telling a story about what I experienced myself, and I only illustrate by what was actually done with my opponents. What were the experiences of the highest

unknown. But now, to guide the reader, I will briefly

I will stop there.

From July 26, 1914 to August 4 - about eight days, during which it was possible to correct the shortcomings of our strategic deployment on the Southwestern Front, namely, to strengthen the right flank of the 4th Army.

But during this time, Alekseev did not take any measures, and Nikolai Nikolayevich nurtured the idea of a march on Berlin, having the flanks of both fronts hanging in the air. Two decisions could be made: either to strengthen the left flank of Samsonov's army and, achieving victory here, go to Berlin, or to strengthen the right flank of the 4th Army and defeat the Austrians. Instead, the guards corps maneuvered around Warsaw and to the west of it. Meanwhile, from the time of Kuropatkin it was clear that the right flank on the Southwestern Front could not be made weak. Only when the defeat of the right flank of the 4th Army - the 14th Corps and Tumanov's cavalry became a fact, then both Headquarters and Alekseev seized on strengthening the flank, who, having changed the direction of the 5th Army's offensive, put its left flank under attack and made it possible the Austrians achieve a private victory at Komarów. True, Alekseev suggested to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command that the forces assembled near Warsaw be used to strike on the left bank of the Vistula towards Tarnów. In the end, the Stavka had to abandon the campaign against Berlin and to throw everything that was going near Warsaw to reinforce the 4th Army, but not on the left, but on the right bank of the Vistula, part of the forces directly along the coast (18th Corps and Guards Rifle Brigades), and part (guards corps) to eliminate the breakthrough between the 4th and 5th armies east of Lublin. In the meantime, on the left bank of the Vistula to protect Lviv against 34 battalions of Woytsch, there were 57 squadrons and hundreds and only 4 infantry battalions. Even the 75th reserve division, being transferred to the garrison of Lviv, was not moved to the west, while the German landwehr and the landsturm of the fortresses of Poznań, Breslau and Tarnobrzeg delayed the advance of the Russian cavalry of the Warsaw detachment. Such was the strategy of the Russian high command, which scattered its forces and wasted time to achieve victory.

GALICIA BATTLE

I left the headquarters of the 14th cavalry division in the forest, north of the village of Vilchi-Lug (southwest of Sytsyn), and began to send the intercepted order of Dunkl to Woyrsh, as well as the evacuation of a completely serviceable Austrian aircraft to Ivangorod. The time was approaching three o'clock in the afternoon on August 19. The outpost front was quite calm, as was Sander, who was stationed west of Zvolen with the 72nd Infantry Regiment and the 8th Cavalry Division. Leaving the duty unit near the village of Dembnitsa - two squadrons of dragoons with two guns of the 23rd cavalry battery - the brigades of the division moved to their usual areas of location. As soon as about four o'clock in the afternoon, the division headquarters by car arrived at their apartment in Sytsyn, and the regiments were pulling up to their parking lots, when disturbing news came: the German infantry, supported by artillery, launched attacks on Osuchow, Kazanow and to the north of them. The outposts, supported by two artillery pieces, have so far held back the enemy advance. Having given orders, the headquarters of the division left already in horseback formation to the place of the ensuing

battle to its command post in the forest near Vilchi Lug. By six o'clock in the evening on August 19, when parts of the division began to arrive at Vilchi-Lug, the outposts were shot down and retreated to the east. Two horse battery guns fired continuously at the advancing German infantry. Kazanow was on fire. The brigades of the division stood in mounted formation, ready to attack. The sun was already setting and with its reflections to the east prevented the brigades from viewing

terrain.

The division headquarters did not dare to suggest to the division commander that the brigade rush and join the battle: the situation was unclear and, by hurrying the units, by darkness it was possible to let go of the control of the entire division. The enemy, having occupied Kazanow and advanced the infantry to the east of it, led the main offensive south of the Ilzhanka River in the direction of Ciepelów. According to intelligence, up to one enemy cavalry division moved here. Fighting broke out in the outpost in Tsepelyuw. It was clear that the enemy was trying to outflank

division's left flank. At the suggestion of the headquarters, Novikov decided to withdraw the 14th division to the swampy line of the Zvolenka River (in the Zelenka, Grabow,

Barych area). Not pursued by the enemy, having gathered its outposts, the 14th cavalry division withdrew to the indicated area by night, missing 150 people (they were killed, wounded or missing). Along the Zvolenka River, before its confluence with the Vistula, a new outpost was posted. At the front of the 8th Cavalry Division and the 72nd Infantry Regiment, silence reigned all day. Our headquarters stopped in Grabow in the house of the

brother of the famous Polish writer Sienkiewicz. We were warmly welcomed by the old owner, he treated us to a delicious dinner. The atmosphere was not so cheerful as to sit up at the table. After a quick meal, Dreyer and I went into the room to discuss the situation. The German attack on August 19 did not yet mean that the enemy had a firm intention to go to Jozefow. The purpose of the attack could be either an exit to the town of Yanovets for crossing the Vistula at Kazimierz, or a deeper detour to Novo Alexandria. One thing was clear: it was necessary to defend Ivangorod, which was only a few kilometers away. It was decided: the 8th Cavalry Division and the 72nd Infantry Regiment should hold their positions at Zvolen on August 20, and the 14th Cavalry Division should deploy on foot across the Zvolenka River from the village of Zelenka to Barych, inclusive, observing further to the Vistula the area only traveling. This proposal was approved by Novikov. From the reconnaissance battalion of dragoons, which was at Lipsko all day, there were no reports on August 19, and where it was, it was

unknown.

The morning of August 20 found units of the 14th division across the Zvolenka River at the position indicated by order. The division prepared for defense. The division headquarters was located on a height to the west of the village of Mezhonchka, well observing the entire position and approaches to it from the enemy. Time passed, but the Germans did not appear. It was also quiet on the Sander section. Observers reported only small patrols in front of the cavalry front. Apparently, the Germans either approached the position, or ... the thought involuntarily crept in whether Woyrsh was moving towards Yuzefuw, hiding from the cavalry by the Ilzhanka River. At about one in the afternoon, it was decided to send a strong cavalry reconnaissance to the west and southwest.

from the 14th Cavalry Division. To fulfill this, a hundred Cossacks moved from Zvolen along the highway to Radom, a squadron of hussars - to Sydul and Sytsyn, and a squadron of lancers went to Tsepelyuv.

The result of the reconnaissance had an effect quickly: the enemy cavalry everywhere retreated south to the Ilzhanka River, crossings through which turned out to be occupied by foot units with machine guns. A hundred Cossacks quickly moved forward. Her passing south of the highway captured the car of the head of the 3rd Landwehr Division, which was going from Radom to Kazanow. The car was delivered to the division headquarters. A bundle of papers was found in the car. Among them was a telegram from which we learned about the death of Samsonov's army. The captured driver and his assistant confirmed that the division had gone to the Viola crossing. They stated that they were taken prisoner only because the head of their division forgot cigars in Radom and sent a car for them. On the way to Radom, the Cossacks seized the car.

The situation cleared up. Woyrsh made a flank march, and the cavalry was to cut off his tails. On August 21, Novikov approved the order to go on the offensive to the south. The 14th Division and the 72nd Infantry Regiment advanced first, while the 8th Cavalry Division served as a barrier at Zvolen. The 2nd brigade of the 14th cavalry division with border guards and the 23rd cavalry battery followed to Kazanow, the 1st brigade with the 4th field battery - to the crossing over the Ilzhanka river, near the village of Gardzenice, and the 72nd infantry regiment with 5th battery moved through Zvolen to Tsepeluv. From the course of the Battle

of Galicia, we know that on August 21 the armies of the right wing of the Southwestern Front also went on the offensive. This circumstance was not known to the headquarters of the division at that time.

At ten o'clock in the morning on August 21, the 2nd brigade of the 14th division, with which the division headquarters followed, was already approaching Kazanow, from the northern outskirts of which the advanced units were met with rare rifle fire. By attacking the dismounted units of the vanguard of the 2nd brigade from the north and two squadrons of hussars from the west, Kazanow was quickly cleared of the enemy. Doctors from the mobile hospital with Red Cross bandages on their sleeves fled from the city towards the approaching headquarters of the division. In Kazanowa, a telegraph station and a field hospital with 200 wounded were captured. Among the wounded were 30 Tullians with an officer taken prisoner on August 19.

Encountering no resistance, the 1st brigade of the division occupied the crossing at Gardzenice, and the Tula scouts went to Tsepelyuv, capturing several German signalmen. From the forests south of Tsepelyuv, a squadron of the 14th Dragoon Regiment of Captain Konyukhov also arrived in the town of Gardzenice. Cut off from the division by infantry columns passing along the roads, Konyukhov's squadron climbed into the very thicket of the forest and stayed here for two days. The Germans did not find him.

It was obvious that all the combat units of Woyrsh's corps had already passed to the east. It was necessary to head closer to the Vistula in order to capture the tails of the German corps at the crossing. Therefore, the columns of the division received a new direction: the 72nd Infantry Regiment was ordered to move to Katarzynów and spend the night here, meaning the further movement to Solec; by the evening of August 21, both brigades of the 14th Cavalry Division should concentrate in the forest, near the villages of Szymanow and Dombrowa. A telegram

arrived from Ivangorod. It reported that Novikov's cavalry with the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment was subordinate to the commander of the 9th Army, who was headquartered in Lublin. In the second telegram, it was reported that a guards rifle brigade was sent to the left bank at the disposal of Novikov. By the morning of August 22, a third telegram was received, from which we learned that instead of the Guards Rifle Brigade on August 21, a brigade of the 75th Reserve Division with two batteries set out from Ivangorod in the direction of Solets. Along with the brigade was the head of the division and his headquarters. Thus, at the disposal of the headquarters of the 14th division were two cavalry divisions, a brigade of the 75th reserve division and the 72nd infantry regiment. Manage these connections

not easy.

Intelligence reported to us that the remnants of Woyrsch's corps were in Lipsko and that his main forces had already passed to the crossing. Therefore, the 8th Cavalry Division, left at Zvolen, could be involved in operations in the south. On the evening of August 21, an order was sent to her - from the morning of August 22, move to Ciepelów and Janow Solecki. The 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment with one field battery was to take Solets and move south to the crossing near the Kamenna River. The attack on the German battalion at Lipsko was to be carried out by the 14th division. For this purpose, the most close reconnaissance was carried out so as not to frighten off the Germans.

Our entire division, without unsaddling their horses, hid in the forest north of Lipsko. The reconnaissance squadron of the hussars, being at the edge of the forest, conducted reconnaissance on the Janow-Lipsko road only by small patrols. It was decided to attack the Germans in Lipsko by dismounted units of the 1st brigade of the 14th division from the north, while the 2nd brigade and border guards would bypass the town of Lipsko from the west and enter from the south to attacks in this place.

The dawn of August 22 had barely dawned when the squadron of hussars headed for Januv. A car jumped out of the gate of a house at high speed and sped along the road to Lipsko. 10 hussars with an officer rushed to pursue the car, from which frequent shots were heard. It was not possible to stop the car. According to the owners of the house, one of the major chiefs of the landwehr corps was driving in the car. At five o'clock in the morning on August 22, units of the 14th Cavalry Division were preparing

to attack Lipsko. The 1st brigade of the division, having taken a battery position on the edge of the forest near the village of Dombrova, led an offensive to the south with dismounted units. At this time, the 2nd brigade from Shimanow moved to Yelgonek and Lipa-Krempa to bypass the enemy from the west. Having crossed the Kremnianska River, the 2nd brigade headed for the village of Babilen. The combat patrols sent forward discovered that from Lipsko to the southeast it was advancing up to a company of Germans. Apparently, they were going to the crossing at Yuzefuwa. There was no need to hesitate with the decision: having sent Cossacks and border guards on foot to the village of Papernya, the division headquarters sent four squadrons of hussars on horseback to pursue the German company. The latter was already approaching the forest and, having taken the edge with rifle fire, met the attacking hussars. Quickly dismounting under enemy fire and fixing their bayonets, the hussars rushed into the forest. Unable to withstand the onslaught of the brave hussars, suffering significant losses, the remnants of the German company through the forest began to retreat to Jozefow. In difficult conditions, the Cossacks and border guards started a fight, attacking German units, retreating from Lipsko along the high road to Papernya and occupying the western edge of the forest. However, with the assistance of the fire of the 23rd battery and machine guns of the division, the Cossacks and border guards quickly coped with their task, pushing the enemy from the edge of the forest and starting his pursuit in the direction of Solets.

The attack of the dismounted units of the 1st brigade, met by strong German rifle fire, developed slowly. The enemy stubbornly defended himself, hiding behind the stone buildings from the artillery fire of the brigade. Soon the 4th field battery opened fire with grenades. This immediately had a noticeable impact on the success of the attackers: Lipsko flared up. The enemy rifle fire weakened. Our units have made up for lost time. It seemed that Lipsko would soon be cleared of the Germans. Parts of the 2nd brigade, pursuing the enemy, moved to the east. From the head of the 8th cavalry division, which approached the village of Leshchiny by 12 noon, a report was received about the movement of a large enemy column with artillery from Ilzha to Lipsko. The position of our 2nd brigade, cut off by a suitable column of Germans, was becoming threatening. However, the head of our division, Novikov, not wanting to leave a favorable position, did not go north, but remained in place. He gathered units, brought back the hussars and border guards who were pursuing the enemy, turning the division around to block the path of the Germans approaching from the west. While the 2nd brigade of our division was reorganizing its battle formation to the west, in a hollow near the Kremnyanka River, units of the 8th cavalry division, which were in the forefront, opened machine-gun fire on the enemy. Shrapnel from the artillery of this division was visible in the air, it fired at the approaching German column. Unable to withstand the artillery fire, the enemy column turned south. She was pursued by the vanguard 8th Lancers. The Germans retreated quickly and erratically. The complete

defeat of this column seemed inevitable, but... Zander stopped the lancers and, congratulating them on a good "first thing", withdrew with the division for the night to the north of the Kremnyanka river. The headquarters of the 14th division focused on taking Lipsko. From the north, units of the 1st brigade came close to this settlement. They knocked out the remnants of the German battalion, suffocating in the smoke of the fire. The Germans were

forced to surrender. At 5 p.m. on August 22, the battle at Lipsko subsided. Parts of the 14th Division were sent east to assist the 72nd Infantry Regiment. At 7 o'clock in the morning this regiment headed for Solets. Soon he took possession of this point and continued the offensive south, towards Sadowice. Here the 72nd regiment came into contact with t

from the units that occupied a position across the Kamenna River. Our scouts, the Tulians, advancing from Sadkovice to the south, were met by the enemy with artillery fire. Shells were fired from the enemy's main position. Having ordered the Tultsy to settle down for the night in Solets, and the 14th division - in the area of Lipa-Krempa, Dzyurkov, Volya-Soletska, the headquarters of our division headed for Solets. Here a meeting was held with officers of the headquarters of the 75th reserve division. This division has not yet seen combat. In its units, we saw elderly and bearded people, led in the majority by warrant officers of

the reserve ... We exchanged thoughts on how to use the brigade of the 75th reserve division. It was decided to send it from the front, pressing the left flank to the Vistula so that the Austrians would not bypass it, and on the right flank, for the closest coverage of the enemy flank, to place the 75th Infantry Regiment, which had already been in battle. For a deeper coverage across the Kamenna River, to the section from Pentkowice to Okul, it was proposed to send the 14th Cavalry Division with the task of fighting on foot. The 8th Cavalry Division, conducting reconnaissance to the west on the front of Starachowice, Ostrovets, was supposed to secure the right flank of the attacking units. We had sufficient forces at our disposal to finish off the Austrians in the battle near Tarnów, who were sitting in a position advantageous for defense south of

From 7 am on August 23, military units on the left bank of the Vistula, united under the command of Novikov, moved to the Kamenna River. Turning around on the line Glina, Pavlovice, the infantry under the overall command of the head of the 75th reserve division started a battle and launched an offensive on the Zembozhin front - the mouth of the Kamenna River. The enemy met the attackers with artillery fire from long distances. A slow infantry battle began.

Throwing back the weak parts of the enemy cavalry, the 14th division began to deploy for an offensive to the east. The 23rd cavalry battery supported the division with fire.

In the first hour of the day, completely unexpected help arrived on the battlefield - the 5th cavalry division. When the German landwehr corps retreated to the east, this division moved south from Nowe Miasto, captured Radom and, conducting reconnaissance in Kielce and Opatow, approached Baltuv by one in the afternoon on August 23. The head of the 5th Cavalry Division, Moritz, being the senior in rank, came to Novikov and

put his division at his disposal (an extraordinary phenomenon in the old Russian army). The approach of the 5th cavalry division freed the 8th cavalry division from the task of securing the flank, and it was immediately sent for a deeper coverage of the enemy in the Uluw, Brzozow, Hermanow area. The 5th Cavalry Division was assigned the task of moving to Baltuv, Gliniany, Ozharuv, to destroy the enemy's crossing at Annopol.

While the 8th and 5th cavalry divisions were preparing to carry out new tasks, units of the 2nd brigade of our division deployed near the village of Potochek. Having taken the direction to the northern outskirts of Yanuv, the hussars and border guards, with the support of the 23rd cavalry battery, soon started a battle for the copses west of the village of Potochek, and the Cossacks advanced towards Tarnuv, from where the enemy's carts hurriedly retreated to the south. The 1st brigade of the 14th division, which was delayed while crossing the Kamenna River, missed the booty. Only part of this task was completed by the 8th Cavalry Division. Knocking out the Austrian infantry from the woods, units of the 2nd brigade of our division by 4 o'clock in the afternoon were on top in the Januv area. Our infantry attacking from the north, having crossed the Kamenna River, moved to the main position of the enemy. The Austrians, without waiting for the blow of our infantry, fearing the bypass of the cavalry, hastily retreated south along the Vistula, leaving the dead and wounded. Many Austrians surrendered. By 6 pm, the infantry continued to advance on the villages of Tsinshtsa-Gurpa, Tsishitsa Pshevozova. And to the south, units of the 8th and 14th cavalry divisions approached the cliff of the elevated bank of the Vistula. They conducted artillery fire on the bridge of the alleged enemy crossing. But there was no bridge. On August 22, the Austrians managed to raise the bridge. The outcome of the day did not please the enemy. The 110th Landsturm Brigade and the 20th Brigade of the 7th Cavalry Division hastily retreated south. Captured 2 officers and 108 soldiers, part of the convoy. The 5th Cavalry Division only reached Ozaruw that day. Parts subordinate to General Novikov spent the night near the Kamenna River, and the 8th Cavalry Division.

By the evening of August 23, the left bank of the Vistula was cleared of the enemy all the way from Ivangorod to Zavikhost. Three cavalry divisions stood on the banks of the Vistula opposite the rear of the enemy, having neither pontoons nor improvised materials to cross to the right bank of the Vistula.

Having reported on the successful battle near Tarnow, the headquarters of the 14th division on August 24 again acted independently, because the army command did not set us new tasks. Dreyer and I went out in the morning to reconnoiter the Vistula, sending detachments of soldiers to the front of Solec, Jozefow, in order to prepare improvised material for the crossing. Parts of the division entrenched in their positions. Intelligence of the Vistula gave some valuable information. Where the Austrians crossed the Vistula, only goats stuck out. The enemy fired heavily from the Yuzefuwa area. Without a pontoon park, we had nothing to think about crossing the Vistula.

When the troops concentrated around Tarnow, events in the headquarters and units of the enemy developed as

follows. Describing the actions of the landwehr corps, his historian Gaye notes the "Nibelungen" loyalty to the alliance with the Austrians. In reality, Gaye himself did not particularly want to cross the Vistula to help the Austrians. On August 19, the landwehr corps received an order to march to the Vistula to the Solec, Jozefow front. The 4th division was the first to act (it was closer than the others in the direction of Yuzefuw). At Kazanuv, she collided with parts of Novikov. Having thrown them back, the 4th division reached Tsepelyuv by nightfall. In a battle with a company of Tula and two squadrons of hussars, supported by the fire of two guns, according to Gaye, the 4th division lost 2 officers and 23 soldiers killed, 2 of its officers and 70 soldiers were wounded. The 4th division opened the way for the 3rd division, which by August 20 reached Tsepelyuv (on this day the 4th division advanced to the Ring). On August 20, the corps chief of staff with several officers drove forward by car to Józefów in order to quickly contact Dunkl. General Woyrsch and part of the staff officers remained in Radom until 21 August. He took a certain risk, since there were Russian cavalry all around, and it was not excluded that the agents would inform the enemy about the isolated position of the corps commander.

Before dawn on August 21, Woyrsch left Radom with several cars. In Lipsko, he mounted a horse and went to the 3rd division, which was approaching Solts. From Józefów, Gaye informed Woyrsch that the commander of the Austrian 1st Army was asking for an accelerated march through the Viola. In this regard, the corps commander sent the 3rd division to Pavlovice.

The pilot's reports and direct observation of what was happening on the right bank of the Vistula confirmed that the Russians had achieved success on the left flank of the Dankl units. Woyrsch wanted to return one brigade of the 3rd Division and ferry it on pontoons to attack the Russian flank, but then he himself went to the crossing at Jozefow. Here, the 4th Landwehr Division was already crossing the bridge, decorated with flags, green leaves and posters. General Terten, who commanded the troops covering the bridge on the left bank (the 110th Landsturm Brigade, the 20th Cavalry Brigade of the 7th Cavalry Division), greeted the commander of the Landwehr Corps. On a motorboat, the corps commander with his staff reached Yuzefuwa. Having met his commander, Chief of Staff Gacke reported on the general situation on the Austrian front and on the order of the commander of the 1st Army. In this order, the task was set for the right flank of the army - to continue the offensive on August 21, and the left flank - to stubbornly defend. The Landwehr Corps was tasked with crossing the Vistula and settling in the Vandalin area. At 8.30 in the evening of August 20, the corps received a wish from Dunkl to speed up the crossing and support the head division heading for Pushno-Godovsk with one artillery regiment (the position of the left flank of the 1st Army was not assessed as entirely satisfactory).

On August 21, the 4th Landwehr Division crossed the Vistula and deployed in the area of Pushno-Godowske, Wierzbica, placing an artillery regiment in position to the north. Early in the morning of August 22, the 3rd Landwehr Division crossed the Vistula on pontoons at Sadkowiec with one brigade, and the rest of its units crossed the river over the bridge at Józefów and advanced into the Vandalin area. Thus, the landwehr corps with its main forces on August 22 was in the Vandalin area, with its tails fought the 14th Russian cavalry division. The historian Gaye describes these battles as follows:

"The 18th brigade of the 3rd division of the landwehr, being in Szydłowiec, on August 20 received an order to head for Jozefow and cross to the right bank of the Vistula. However, the brigade failed to do this, since on August 23 the troops guarding the bridge on the left bank attacked Novikov's cavalry corps. General Dunkl on the same day gave the order to open the bridge. Landwehr Corps headquarters managed to warn its 18th brigade in time and send it through

Opatov on Sandomierz. The 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 4th Landwehr Division, which was guarding rear communications near Piotrkow with the 21st Brigade, was sent from there through Shidlovets, Ilzha and Lipsko to the crossing. On August 22, this battalion near Lipsko was surrounded by units of Novikov. The battalion fought bravely, but lost 5 officers, 200 soldiers and their entire convoy. From the 7th and 8th companies of the battalion, only 300 people were able to break through to the crossing and cross to the right bank of the Vistula. The battalion headquarters, 5th and 6th companies (they numbered 410 people) withdrew south and joined the 18th brigade, and the 2nd battalion of the 7th regiment of the 3rd landwehr division, guarding the corps headquarters in Radom, together with squadrons of Austrian dragoons, he went for parts of Woyrsh through Odezhuv, Lipsko to join his division. Near the village of Lipsko-Miklyas (west of Lipsko), on August 22, the battalion was attacked by Novikov's cavalry (apparently, the 8th cavalry division. - B.Sh.), 2 officers and 100 soldiers made their way to Juzefuw, and the main forces joined the 110th Landsturm brigade of General Terten and together with it, conducting rearguard battles, withdrew to Sandomierz. On August 30, the battalion crossed the Vistula at

Sandomierz and joined the already retreating corps. On August 20, the convoys began to be attacked by cavalry, but nevertheless, most of them managed to cross the bridge at

Jozefow, and on August 23 they gathered at Annopol. From August 21, the delivery of everything necessary for the corps to Sandomierz began already through Krakow (Nadbzhese unloading station).

Further, Gaye comes to the conclusion: the flank march and the crossing of the Vistula by the landwehr corps, attacked by the bold and strong Russian cavalry, could be difficult, the corps would suffer heavy losses. In reality, the corps organized the march and crossing well and quickly, without significant losses. Novikov's attempts to deliver a powerful blow to the corps were again unsuccessful with the strength of the troops and

convoys. So Gaye evaluates the campaign of the German Landwehr Corps, consisting of 34 battalions, 12 squadrons, which had 72 guns. 57 squadrons, 4 battalions and 34 Russian guns acted against this corps, which were still beating the Austrians under the Lie and on the Kamenna River.

From August 19 to August 22, inclusive, parts of the Novikov corps lost 189 people killed, wounded and captured. What did the Germans lose? Near Kazanow they lost 97 soldiers and officers, a field infirmary, part of a communications company; near Lipsko - 205 officers and soldiers of the 2nd battalion of the 23rd regiment and up to 300 soldiers and officers of the 2nd battalion of the 7th landwehr regiment, in total - 602 people.

From an operational point of view, Gaye himself admits that the corps for a long time was deprived of the seven and a half battalions that marched on Sandomierz and arrived when the corps near Tarnowka, together with the 1st Austrian army, retreated to Galicia. Where one can sympathize with him is in complaints about the desire of the Austrians to tear the corps apart. Therefore, we will continue his story about the adventures of the corps on the right bank of the Vistula. First of all, Gaye notes that the three-day campaign with the crossing over the Vistula exhausted the corps. Then he really did not like the terrain on the right bank, and the sandy roads, and even more - the lack of culture of the inhabitants of the Lublin province. But all this would be nothing if the corps were used to deliver a decisive blow to the Russians. But in reality it turned out differently: parts of the 1st Austrian army thinned out, tired and barely held out against the Russians, who, on the contrary, had already received not only moral, but also qualitative superiority in strength. Russian artillery was especially annoying. With the advent of a fresh landwehr corps, the faces of the soldiers and officers of the Austrian army read: "We have already done quite a bit, but now let the Germans replace us and continue." Dunkl, instead of setting himself the decisive goal of defeating the Russians, also gradually came to this conclusion. As soon as the landwehr corps appeared on the right bank of the Vistula, not always justified requests for support rained

down from the Austrians. But the worst was yet to come. On August 23, the landwehr corps received an order to retreat. The right wing of the 1st Army (10th Army Corps), which had been successfully advancing so far, was to withdraw back across the Por River. A group of Joseph Ferdinand (three rifle and one cavalry divisions) hurried to his aid. The commander of the 1st Army considered the possibility of his withdrawal to the Krasnik line, which is why the landwehr corps had to strengthen the heights west of this point. With chagrin, Gaye says that instead of resolute

offensive, the corps was supposed to begin its operations with a retreat and digging trenches. On August 23, on the way to Ksienzomierz, the corps headquarters received a message from Kummer that the 110th Landsturm Brigade was in a difficult situation and was withdrawing, and since Kummer had no reserves, there was an open gap at Jozefuw. Woyrsch agreed to provide three battalions and three batteries of Reis's 17th Reserve Brigade to cover him, on condition that they be returned to the corps as soon as the battle was over. Upon arrival in Ksenzhomierz, the headquarters of the corps received an order from the 1st Army to stop engineering defensive work, since the Russians did not pursue the 10th Corps, and begin advancing to the east. On August 24,

Woyrsh and Gaye drove to Krasnik to be introduced to the commander of the 1st Army, General Dunkl, where they asked him to use the entire corps, to which they received agreement in principle, but the Reis detachment was ordered to be left for another day against Yuzefuw. Thus, the distance between the detachment and the main forces of the corps reached 80 kilometers. Dunkl reassured the Germans that Joseph Ferdinand would not pass until 27 August, and Reis would have time to join. At the headquarters of the corps, located east of Krasnik, around noon a message arrived that there was a panic in the wagon trains that stood at Annopol, where there were wagon trains of the landwehr corps. The convoys were fired upon by artillery fire from the left bank, and several squadrons of the enemy crossed to the eastern bank of the Vistula. (Actually, on August 26, such a raid was carried out by the 8th Cavalry Division.) The Landwehr Corps again recognized its old adversary, Novikov, who was trying to interfere with the corps' march. This made a different impression on the commander of the 1st Austrian army, who ordered Woyrsch to detain the 3rd Landwehr division where it happened to be and leave it at the disposal of the commander of the 1st Austrian army. This order justified the division of the landwehr corps. At 9 pm on August 24, order No. 690 for August 25 was received from Dunkl and addressed to the Landwehr 5th and 10th Corps. Order

read:

"1. The 1st and 5th corps occupy a position on the front from Hodel through Skrzyniec, Bychawa, Zaraszow, the heights north and east of Tarnow. the 10th Corps in contact with them across the River Nor; on the right flank near Zapozhe, the 3rd cavalry division operates.

2. To the Prussian Landwehr Corps - the lead 4th Landwehr Division early in the morning takes up a position between the 5th and 10th Corps at the front: heights east of Tarnow through heights 314 to the village of Dombrova inclusive. The 36th Landsturm Brigade, located on the heights east of Tarnow, is subordinate to the Prussian Landwehr Corps. The 3rd Landwehr Division was ready to advance west of Krasnik by 7 o'clock in the morning. Its tasks will be determined by the command of the 1st Army.

The chief of staff protested in writing against such a dispersal of the forces of the landwehr corps. An explanatory reply came from Dunkl during the night, addressed to Woirsch himself: I ask Your Excellency to be sure that, as soon as circumstances permit, I will send the 3rd Landwehr Division to you to link up with the 4th Division ... The situation on the Vistula is not yet clear. To push back the enemy that appeared at Yuzefuwa, a part of Kummer's group was sent there. This means that as soon as I achieve success, I send a detachment of Reis to the 4th division of the Landwehr ... Whether only squadrons crossed at Aniopolis or there is an infantry corps ready for crossing, I don't know. In the latter case, in the interests of the whole army, I must repel this offensive, which threatens its rear. For this purpose, only the 3rd Landwehr Division is available at hand. In assessing the general situation, with all my desire, I have no choice but to keep the latter ready for all occasions. "According to a later captured order (the usual trick of the Germans. - B.Sh.), Cossack General Novikov," writes Gaye, "was then on the left bank: 1. 14th Cavalry Division, well known to the Landwehr Corps; 2. 72nd Infantry

Regiment, which we knew from Kazanow; 3. One brigade of the 75th

reserve division from Ivangorod; Novikov could exalt himself highly by tying up more than one army corps: a) on the left bank of the Vistula: 1. Mixed 110th Austro-Hungarian brigade - six battalions; 2. 18th German Landwehr Infantry Brigade - six battalions;

3. About one and a half battalions of the 7th and 23rd infantry regiments landwehr.

b) on the right bank of the

Vistula: 1. 3rd Landwehr division (including the

Reis detachment); 2. Part of the army

group Kummer. His tireless activity was successful in that the introduction of the landwehr corps on the eastern flank, which was carried out with an offensive goal, was disrupted ... There was a depressed mood at the corps headquarters, "concludes Gaye.

On August 20, when the corps was still in Radom, an undecipherable telegram was received from the 8th German Army; on August 22, when the corps was already on the right bank of the Vistula, a repeated Hindenburg telegram was received, which contained the following instructions: the Hungarian troops near Lvov are very unsatisfactory; Auffenberg's 4th Army, advancing east of the 1st Austrian Army, was stopped, and therefore, based on the current situation, the commander of the 8th Army leaves the landwehr corps to act at his discretion. Gaye regrets that the telegram was not deciphered on August 20, since then it was possible to assist the Austrians with a strike through Novo-Alexandria or Kazimierz. The new decision, made on the basis of political considerations (allied loyalty), left no other choice but to fight side by side with the Austro-Hungarian troops.

The attention of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff at that time was diverted to the east, where the 3rd and the supplied units of the 2nd Army suffered defeat after defeat. The 1st Army held well near Lublin, and one could hope for the success of its right flank. The crisis of the battle near Komaruw was brewing, after which most of the 4th Army was released to assist the 3rd Army.

From the telegram to Moltke, Konrad knew that, in view of the victory at Tannenberg, it was decided to send two army corps instead of three from the Western theater of operations to the east. Despite Konrad's request to deploy them in the Przemysl region, Moltke sent them to East Prussia. In a word, the Germans wanted first of all to clear their territory, and the representative of the German headquarters

he was mainly interested in the situation of the 1st Army, which blocked the road to Silesia.

Konrad and the Austrian Official History of the War 1914–1918. confirm the assumptions to replace units of the 12th Infantry Division and the 100th Landsturm Brigade with the Woyrsch Corps in order to transfer the latter to help the retreating right flank of the 1st Army. However, this was abandoned, and Woyrsch's corps proceeded eastward. Neither Konrad nor official history speaks of the dispersal of the forces of the corps and the panic of the carts near Annopol.

How did the Russian command regard the significance of the left bank of the Vistula? We know that Alekseev suggested to the Chief of Staff of the Headquarters that at one time the Guards Corps should strike along the left bank of the Vistula. However, this was rejected, and the entire guards corps, following the 18th corps, was transferred to the right bank - to Lublin. At one time, on paper, the Guards Rifle Brigade was subordinate to Novikov, but this was also canceled. Instead, two regiments of the 75th reserve division came, which did their job in the battle on August 23 on the Kamenna River.

On August 21, the 9th Army of Lechitsky was formed from the 18th and 14th Corps, the Guards Rifle Brigade, the 75th Reserve Division, the 13th, 14th, 8th, 5th Cavalry Divisions, the Guards Separate Cavalry Brigade and the 72nd Infantry shelf. On the same day, under

pressure from the Stavka, the Southwestern Front issued a directive to its troops on the offensive. On August 23,

when near Tarnow the troops on the left bank of the Vistula were crushing the Terten group, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front issued directive No. 854, which proposed that the 9th Army strike at Jozefow, transport the entire army here to the left bank of the Vistula and then act on Opatow and Sandomierz. 4th Army - with a blow from the left wing, throwing the enemy back to the Vistula, to advance in the zone between the Vistula and the Sobieska-Wola line, Janow Lubelski, Nisko.

Despite these directives, the actions of the 9th Army, due to a lack of understanding of the situation that had arisen, its commander was clearly not active enough.

To do justice to Alekseev, such a concentration of maneuver to defeat the 1st Army was absolutely correct, since the latter would be isolated from the rest of the Austrian armies and

surrounded in the area of Sandomierz. From the description of Gaye we have already seen what kind of panic occurred in this army due to the crossing of several Russian squadrons at Annopol to the right bank of the Vistula, and that Dankl was waiting for the crossing of the infantry corps behind these squadrons. In a conversation with Headquarters Quartermaster General Danilov, Alekseev said that "the time has come to strike here (near Sukhodola. - B.Sh.) a blow from our side." On August 24, Alekseev was preoccupied with what was happening on the left bank, and by a special order he put the task of reconnaissance to find out if a withdrawal was being made to Kielce, Pinchuv, Stoshitsa and what forces were being grouped in the Czÿstochowa area.

At that time, all of the above, of course, was not known to the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division, to which we will now return. The 5th cavalry, having done nothing near Annopol, went somewhere to the south. It was obvious that the enemy was heavily guarding his immediate rear near Jozefow. It will not be possible to force the Vistula here without the presence of pontoon facilities. "The Moor has done his job - the Moor can leave" - this was done by the 9th Army with its left bank cavalry. On the evening of August 24, the head of the 14th cavalry division received the only order from the army headquarters - to send a brigade of the 75th reserve division to Kazimierz, and the 72nd infantry Tula regiment was to withdraw to Solts, from where artillery fire would help the offensive of the guards rifle brigade along the right bank Vistula. At the disposal of the head of the 14th cavalry division were two cavalry divisions, which were not given any additional task. The following tasks were presented to me for the cavalry: 1) it was necessary to deprive the Austrians of the opportunity to withdraw to the left bank, and for this it was necessary to destroy the crossing facilities, which the enemy, very

likely, had concentrated at Annopol; and 2) try to capture the completed bridge over the Vistula at Sandomierz,

on which only it was possible to cross the Vistula.

I expressed these considerations to Dreyer, who has already reported to Novikov. Having received approval, I sat down for an order according to which the 8th Cavalry Division was to move to Lyasotsin and there destroy the enemy's crossing facilities on the right bank of the Vistula. 14th

the cavalry division was heading to the area of Svetsine, Bilcha, where it took up a starting position to attack Sandomierz from the west.

On August 25, the Tarnow region, filled with Russian troops, which the commander of the 1st Austrian army looked at with concern, suddenly became empty. Russian infantry stretched to the north and northwest, which did not escape the attention of the Austrians. Conrad received the following report from Dunkl at about 5 p.m.: "The situation is unchanged. The enemy is withdrawing from Yuzefuwa in a northwestern direction. After passing 8 kilometers and not finding the crossing at Annopol, the 8th cavalry division considered its task completed, and Zander placed the division for the night in the Lyasotsin area. When a report about this was received at the headquarters of the 14th division, Novikov was forced to sign an urgent paper to Zander indicating the need for decisive action against Annopol. On August 25, the 14th Cavalry Division, having made a 43-kilometer march and cutting the Sandomierz-Opatow highway, settled down for the night in the Svetsine, Bilcha area. Reconnaissance on that day in the Opatuva region and to the west of it discovered only small parts of the enemy cavalry, which quickly retreated beyond the Nida River. In the east, the enemy also hurriedly hid in Sandomierz, and a hundred reconnaissance Cossacks, who left the Opatow-Sandomierz highway from the north, advanced unhindered to the village of Lenarczyce and captured Hill 215.9 and the village of Mielchany. Such a quick withdrawal of the Austrians to Sandomierz and the abandonment of the heights dominating the city without a fight spoke of the weakness of the enemy. On August 26, it was decided to try to capture Sandomierz on the move. On the morning of

August 26, the 2nd brigade with four guns of the 23rd cavalry battery moved along the highway to Sandomierz, the 1st brigade with two guns of the same battery - to the front Zhuravitse, Loevice, border guards - to Zlota. Concentrating south of Lenarczyce, units of the 2nd brigade, supported by the fire of the 23rd battery, launched an offensive along the highway and, despite enemy artillery fire, quickly occupied the Sudola farm and height 215.9, finding excellent trenches abandoned by the enemy with the front to the west. In one of these trenches at a height of 215.9, Novikov, Dreyer, I and part of the orderly officers were stationed, leaving the grooms on the western slopes of this height. The border guards quickly took possession of Zloty,

pushing back small infantry units of the enemy, and gradually moving towards Andrushkovitsa. The enemy fired artillery mainly at the Sudola estate. The hilly nature of the terrain,

heavy enemy fire from the western outskirts of Sandomierz stopped the advance of the 14th Cavalry Division, which, leaving Milchany and the eastern outskirts of the Zloty guard on the Sudola line, retreated to the nearest area to the west for the night. The division headquarters was located in the manor's yard Rozhki.

The 5th cavalry division was also found, which on August 26 approached from Zavikhost, located near the village of Kihara, having security south of the Opatowka River. After spending two days at Zavikhost, the 5th Cavalry Division now also rushed to Sandomierz. Coming into contact with the advanced units of the Austrians on the Khvalka-Mokoszyn line, the 5th Cavalry Division withdrew by nightfall to the north across the Opatowka River, exposing the left flank of the outpost of the 14th Cavalry Division. The senior in rank, General Moritz, the head of the 5th Cavalry Division, did not take upon himself the unification by the actions of all three divisions, but at the same time he did not want to submit to Novikov. The chief of staff of the 5th division, Colonel Popov, was more to blame for this, who, in the end, expelled the communications officer I sent from the headquarters. So, in front of one object - the bridgehead at Sandomierz - there were two independent chiefs of cavalry divisions, solving, in essence, the same task.

Left at Annopol, the 8th Cavalry Division, after receiving persistent confirmation of more energetic work, moved to the Vistula on August 26. Having concentrated three regiments of the division with a battery south of Dźbno on the highway, Zander sent the 8th Lancers with the 15th cavalry battery, which took up position to shell the right bank, to the river. Having not found any means of crossing, the commander of the 8th Lancers Regiment, Colonel of the General Staff Nikulin, decided to again transfer the hunters to the opposite bank. Led by the valiant commander of the regiment, forty uhlans soon found themselves on the right bank of the Vistula and immediately set about destroying enemy depots, easily pushing back their weak covering units, and the 15th cavalry battery opened fire on enemy carts stretching from

north to south and leaving the sphere of fire. These are the "several squadrons" of which we heard about the crossing from the lips of Gaye, forcing General Dunkl to detain the 3rd division of the German Landwehr at Krasnik. Soon, infantry with artillery appeared at Annopol, and the uhlans, suffering small losses, also swam back to their battery. The 15th cavalry

battery, which stood in an open position, was taken by the enemy under effective artillery fire, but Zander quickly supported his 15th cavalry battery with the 1st Don battery, which took a closed position and, in turn, took the Austrian battery under fire and forced it shut up. The 15th cavalry battery was taken to the limbers and, together with the lancers, retreated to the main forces of the 8th cavalry division. Having finished on this day, on August 26, the 8th Cavalry Division was located in the Lyasotsin region, watching the Vistula. In general, on this day, August

26, the left wing of Dunkl's army was shot down and began to move south. It was clear that the cavalry would not be able to cross to the right bank either at Annopol or at Zavikhost. The task - to strike at the rear of the enemy to the west of San - remained the same. There were no pontoons. The only solution was to take Sandomierz and build bridges here. Therefore, Novikov approved the decision proposed for August 27 by the division headquarters: 1) the 14th cavalry division from the west to attack Sandomierz; 2) to ask the 5th Cavalry Division to help this attack with actions from the north; 3) pull up the 8th cavalry division to Sandomierz. On August 27, units of the

14th Cavalry Division began to pull up to the outpost line in the morning. The border guards, knocking out the enemy, quickly captured Andrushkovice and continued the offensive on Strochtsytse. The 1st brigade of the 14th cavalry division, having occupied Milchany, was advancing on Koberishi, but the offensive was still slow. The 2nd brigade made little progress across completely open terrain from the front of Hill 215.9, the Sudola estate. On the entire sector of the 14th division, only six horse-drawn guns of the 23rd battery operated. The 5th Cavalry Division, which

received an order from the headquarters of the 9th Army to act in cooperation with Novikov, but was not subordinate to the latter, limited itself to artillery combat.

against the Makoshin line, Golembice, and again at night, without leaving guard guards at the line reached during the day, she went to spend the night across the Opatowka River. Despite instructions from the 14th Division Headquarters to expose its flank, the 5th Cavalry Division remained true to itself. The extended units of the 14th division had to occupy

Khvalki themselves. Even with the approach of the 8th cavalry division, Novikov had at his disposal no more than two battalions of dismounted cavalry with 18 guns (the 5th cavalry division, which was hard to count on, could provide another battalion and 12 guns). The enemy in Sandomierz had more than a regiment of infantry with several batteries located in pre-dug trenches with peaks and a barbed wire of at least three stakes. Infantry was needed to attack such an enemy position.

Fortunately, our infantry returned again. On the evening of August 27, a report was received from the commander of the 72nd Infantry Regiment, who informed Novikov that his regiment was being placed at the disposal of the 14th Cavalry Division and asked for instructions. The answer was sent quickly (by telegraph and by flying mail): go to Sandomierz.

There is no need to hide the fact that the Tilians were awaited at the headquarters of the 14th division with great impatience and they knew that old comrades would help in a different way than Moritz's 5th cavalry division did. To wait two days for the approach of the Tilians, who had to travel about 60 kilometers and not try to force the Vistula somewhere upstream from Sandomierz, the headquarters of the 14th division considered unacceptable. Therefore, Dreyer and I, having discussed the situation, proposed to Novikov on August 28, leaving the 8th cavalry division and border guards in front of Sandomierz from the west, to send the 14th cavalry division, consisting of two brigades and the 23rd cavalry battery, west to the Osek region, so that here try either to find fords, or to cross the Vistula using improvised means and boats collected from local residents. Novikov agreed to this, and the 14th Cavalry Division, under the command of Colonel Senchi, moved west, handing over its sector to General Sander. By the evening of August 28, the division spent the night in Klimantow. Near Sandomierz,

in anticipation of the arrival of the 72nd Infantry Regiment, there was a comparative lull: artillery skirmish was carried out from both sides, and from our side the fire was already directed at the center of the city, where, apparently, the enemy's reserves were located. The 5th Cavalry Division was still moving back and forth from the Opatowka River during the day and across the Opatowka River at night. Thus passed the days of 28 and 29 August.

However, the hopes for the crossing of the 14th cavalry division in the Osek region did not materialize: there were no fords, and there were no boats from the local residents. The swimming of individual fighters to the right bank of the Vistula was met by rifle fire from the enemy, which had noticeably

strengthened here. By the evening of August 29, the 72nd Infantry Regiment approached with two field batteries, located for the night in the area of the villages of Malice and Loevice. It was clear that the Austrians were retreating: the 14th Cavalry Division reported on the movement of carts to the west, but it was not known where the right flank of the Russian 9th Army was located. The headquarters of the 9th Army was stubbornly silent and apparently considered it normal that three cavalry divisions with the 72nd Infantry Regiment, stationed at Sandomierz, did not cross the Vistula. For the headquarters of the Novikov division, it was clear that the Austr

the river San, and therefore the crossing of the cavalry at Sandomierz to the right bank has not yet lost its significance. Therefore, it was proposed by the headquarters on the night of August 31, the 72nd Infantry Regiment and the border guards to attack Sandomierz. On the morning of August 30, I felt unwell: I developed a high temperature, and from 12 o'clock in the afternoon I lay in semi-consciousness. Therefore, all orders for the night assault were made by Dreyer himself. The main blow was assigned to the three battalions of the 72nd Infantry Regiment, which was supposed to take possession of the Catholic cemetery and the church near it, and then, together with the border guards moving from Andruszkowice to Starachowice, break into the city and take over the bridge. The 8th cavalry division remained in its positions from height 215.9 to the Sudola estate and the village of Khvalki. To build on the success of the night assault, by 8 o'clock in the morning on August 31, when the fog cleared, the field battery and one of the batteries of the 8th cavalry division were to approach the front lines and assist the attackers with their fire. The general head of the assault troops was not appointed, and the head of the 8th cavalry division was informed of the upcoming attack by written order. The night was approaching. The headquarters of the 14th cavalry division was 8 kilometers from the Tula people, but was connected with them by a telephone, which often deteriorated. While all these orders were being made, the scouts of the 72nd Infantry

Regiment and the border guards studied the approaches to the enemy position and the position itself all day on August 30. In the first hour of the night, both the Tuliens and the border guards moved to the initial lines of the attack. In the stillness of the night, the 72nd Infantry Regiment deployed its battle formation to attack; guarded by a chain of patrols in the first line, two battalions of the regiment marched in the ranks in two lines; from the third battalion, two companies each went to the reserves with a ledge behind both flanks of the first line; companies of all battalions were in two platoon columns.

Communication with the border guards, established by the commander of the 72nd Infantry Regiment, began to be interrupted more and more often with the start of the movement. At five o'clock in the morning, the Tuliens came close to the fortified position of the Austrians, who were unaware of the impending strike. The decisive moment came, and the regimental commander gave the order to move on the assault. Without opening fire, in complete silence, the Tula rushed forward. Smashing with butts, small axes, shovels and pushing

with the hands of the enemy's barbed wire, the attackers were in the first line of trenches in an instant, destroying the Austrians who did not have time to recover. Sweeping away everything in its path, in a short period of time, the Tulsians took possession of two lines of trenches with a decisive blow and fought near the church, breaking into the city itself. The impulse of the attack was so strong that the enemy offered almost no resistance, falling under the bayonet attacks of the assaulting Tula. Having knocked out weak guards on Strohish, the border guards soon found themselves in front of the Austrian trenches on the outskirts of Krakow, where they lingered, having no connection with the 72nd Infantry Regiment. Having filled the resulting gap, the two right-flank companies of the 3rd battalion were forced to move into the first line, and the two reserve companies of the same battalion, located behind the left flank, extended the regiment's battle formation to the north. By 7 o'clock in the morning on August 31, the Tula people no longer had a reserve, they could not count on any help other than artillery fire. The neighbor on the left, units of the 8th cavalry division, led the usual gunfight with the enemy, and on the right, the border guards did not move forward. Assessing the situation, the wounded regiment commander ordered to gain a foothold in the captured positions.

Stunned by the first blow, the enemy had already begun to recover. Having summed up the reserves, the Austrians stopped the advance of the advanced units of the Tulsians to the city center, at the same time organizing a counterattack from the northwestern part of the city against the left flank of the regiment. At eight o'clock in the morning, dense lines of Austrians appeared in the dissipating fog, decisively advancing against the left flank of the regiment. Fighting back with rifle and machine-gun fire, the 72nd Infantry Regiment waited in vain for the support of its artillery fire: the field battery at that time was only approaching Loewitz, and the artillery of the 8th Cavalry Division did not open fire, was indifferent to the flaring infantry battle. The Tula people experienced difficult moments, the unpunished fire of enemy artillery intensified, the number of killed soldiers increased. In vain the officers of the regiment begged the soldiers to continue to hold out until our artillery opened fire. The impulse of the attack weakened, faith in the help of others went out, and ... the Tula people began to retreat. Suffering huge losses, having lost almost all the officers, leaving the wounded and killed on the battlefield, the remnants of the 72nd Infantry Regiment were among only 600 of the 2200 people who went on the attack by 9 o'clock

August withdrew to their original position, and then to Loewitz. Having lost contact with the Tullians, the border guards drove the enemy out of the Krakowka suburb, but did not advance further and by 9 o'clock in the morning they

also retreated to Andrushkovitsa. The headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division calmly woke up, confident in the success of the night assault on the 72nd Infantry Regiment. However, during the night not a single report was received from the regiment commander, therefore, without waiting for the departure of the headquarters, I sent an officer on horseback to Loewitz and further to Sandomierz for communication. At nine o'clock in the morning, when Novikov and his staff rode out to the heights southwest of the village of Leparchitse, there was complete silence on the battlefield. The 8th Cavalry Division remained in its positions. Soon, General Zander also appeared at the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division. At about 10 o'clock in the morning, on the height on which the headquarters of the 14th division stood, a communications officer sent by me to the 72nd Infantry Regiment arrived with a gloomy look and reported on the catastrophe. Novikov, as usual, sighed and puffed heavily, and Dreyer attacked Zander, considering him responsible for the death of the regiment, which was not promptly supported by artillery fire. Meanwhile, it was clear that if the Tula were repulsed, then the enemy was strong enough to go on the counterattack against the 8th Cavalry Division. I intervened in Dreyer's dispute with Sander and, first of all, suggested that the 8th Cavalry Division consolidate, prepare artillery to meet the Austrian advance and call the 14th Cavalry Division to Sandomierz, in view of its unsuccessful attempts to cross the Vistula. My proposals were accepted, and I could give the appropriate orders. Captain Leonov, who arrived from the 5th Cavalry Division, reported that the San River had been forced at Chokay by guards riflemen advancing further to the Nadbzhese station, south of Sandomierz. From now on, Sandomierz, as a point of cavalry crossing

for a strike on the flank and rear of the Austrian army, was already losing all significance. The first major setback had a hard time at the divisional headquarters. Novikov was afraid that he would be removed from the division. Dreyer, dreaming of an extra reward, walked around depressed. I am writing a memoir, not a historical study, but in all fairness I must say that either it was necessary to take the leadership of the night battle into my

in the evening, put the artillery in position so that it can provide assistance in a timely manner, even at night.

The day of August 31 passed horribly at the front near Sandomierz. Recovered and put in order, the remnants of the 72nd Infantry Regiment with the accidentally remaining alive adjutant of this regiment began to move forward again to pick up the wounded. The border guards and units of the 8th cavalry division followed the turrets. Austrian marauders were already prowling around our dead and wounded, rummaging through the pockets of officers and soldiers. When our soldiers approached, the Austrians hurriedly fled to the city. Involuntarily, the thought of the withdrawal of the Austrians crept in due to the crossing of the guards riflemen of the San River at Chokai. On the shoulders of the retreating enemy, units of the 8th Cavalry Division and border guards from the west, dragoons of the 5th Cavalry Division from the north broke into the city and captured the bridge, extinguishing its span that was burning on the opposite bank. The enemy, fearing encirclement in Sandomierz, leaving guns, weapons, stocks of shells and ammunition, food depots and other property, hastily crossed the bridge and two fords to the right bank of the Vistula.

The remnants of the 72nd Infantry Regiment were introduced into the city, while the 8th Cavalry Division and border guards remained in the occupied areas. The 5th Cavalry Division, on instructions from the headquarters of the 9th Army, set out for Staszow and Stopnitsa for reconnaissance on the left bank of the

On September 1, units subordinated to Novikov remained in the Sandomierz area, throwing cavalry reconnaissance to the right bank of the Vistula and repairing the bridge. On the same day, the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division went to inspect the night battlefield of the 72nd Infantry Regiment, which retained only a small part of its fighting strength. True, the wounded had already been placed in city hospitals and churches, but the dead were still lying on the battlefield, testifying to the successes that the Tula people had achieved in the night assault. A battlefield unfolded before our eyes. In what positions were the dead not lying! Almost at the exit to the central square of the city, they found a house set on fire by the Austrians, in which badly burned corpses of officers and soldiers lay. The fire was extinguished soon after. The corpses of the regiment commander, all battalion commanders, most of the company commanders, already collected at the churches, were lying. Calmly, with open eyes, lay the courageous commander of the 72nd Infantry

regiment, who received two wounds in the arm and leg and died from a third bullet in the scrotum. Death appears to have been instantaneous. Interspersed with the corpses of the Russians were the dead Austrians. Hospitals, churches of the city were overflowing with at least 1500 Austrian and Russian wounded. In a hasty flight, the Austrians not only did not leave doctors and medical personnel, but even requisitioned all the dressings in the city's pharmacies. All doctors of the 8th and 14th cavalry divisions were urgently sent to bandage the wounded.

English military agent in Russia Knox in his diary wrote the following about Sandomierz:

"The policeman found me a lovely, clean room in this very dirty city that was full of troops. I saw one squadron of Ural Cossacks in Sandomierz - these are huge, red-bearded, wild-looking people, almost all with a waterproof cape over their military uniforms. I am not surprised that the Austrians were horrified by them ... Sandomierz was taken on Monday in September, and the Tula regiment suffered severely. The city was occupied for two and a half weeks by the Austrians. My hostess, who spoke a little French, told me that there were Hungarians, Cossacks and all kinds of people in her house ... She told me that her husband insisted that she go to her sister when Sandomierz was occupied by the Austrians. On the day when the Russians recaptured the city, the Austrians captured 17 old people and took them away with them. Her husband, a 56-year-old pharmacist, was one of those taken away, and the reason was the fact that a shot was fired from a group of houses, among which was the pharmacist's house. Now she is in despair, because she is not able to find out anything about him and it is indeed quite possible that this will last for months.

On September 2, the 14th and 8th Cavalry Divisions, leaving the 72nd Tula Infantry Regiment as a garrison in Sandomierz, crossed to the right bank of the Vistula, but ... ended up in the rear of the Guards Rifle Brigade advancing on Tarnobrzeg. Following the arrows, both divisions reached Tarnobrzeg, and then were turned back to Sandomierz. The enemy snapped at the rearguards against the pursuing riflemen and sometimes went over to such counterattacks that the riflemen who had in the companies

60-80 people, they were barely beaten off. It was felt that the Battle of Galicia, won by the armies of the Southwestern Front, had subsided. There was a break in operations. On September 4 or 5, a

telegram arrived from the army headquarters in which General Lechitsky summoned Novikov to his office for a report. It was a thunderbolt from a clear sky. Dreyer was confused. He came to me for advice. I thought that Novikov should go with the chief of staff (although he was not personally called), who always accompanies his commander. So it was decided. And now let's turn to historical references, what happened

on the opposite side and in the highest headquarters of the Russian army.

Conrad's attention was diverted by the decisive battle that ensued on the Eastern Front of the 2nd, 7th and 4th Austrian armies with the advancing 8th and 3rd Russian armies and the 5th Russian army that began to move forward again. On August 26, the left flank of the 1st Austrian Army was pushed back by the Guards Rifle Brigade and began to retreat to the south. To a report sent by Dankl about this, Conrad replied: "The High Command is convinced that the brave 1st Army will do everything possible to prevent the Russian advance from Lublin so that the retreat to Sanu is not in danger." In the morning, at about nine o'clock, on August 27, the command of the 1st Army reported that there were no more large Austrian units on the western bank of the Vistula, and the entire 7th Cavalry Division had been transferred to the right bank. But by one in the afternoon Dankl reported that it was possible to expect an attack on the rear of the 1st Army through Sandomierz and Tarnobrzeg, so he subordinated the 7th Cavalry Division to the chief of rear of the 1st Army. At about 5:30 a.m., the commander of the 1st Army reported that at night the army would withdraw to the line Frampol, Gorai, Polichna, Olbenzin, Lisnitsk, Sveciechow. The army headquarters on August 27 moves to Janur Lubelski.

On August 28, a crisis of battle broke out in the east, and Conrad, along with the commander-in-chief went there.

Meanwhile, the situation on both flanks of the 1st Army was developing unfavorably, therefore, on August 28, Dankl asked Conrad whether it would be in the common interest for the stubborn defense of the 1st Army north of the Tanevskaya lowland, or would it be better for her to retreat across the San River (for his part, Dankl believed retreat behind the San is the most expedient, especially since there are few shells left). On this same day Conrad

replied that a battle was going on in the east, and the task of the 1st Army was to temporarily delay the enemy north of the Tanev forests, without getting involved in a decisive battle. Continue sending carts to the rear, so that, if necessary, the army could retreat beyond the San River and there, in the area from the mouth to the confluence of the Trzebosnitsa River, gain a foothold. Highway Bilgorai Senyava to cover with cavalry and detachment infantry.

On August 29, Conrad made the final decision to interrupt the first battle and withdraw the army behind the San. On August 30, the 1st Army reported that the enemy was weakly pursuing from the front on the right bank of the Vistula. Kummer is ordered to stubbornly defend the San, thoroughly destroy the bridges and take his carts to the rear. The 110th Landsturm Brigade was subordinated to Kummer. On August 31, Konrad had already put before Moltke the question of transferring significant forces to the Krakow region in order to cover Posen and Silesia. The 1st Army withdrew that day behind the San, but already reported the appearance of the enemy at Kopshivnitsa (14th Cavalry Division. - BSh.) and in front of Sandomierz two cavalry divisions with infantry (5th and 8th Cavalry Divisions and 72 th Infantry Regiment - B.Sh.).

On September 1, the Russians crossed the lower reaches of the San on the Kummer front. The 12th Infantry Division launched a counterattack in a northeasterly direction. On this day, the fate of Kummer's army group was decided - it was disbanded. The remnants of the 110th Landsturm Brigade, defending Sandomierz, were merged into the 106th Infantry Division, which was directly subordinate to the 1st Army. The 100th Brigade and the remnants of the 95th Landsturm Division were used as stage troops. Such is the fate of the "old" enemy of the 14th Cavalry Division, which ceased to exist as a military unit in the very first battle of Galicia.

The official Austrian history of the world war explains that Dankl, the commander of the 1st Army, wanted to withdraw his regiments across the San River undisturbed. Of course, the looming threat over the bridgehead at Sandomierz, defended by the "frightened and weakened 110th Landsturm Brigade," mattered. On August 29, Dankl reinforced the Sandomierz garrison with the 100th Landsturm Brigade. The right bank of the Vistula from Sandomierz to Tarnobrzeg and further west was covered by the 7th Cavalry Division.

Thus, on the night of August 31, about four battalions of the 72nd Infantry Regiment and border guards attacked seventeen battalions of the Austrians, although they were significantly thinned and "scared", as the official Austrian history says, but the success of the Tula people would have been undoubted if they had supported him in time artillery fire.

It is not my task to analyze in general the actions of the Russian armies during the Battle of Galicia, but it must nevertheless be noted that in this battle neither side succeeded in encircling and destroying most of the fighting forces. Meanwhile, the situation for this was favorable for the Austrians against the 5th Russian Army, which had escaped the blow in time, and for the Russians against the 1st Austrian Army (provided that Alekseev had persistently carried out his plan of transferring the 9th Army to left bank of the Vistula). What would be the significance of at least the encirclement of the 1st Austrian army on the outcome of the war - it is difficult even now to say, but it would, in any case,

significant.

So, the first big front-line operation was carried out, in which I had to take part, although in a small position, but in a rather difficult situation. I described it in detail because the historians of the First World War were extremely careless in the study of archives. Maybe my work will fill them up a little.

The situation was difficult for the 14th Cavalry Division from the very first days of not only the war, but also the preparatory period for it. But on the other hand, officers, non-commissioned officers and privates received many awards for their work. As for me, I received the orders of Vladimir 1st class, Anna 4th and 3rd class and Stanislav with swords and bows. Regarding the knowledge of the war, I somehow felt stronger on my feet, I gained confidence in actions, which I previously knew only theoretically, and I developed the skills of operational staff work. Speaking in cavalry, I felt myself sitting firmly in the saddle!

CAVALRY VEIL ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE VISLA IN AUTUMN 1914

In the evening of September 5, Novikov and Dreyer returned from the commander of the 9th Army, General Lechitsky, to the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry

Division, located in Tarnobrzeg. I went out to meet them, they were both in a cheerful mood. Dreyer informed me that Novikov had been appointed commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps, and that he had been appointed chief of staff of the same corps. Congratulating, I asked how such a strict person as Lechitsky met them. When Novikov left, Dreyer told me about the reception. According to him, he, Dreyer, talked more, and Novikov

kept silent more often, sometimes puffed up, making a warlike appearance. After asking about past events, Lechitsky outlined the new tasks of the 1st Corps. At the direction of the front commander, the corps included the 5th, 8th, 14th cavalry divisions, the 4th and

5th Don Cossack divisions and the Separate Cossack Turkestan brigade. The tasks of the corps were to clear the left bank of the Vistula from the Austrians, to reconnoiter the situation on the Czesochowa, Krakow front, and to strike at the rear of the Austrian armies east of Krakow. To cross the Vistula, a pontoon battalion was attached to the corps. This is how Dreyer described the tasks of the corps. Meanwhile, in all our military-historical works, covering the tasks assigned to the 1st Cavalry Corps, it is completely silent about the fact that it was

supposed to strike at the rear of the Austrians. But this is a fundamental question. Let us refer only to some facts. The second part of the "Strategic Sketch of the War of 1914-1918", written by Voronkov and published in 1923, says, in particular: the 1st Cavalry Corps "is entrusted with the following tasks: 1) to secure the right flank of the front, 2) to clear the enemy area of the river Nida, 3) reconnaissance

Krakow, 4) observe the Vistula River from Krakow to Sandomierz. The 9th Army must move an infantry brigade to the left bank of the Vistula to support the corps. At the same time, Voronkov refers to an "authoritative" source - the Military Scientific Archive (case No. 162, p. 126). From Volume V of the "History of the World War", published by the Reichsarchiv, we learn about the content of Novikov's radio message intercepted on September 12: ... as soon as intelligence finds out the deployment of the Germans in Silesia, he will refuse to fulfill the order given to him - he will not cross to the southern bank of the Vistula, but will limit himself to defense and a curtain on

the north bank of that river. I deliberately highlighted the tasks of the corps. After all, if you distort them, as Voronkov and others did, then any historian has the right to present a claim to the corps: why did he trample around the Vistula, why didn't he go straight to Silesia? Such a claim would be justified if Lechitsky did not take it into his head to carry out his operational ideas, which run counter to the guidelines of the commander of the Southwest

So, to cut off the Austrians from Krakow, while at the same time conducting reconnaissance against Silesia, Novikov and Dreyer returned to Tarnobrzeg with

such an attitude. Naturally, I asked Dreyer who would be the head of the 14th Cavalry Division? He replied: the quartermaster general of the headquarters of the 9th army of his majesty's retinue, Major General Erdeli, receives

the division. Dreyer also started talking about me, saying that Erdeli insisted that one of the staff officers who had already been in combat should head the division headquarters. Since Dreyer himself was leaving for the corps, I had to remain behind him.

To himself, at the headquarters of the corps, Dreyer took Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Shatilov from the headquarters of the 9th Army to the post of staff officer of the General Staff. His father was a member of the State Council, and this was of no small importance to his son. As we parted, Dreyer asked me which of the division staff officers I could recommend for promotion to the post of senior adjutant of the General Staff. I named two candidates: staff captains Rozhenko and Melchakov. They studied at the Academy of the General Staff, both made a good impression. I advised taking them to the headquarters of the corps, hoping to do without them at my headquarters.

In a word, in the evening the personnel issues of the division of the two headquarters were resolved. I was in a hurry to see the acting head of the 14th division, Colonel Sencha, in order to resolve a number of issues related to the redeployment of the division. On the morning of September 7, the division was to cross the bridge at Sandomierz again to the left bank of the Vistula and reach Klimantow. Having written the order, I go to Sencha. He signed it. I returned to my headquarters at about 23.00 and suddenly I learned good news: the chief of staff of our division, Colonel Westfalen, had returned from St. Petersburg. I was glad that I would again remain in my former full-time post of senior adjutant of the General Staff (chief of the operational unit. - B.Sh.) > and, therefore, I would be freed from household worries and troubles. And there were a lot of them! After all, Dreyer did not like to engage in economic affairs.

My thoughts somehow involuntarily switched to the career ladder, along which Novikov was climbing. For only a year he commanded the 14th Cavalry Division. And how he has risen! He achieved a promotion - he was appointed commander of the corps. This means that he overtook the heads of the 8th and 5th cavalry divisions, Generals Sander and Moritz, The Order of St. George of the 4th degree flashed on his chest, this award was given to him for the "successful actions" of the division

on the left bank of the Vistula. Did Novikov deserve a promotion and an award? To tell the truth, no! He just got lucky. And he was lucky because he had to command the very division that his predecessor, General Oranovsky, had well prepared for hostilities. He worked hard, tempered the division on the fields of exercises. This is what ensured her success in the battles on the left bank of the Vistula. She was accustomed to both equestrian and foot combat. And if necessary, it turned from cavalry to infantry. Its soldiers and officers in the offensive showed swiftness and courage. Out of a total of 5200 people, the division lost 32 soldiers killed in a month and a half of the war, 137 people were wounded, including 130 soldiers, 7 officers. While in Tarnobrzeg, the

division was replenished with two marching squadrons. Their soldiers made a good impression. They were upset that they were given weak horses. Not drawn into the campaign, the horses quickly gave up. I had to replace them with stronger horses,

which were taken from the landowners. The regular horses, with which the division went to war, continued their faithful, sometimes very difficult service for a

long time. The morning of September 7, 1914 came. The 14th Cavalry Division, having crossed the bridge at Sandomierz Vistula, again found itself on its native left bank. From here she moved to Klimantow. Regiments and squadrons arrived in the Klimantuv area on the same day at about 15.00. We spent the night in the surrounding villages.

As early as September 6, the 8th Cavalry Division crossed to the left bank of the Vistula, concentrating in the Golembyuv area. The 5th Cavalry Division on September 1 made the transition from Sandomierz to Staszow, then to Stopnitsa and settled down in the area of Stopnitsa, Polanets. From here she conducted reconnaissance to the west, observing the course of the Vistula east of Polanz. The corps headquarters moved to Sandomierz.

By the evening of September 7, the head of the 14th Cavalry Division, General Erdeli, arrived in Klimantow. He was accompanied by his personal adjutant, Prince Kantagetszen, and a young man in civilian clothes, a certain Kuzminsky. Erdelyi first received Colonel Sencha and Westphalen. Then the staff officers were called in to introduce them to the new chief. Erdeli was taller than

average, still a young general in years. He made a good impression. He simply accepted us. When the presentation ceremony ended, he asked me to stay and report on the state of the division. After listening to my opinion about the state of the regiments, their command staff, the general instructed me to prepare an order for the division to move in one column to Bogoria and Stoshnitsa. I said that it would be very difficult to move in one column. He explained that the division had lost the habit of this outdated method of movement, but Erdeli insisted on his own. I took the order to Westphalen, the division chief of staff. He

did not dare to report it to the general himself and dragged me with him. Erdeli signed the order. In the regiments and squadrons, of course, they were surprised at the order in which the marching order of the division, long discarded by life, was revived.

In the evening, at dinner, Westphalen asked me about the affairs in the division, about its combat operations, about the dynamics of the most acute battles with the enemy. I couldn't help but feel that before Westphalen

comes the simple truth: war dictates its own laws, requires flexibility, throws away everything that is outdated. When I told him that in our division most often we had to conduct a dismounted battle, rarely go into cavalry attacks, Westphalen frowned. Not recognizing a dismounted battle, he was fond of only attacks. "Here it would be to wrap up the cavalry attack by the brigade, or even the entire division!" - he threw a remark when it came to dismounted combat. It was thought that the war would teach him how to act! But, unfortunately, the war did not teach Westfalen, who was limited in operational-tactical thinking. On June 8, 1915, he died in a horse attack and killed almost the entire 2nd brigade, which he temporarily commanded. Westphalen's gross miscalculation is yet to come... The

morning of September 8... The hour hand is approaching the number 10. It's time to get on horseback to follow in the head of the column of the main forces. Suddenly, the head of the division calls me. I find Westfalen and an unfamiliar foreigner with him. Erdeli introduces me to a colonel in English uniform, Knox. "Mr.

Knox will be at our divisional headquarters," said Erdeli. - Orient him in the environment. Shaking hands, we set

to work: I unfolded a two-verst card, and Knox took out a ten-verst one. Then I also took out a ten-verst map from my bag. I orient the colonel in the location of neighboring formations and units, explain the task assigned to the 14th cavalry division. Knox listened attentively, but very rarely made notes on the map. He did not

make any notes in a notebook either. But now, almost thirteen years later, Knox's book "With the Russian Army in 1914-1917", London, fell into my hands. Knox devoted an entire chapter of his book to our division. This chapter, "With a Cavalry Division in Southwestern Poland in September and October," is written in the form of a diary.

It became clear to me: the military agent of England conscientiously kept a diary, writing down his observations in it so that none of the outsiders could see ...

The situation at the front changed quickly. The corps headquarters urged our division to cross the Vistula, demanded that we strike at the rear of the 1st Austrian army, retreating to Krakow. It was the closest

rear saturated with troops. Water in the Vistula was constantly arriving, and the division did not yet have any means of crossing. After weighing these circumstances, Erdeli became worried. He summoned Westfalen and me and said that we would go with him to the headquarters of the corps (he was in Staszow). We expressed our point of view to the chief of staff of the corps. In our opinion, it is more expedient for the 14th Cavalry Division to advance to the west of Stopnitsa, and not to the south. We also stated that without a pontoon battalion the division would not be able to cross the Vistula. After listening to us, Dreyer insisted on crossing the division in the area south of Stopnitsa. Erdeli, supporting Dreyer, actually rejected my arguments, the essence of which was that the division would not be able to cross the Vistula south of Stopnitsa.

We returned to the division headquarters disappointed, because Dreyer was acting contrary to

common sense. On the morning of September 9, the headquarters of our division headed for the area south of Stopnica, on the Vistula. Intelligence, of course, did not bring us anything new. Somewhere far away, beyond the Vistula, gunfire was heard. The closer our combat patrols approached the Vistula, the more often the enemy met them with rifle fire from the opposite bank. In a word, the day we spent at the corps headquarters was wasted in vain. But on that day, the division would be able to move westward by at least 35 kilometers. How useful these precious kilometers would be for our cavalry!

While the 14th Cavalry Division was at Stopnitsa, the 8th Cavalry Division advanced to its right flank, to the area of the village of Solets, and the 5th Cavalry Division moved to the area of Nowy Korczina.

Only by the evening of September 9, the corps commander Novikov decided to strike at the rear of the 1st Austrian army between Krakow and Tarnow. Three regular cavalry divisions (8th, 14th and 5th) were involved in this task. Reconnaissance to the west, at the front of Klyuchbork, Krakow, was to be carried out by the 4th and 5th Don Cossack divisions and the Cossack Turkestan brigade. Before the approach of the 4th and 5th Cossack Don divisions from the right bank of the Vistula through Sandomierz to the Kielce region, the Cossack Turkestan brigade was moving northwest of

Endzheyuv in the direction of Vloshchova. On September 10, the 14th Cavalry Division was to cross the Nida River in the Wislice region, and the 8th C

Pinchuva. The pontoon battalion was moving to join the 14th division, which was to begin crossing the Vistula.

On the morning of September 10, the 14th division moved in two columns from the area of Stopnica to Wislice. Wet roads made traffic difficult. The division headquarters went with the left column - the 1st brigade, the 2nd brigade - with border guards. Having provided enhanced security guards, the brigades settled down for the night, choosing for it pre-prepared areas in peasant villages. On the morning

of September 11, the commander of the pontoon battalion, who was already on the way to the division, arrived at the division headquarters. The head of the division instructed me, together with the commander of the pontoon battalion, to reconnoiter the crossing point. We were covered by a squadron of lancers. It turned out that his commander, Captain Demyanovich, was very lazy. It was his fault that we arrived at the mission with a delay of almost four hours. I could not put up with the extreme slowness and irresponsibility of Captain Demyanovich and took command of the squadron.

After spending the night in a small manor, abandoned among the hills and copses, I moved through Kosice to the village of Seroslavice, located on the Vistula (40 km east of Krakow). In Kosice I found the commander of our reconnaissance hundred. I warned him that I would be ahead, on the Vistula. The squadron

disguised itself in a hollow. I took with me one officer from the reconnaissance squadron, and together we climbed to a height dominating the northern bank of the Vistula to the east of the village of Seroslavitsa. We are counting whether we will have enough materials and engineering means for aiming in this area of the bridge ... At about one in the

afternoon, we learned that Austrian soldiers were robbing the village of Seroslavitsa and transporting the stolen property to their shore by boat. At about nine o'clock in the morning a German plane flew along the Vistula towards the east. I urgently reported this to the divisional headquarters, which, in my opinion, was moving towards the crossing point. Far, far away, on

the horizon, rose the Carpathians, covered with forests. In some places, white puffs of smoke could be seen above the forest: trains were going. To the right, closer to the shore, stretched the dense Nepolomice forest. To the east of it, Austrian carts were moving along the roads.

I urgently send a combat patrol to Seroslavitsa, and I put the squadron on horses. Suddenly, our combat patrol at full speed returns back: the Austrians opened heavy machine-gun fire on it. I'm withdrawing the squadron to Kosice, establishing contact with our reconnaissance hundred here. I learn from its commander: a hundred are ordered to retreat to the north. There, to the north, our division was moving. It became clear to me that something unforeseen by the head of the division had happened. And at about 16.00 I learned that Austrian intelligence had already occupied the area where in the morning we planned to build a pontoon bridge ...

I decided with the squadron to also move north to Pinchuv.

Not reaching ten kilometers to Pinchuv, I overtook the 2nd brigade. From its commander I learn about the location of the division headquarters for the night. The headquarters spent the night in the forester's house near Pinchuv, occupied by units of

the 8th cavalry division. I dismount from my horse and enter the forester's kitchen. It is filled with captured German soldiers. And next to it, a captured German officer sprawled on the couch in the room. His mouth is bloody. The duty officer at headquarters reported that the head of our division was still awake. I am going to report to him. Erdeli looks at me with guilty eyes. But, leaving me with the squadron to the mercy of fate, without informing me about the withdrawal of the division from the area where it was planned to cross the Vistula, Erdeli does not want to admit his guilt. "It was not

I who made the mistake, but Westphalen," Erdeli told me. Further, Erdeli told me: on September 12, after twelve o'clock, an order was received from the headquarters of our 1st corps: in connection with the concentration of large enemy forces in the Czÿstochowa region, Bendzin to abandon the attack on the rear of the Austrians south of the Vistula and turn all divisions of the corps to the north -west. In pursuance of this order, the Cossack Turkestan brigade should take possession of Vloshchova and advance west to Konetspol; The 4th and 5th Don Cossack divisions should take Kielce, the 14th Cavalry Division should take Endrzejow and move west to Naglowice; The 8th Cavalry Division was to take Wodzisÿaw, and the 5th Cavalry Division was to take Skalbmierz, securing the flank from Krakow.

Immediately, the head of the division told me about the capture of a German patrol on the road to Pinchuv. The siding belonged to the 1st

Guards Reserve Dragoon Regiment.

I asked if intelligence had been sent in a new direction. Erdeli replied that she had not yet been expelled. He suggested that I urgently prepare instructions for reconnaissance squadrons. I wrote the instructions by three o'clock in the morning. Having handed it over to the squadron commanders, I ordered them to immediately go to the indicated areas.

I learned from the liaison officers how the day of September 12 passed in our division. In the morning, she moved south in two columns in the direction of the point chosen for the crossing. At about twelve o'clock in the afternoon an order was received: to change the route of the division in the opposite direction. The order was written by Westphalen. It was clear to me that he had completely "forgotten" about my existence at the divisional headquarters. Otherwise, why did he need to go south himself to reconnoiter the crossing? ... According to our intelligence

and the testimony of captured German soldiers and commanders, it was established that a whole German corps was advancing on Pinchuv.

On the morning of September 13, our 14th division moved through Pinczow to Motkowice. Having crossed the Nida River, she began to move west along the highway from Motkovitsa, to Endzheyuv. Not reaching six kilometers to Yendzheyuv, the division settled down for the night, occupying the city with outposts - a squadron with two machine

guns. The headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Corps moved to Motkovic. A report came from our undercover intelligence: up to two German infantry regiments with artillery were moving towards Naglowice. Soon, the reconnaissance squadron, sent at night to Naglowice, reported that east of Naglowice, he entered into contact with the horse and foot units of the enemy. It was about

two in the afternoon. We had hardly laid out our camp beds when artillery fire began to the northwest of Jydrzejów. They quickly saddled the horses. The headquarters of the division leaves forward, to Endzheyuv. The brigades prepared for battle. According to the

headquarters of our corps, the German corps was advancing along its entire front, which included guards reserve and spare parts.

At about five o'clock in the afternoon, enemy artillery opened fire on Yendzheyuv, knocking out our observers from there. Our two squadrons

supported by the fire of heavy machine guns, fought on the western outskirts of the city. With the onset of darkness, they were forced to leave the city. The Germans immediately entered.

The main forces of our 14th division were not brought into battle. They were taken back for the night to the Yasenna-Yakubuwa area. And the division headquarters went to spend the night in Motkovitsa. Here was the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Corps.

While Erdeli was reporting the situation to General Novikov, I was talking to Dreyer. He was distrustful of our information that a German corps was advancing on Endrzejów. Dreyer described our departure as "too hasty." "All right," I said, "tomorrow you will see for yourself that the 14th Division remains the same as it was." Refusing the proposed dinner, we went to rest. Before going to

bed, we talked with Erdeli. It was about what measures the division should take on 14 September. My opinion was this: to offer decisive resistance to the Germans, leading a mobile defense, starting it from Endrzejów. Erdeli agreed and instructed me to urgently prepare the order. He approved the draft order in full. The order read: units of the 14th Cavalry Division on the morning of September 14 attack the enemy in the town of Endrzejów. To accomplish this task, the border guards advance along the highway to Endzheyuv, the 1st brigade - to advance north of the highway through Rachow on Podhojna, the 2nd brigade - to advance through Dalechove, Wengleniec, Longchin, covering Endzheyuv from the south.

The day came September 14th. At dawn, the head of the 14th division with the headquarters of the division moved from Motkovic along the highway to the west. The observation post was chosen at a height from where the field of the upcoming battle was clearly visible. Erdeli, Westfalen, Knox and I are watching the advance. Ahead, along the village of Piaski, border guards advance in a dismounted formation. The 1st Brigade is advancing cautiously north of the highway to Jydrzejów. The 2nd brigade went head to Dalekhov and Venglenets.

At about eight and a half o'clock in the morning, we saw a rather unexpected picture: the divisional cavalry of the Germans was moving along the highway to Kielce from Endzheyuva, at a certain distance behind it was an infantry outpost, behind which the head of the avant-garde soon appeared. We noticed that the German units did not have side guards.

Silence reigned all around. When the divisional cavalry of the Germans approached Podhojna, and its vanguard stretched out from Endzheyuv, our 1st brigade fell upon them. Machine guns and dismounted dragoons shot at the German cavalry, and our battery from a distance of about one and a half kilometers hit the infantry with shrapnel. The enemy began to panic: the cavalry, throwing peaks, rushed to Podkhoyna; infantry from the highway rushed west to the railroad, leaving their artillery behind. Everything happened so unexpectedly for the enemy that he was stunned and demoralized. But soon the picture changed

dramatically: at least two enemy batteries opened fire on the battery of the 1st brigade. Our gun crews went out of order, the battery fell silent. The German infantry launched a counterattack. One way or another, we had to pull out our battery so that it would not be captured by the enemy infantry. Our 2nd brigade also came under heavy

artillery fire. She had to quickly disperse in squadrons to avoid heavy losses. The commander of the 2nd brigade was ordered to gather squadrons in the Dalekhova area and conduct an offensive in a dismounted formation. Our border guards were also in a difficult situation. They had to retreat.

The shells also flew over the observation post. We ended up in the fire director. It was clear

that ours would not last long here. I suggested to Erdeli to move to the village. While I was saying this, a shell flew close to him. He staggered and grabbed his left cheek with his hand, receiving an air concussion. We started leaving...

We caught up with the division headquarters at a height of 248.6, which is north of the highway to Motkovitsa. The 1st brigade occupied <? > position, and the 2nd brigade and border guards entrenched south of the highway. All squadrons and hundreds were dismounted. The guns took up open positions to the west of the large forest that crossed the highway. The forest was dense and neglected: it was not easy to break through it in a horse formation. The headquarters of our division was located on the western edge of the forest, north of the highway.

The German infantry continued to pursue our retreating covering parts.

At about four o'clock in the afternoon, German infantry units, supported by artillery, stepped up the onslaught. Enemy batteries

continuously fired at our six guns. We had to leave for Nida. Delaying the advance

of the Germans in the forest, the division crossed the bridges at Motkowiec Nida and set them on fire. The brigades immediately turned around on the east bank of the river: the 1st brigade north of the highway to Rembowa, the 2nd brigade - with border guards - south of the highway.

Night has come. I did not have to rest: I worked on preparation of a new order on the further actions of the division.

This is how the battle of our cavalry division near Andrzejów went on September 14th. During this day, the German infantry advanced only 15 kilometers, and lost at least 800 people killed and wounded. Our losses are 64 people. The commander of the Southwestern Front, General Ivanov, thanked the personnel of the 14th Cavalry Division.

Analyzing the battle near Andrzejów on September 14, one cannot help but come to the conclusion that it opened the eyes of many of our commanders to an indisputable truth: we had to fight a very serious enemy. Both at the headquarters of our corps and at the headquarters of the division they realized that it was much more difficult to fight the Germans than the Austrians, but not as scary as those who had been in battles in East Prussia claimed. Our division has become stronger, even more confident in its strength. Dreyer no longer looked askance at her - a little more difficult the situation, he attracted the 14th division to carry out the most

important tasks. I do not intend to describe in detail the Warsaw-Ivangorod operation carried out in the autumn of 1914. For an objective assessment of the actions of the 14th Cavalry Division in this operation, I would like to dwell only on the most significant points characterizing the combat events on the left bank of the Vistula, since we now know more about them than in the autumn of 1914. How did these events develop? Early September... The Southwestern Front continues to pursue the Austrians in the direction of Krakow. At the same time, it is important to recall that as early as August 24, the chief of staff of the front, General Alekseev, foresaw the possibility of a German offensive on the left bank from Krakow, as well as from Silesia. That is why the 1st Cavalry Corps was formed. His task was to conduct reconnaissance on the left bank of the Vistula.

If we talk about the state of affairs in the 1st Army, which was part of the North-Western Front, then this situation was not easy: under the onslaught of the 8th German Army, the 1st Army retreated behind the Neman. It is no coincidence that the replacement of the commander-in-chief of the North-Western Front took place. Instead of General Zhilinsky, General Ruzsky was appointed to the post of commander. The headquarters of the Supreme Commander, dejected by the second failure in East Prussia, did not have a unified plan, each front acted in its own way.

The command of the Southwestern Front decided to transfer the actions of its troops to the left bank of the Vistula. But the tide of water in the Vistula and San delayed the regrouping of troops. German troops at that time, as General Alekseev had assumed, were concentrating for an offensive from Upper Silesia. Therefore, Alekseev decided to regroup the troops on the middle Vistula and withdraw them from the western part of Galicia. He made his proposal to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander: to create a powerful group of troops in the Warsaw region, which could successfully attack the flank of the German troops advancing along the left bank of the Vistula. Alekseev proposed to create such a group of troops at the expense of the forces of the North-Western Front. But Alekseev was preempted by the commander of the Northwestern Front: he began to withdraw the left-flank 2nd Army

100-150 kilometers east of Warsaw. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, after listening to the opinion of the commanders-in-chief of the fronts, gradually worked out their plan of counter-maneuver in order to frustrate the plan of the offensive of the German troops. She believed that on the left bank of the Vistula, the enemy would be able to detain Novikov's cavalry corps, provided that our troops were regrouped on the middle Vistula. From this it is clear that the operational thought of many leaders of the Stavka, and above all, Quartermaster General Danilov, was, as it were, hypnotized by East Prussia. Later it became known that it was Danilov who, at the beginning of the war, adhered to his main idea - to seize East Prussia. With this idea, he left the front in 1915. Danilov did not part with her even after the war. This is evidenced by his memoirs, written under the yoke of the thought of the "hornet's nest" - East Prussia. No words, the

Russian troops, if they had East Prussia, would have great advantages. This is proven by the course

seven years war. But the struggle for East Prussia would divert significant forces. In addition, our troops would lose a lot of time in vain. As for

the command of the German troops, it did not waste precious time. Even during the battles for Lviv, Field Marshal Konrad asked to send two German corps to Przemyśl. Now, in connection with the withdrawal of the Austrian armies to the west, Konrad and the commander-in-chief Friedrich asked to transfer two German corps to the Krakow region. They abandoned the attack on Sedlice. On September 15, Falkenhayn ordered the 8th Army to prepare two corps and one cavalry division for dispatch to Upper Silesia. He was also preparing two other corps for the transfer here. General Schubert was appointed commander of the 8th Army, and Ludendorff was appointed chief of staff. As early as September 5, at 03:30, Ludendorff agreed with Konrad on the forthcoming deployment of the 9th German Army in the southeastern part of Silesia. It consisted of four corps and the 8th Cavalry Division. Then they agreed to join the right flank of the 9th Army of the German Landwehr Corps. This army was tasked with striking the flank and rear of the Russian armies advancing against the Austrians. One corps (11th) landed in Krakow. The Austrians retreated to Tarnow. They were to advance south of the Vistula from here. It was assumed that the concentration of the 9th Army would end on September 17th. Reserves from the garrisons located in the fortresses of Poznan and Wroclaw were pulled up to the 9th Army. On September 16, Hindenburg took command of the 9th Army. He also retained the overall leadership of the 8th Army, commanded by Schubert. Anticipating the possibility of a strike from Ivangorod or Warsaw, Hindenburg expressed his intention to

advance in a northeasterly direction. Having a ledge behind the left flank, he demanded that the 1st Austrian army be transferred to the left bank of the Vistula. However, Konrad from this army sent only five infantry and two cavalry divisions, as well as a Landsturm brigade, along the left bank. This meant that the concentration of German units accelerated by two days. How did Novikov's cavalry corps operate in September? By September 1, on the left bank of the Vistula, south of the mouth of the Pilica River, reconnaissance

only the 5th Cavalry Division and the Separate Cossack Turkestan Brigade led to the west. It is completely incomprehensible why, on September 2, General Lechitsky transferred the 8th and 14th cavalry divisions from the left bank of the Vistula to its right bank. It is appropriate to recall that these divisions trailed aimlessly behind the infantry carts. Only on September 7 they returned to the left bank of the Vistula. Instead of boldly and quickly moving west, to the areas of concentration of the 9th German army, the 8th and 14th cavalry divisions performed a secondary task - they struck at the rear of the 1st Austrian army. General Lechitsky considered this their main task.

If the movement of all three cavalry divisions (8.5 and 14th) to the west began from Sandomierz on September 2, then, doing 30 kilometers a day, by September 9 they would have reached the line of Koniecpol, Pradla, Miechov, the forts of Krakow, and by September 12-13 - the area of unloading

units of the 9th German army. Only on September 12, Novikov's divisions reached the Nida River. The very next day they met the advancing (and not unloading) enemy infantry. On the morning of September 12, the 14th Cavalry Division was approaching the Vistula crossing at Seroslavitsa; the 35th Landsturm Brigade was advancing north of this village. Near Seroslavitsa, enemy military units crossed over to cover the area where the bridge was being built. Three days later, the German corps, commanded by Woyrsch, crossed this bridge to the left bank of the Vistula.

On the evening of September 14, the 14th Cavalry Division withdrew across the Nida River. On this day, to the north, near Kielce, the 4th and 5th Cossack Don divisions concentrated, and the Separate Cossack Turkestan brigade (without artillery) retreated to Malogoscha. The 8th Cavalry Division, holding back the advance of the enemy south of Kielce, retreated from Pinchov to the east. On September 15, its main forces reached the Gnoino area (10 km southeast of Khmelnik). The 5th Cavalry Division, holding back the advance of parts of the 7th and 3rd Austrian cavalry divisions and the 35th Landsturm Brigade, retreated to the Stopnitsa

area on September 14th. Ludendorff in his memoirs and other German authors argued that the basis for the concept of the operation of the 9th German army was the speed of its actions. The purpose of this operation is to disrupt

regrouping of Russian troops. The German infantry moved at a speed of 30-35 kilometers per day. It was

difficult for our cavalry divisions to slow down the march of the German 9th Army. This, in particular, is evidenced by the battle of the 14th Cavalry Division, which she fought on September 14 near Endrzejow. This fight was of particular importance. He convinced Dreyer and other officers of the headquarters of the 1st cavalry corps that it was not the weak spare parts of the guards and the 4th corps district of the enemy that were advancing from the west, but the entire 9th German army and parts of

the Austrian army were rushing forward. The divisions maintained contact with the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Corps through officers who were provided with vehicles. Flying mail was also used. The headquarters of this corps kept in touch with our 9th Army by radio. The enemy, of course, intercepted radio messages and carefully deciphered them. Deciphering was easy for him: our ciphers were imperfect. As for the headquarters of the divisions, they did not yet have radio communications at that time. That is why the enemy often ran into trouble, especially at those moments when he was unable to obtain information about what responses the division sent to the radio messages of the corps

headquarters. But back to the 14th Cavalry Division. She spent the night in the Khmilnik area, leaving the reconnaissance squadron (14th Lancers) in Kiya. Its core and sidings were located on the banks of the Nida.

On the night of September 15, reports were repeatedly received from the reconnaissance squadron about German attempts to cross the Nida north of Motkovice. Our reconnaissance squadron continuously fired rifle fire at the enemy.

It could be expected that the Germans, moving north, in the direction of Kielce, would turn again to the southeast. In this regard, on September 15, Erdeli decided to move northwest from Khmilnik, to Petrkovitsa, and here strike at the Germans. However, the enemy did not show up, and in the afternoon the division began crossing the Lysaya Gora mountain range from the Petrkovitsa area along difficult roads. The division stopped for the night near the village of Otsesenki. There was no need to linger here, and therefore on September 16, the division,

having made a short march, she moved to the Laguva region, covering the road from Kielce to Opatow from

here. Upon arrival in Jagow, I decided to replace the squadron of lancers left in Kiy, to send a squadron of hussars under the command of Captain Pushkin. Having received instructions to conduct reconnaissance, the hussars moved in

the direction of Kie. From the headquarters of the corps, which had withdrawn to Staszow, an order was received, the meaning of which was as follows: the 1st cavalry corps is divided into two groups: a) the northern one - under the command of General Vannovsky (chief of the 5th Don division); this group includes the 4th and 5th Don divisions and the Cossack Turkestan brigade; b) southern - under the command of General Zander; as part of the group - 5, 8, 14th cavalry divisions. The corps commander instructed the groups: if necessary, the northern group should withdraw in the direction of Skarzysko, Radom, and the southern

group in the direction of Opatow. After the battle near Endrzejow, our division was slightly reinforced. Arriving at the headquarters of the corps in Khmilnik, I managed to persuade Dreyer to give us two guns from the battery of the 8th cavalry division. Having received them, our division had two batteries of four guns each. In the 8th cavalry division, two batteries remained: one of six guns, the other of four. The gun crews joined us at Jagow. The firepower of the division thus increased.

On September 17-19, the 14th Cavalry Division was in the area of Sarnya, Zvolya and Vasniuv, covering the roads from Kielce, which were occupied by the enemy on September 18 in the southeast direction. The right flank in the Kunuva area (on the Skarzhisko-Ostrovets highway) was

provided by a squadron of lancers. General Lechitsky, in order to cover the left flank of his 9th Army and to support the southern group of General Novikov, decided to send a guards rifle brigade to Opatuv on September 16, and a guards cavalry brigade to Klimantuv. The task of capturing Sandomierz was assigned to the 80th Infantry Division.

The headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Corps assumed that the 2nd Rifle Brigade would

occupy Astravets. The advance of rifle units towards the advancing enemy seemed dangerous, but at that time I, not knowing the situation in

On the whole, he had no particular doubts about the expediency of such a nomination. For the 14th Cavalry Division, it was valuable that in its rear the infantry would capture Astravets, which would ensure a crossing across the Kamenna River. By itself, this river is small in the Ostrovets region, but it had dams that made it difficult to cross

it by swimming. On September 19, the northern group (commander Vannovsky), after the battle near Skarzhisko, with the support of the 75th Infantry Division, retreated to the north. Its southern neighbors at that time were camping for the night: the 8th Cavalry Division was in the area of the village of Rudniki (10 km west of Opatuv), and the 5th Cavalry Division was in the Mydlovets

area (10 km southwest of Opatuv). By the evening of September 19, our 14th division, located in the Vasniuv area, was only 8 kilometers away from the enemy. It was assumed that on the morning of September 20, the enemy would be struck near Vasniuv. At night, the commander of our squadron sent a report from Kunuva: to the north of Kunuva, large enemy cavalry and infantry forces are camping for the night. Given this, the task was assigned to the 1st Cavalry Brigade - to send two squadrons with four machine guns through Ostrovets to Kunuv in order to deliver a sudden blow to the enemy. At dawn, a detachment of the uhlan regiment headed for Kunuv. He had to go to Ostrovets for about 12 kilometers, and then, crossing the Kamenna River, to reach Kunuva, that is, to go about 8 more kilometers. 8 am.

September 19th. The brigades of our division concentrated east of Vasniuv and took up their designated positions. As agreed, the battery of the 2nd brigade opened long-range fire on Khybitsa, from which the Germans were moving east in a dense column. At this time, the headquarters of our 14th Cavalry Division received a telegram from the commander of the Southwestern Front. It read: the 14th Cavalry Division was thanked for successful actions in the battle near Yendrzejow. And a message came from the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Corps: the wounded commander of the artillery battery of the 2nd brigade, Captain Briksen, was awarded a golden weapon - a statutory award.

But to our joy, chagrin also came in - at about 10 o'clock in the morning a report came from the reconnaissance squadron: Kunuv was occupied by infantry, cavalry and cyclists of the enemy. Our squadron departs for Ostrovets. It was clear to me that the assumption that 2-

I rifle brigade will take possession of Astravets, did not materialize. The enemy threatened to push us back to Opatow, preventing us from withdrawing to the Vistula. That is why it was impossible to delay. Steps should have been taken to capture Astravets before the enemy came here. To this end, the 1st brigade was ordered to cross the bridge, turn around to the north and northwest and trot to Astravets, cover the transition of the remaining units through this point in the northeast direction from it. Everything was in motion quickly. When the headquarters of our division with units of the 1st brigade approached Astravets, to the north-west of it, in the forest, a battle broke out. It was led by three squadrons of our lancers, supported by four machine guns. They cut off the enemy - scooters and dragoons - the path to Astravets. Having captured Astravets, the 1st brigade deployed to the north of it and supported the uhlans with artillery fire.

The rest of the division at that time entered the forest northeast of Ostrovets. Now we

had to make an independent decision: in which direction our division should withdraw. We knew that the 8th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were moving southeast. It was expedient for the 14th Cavalry Division to withdraw to the east, to the mouth of the Kamenna River. But did the crossings survive there? Our headquarters had no information about this and did not want to take risks. The conclusion suggested itself - to overtake the enemy, quickly go to the north and cover the direction to Ivangorod.

Once in a familiar area of action, I suggested to the head of our division, Erdeli, move through Senno to Yavur-Soletsky, where to arrange an overnight stay, and after rest, intercept the road leading from Ilzha to the Vistula. Erdeli approved this proposal. The division moved in two columns along the already familiar roads to the northeast. On the way, I was disturbed by the thought of the position of the two reconnaissance squadrons left in the Pinchuv area. They haven't heard from them for a long time. But it was known that they were cut off by the German infantry, advancing from Kunuva in a southeasterly direction. Our

withdrawal was covered by two squadrons left in the village of Lipsko. Having reached Volya-Soletskaya, we posted direct guards. At two o'clock in the afternoon the division set off for

northwest direction. When our rearguards hid in the forest, artillery fire was heard from the direction of the village of Lipsko: it was the Germans who knocked out our squadrons from the settlement. Without delaying for a long time, both squadrons managed to join to the division.

At 5 pm we were in a safe place. Having crossed the Ilzhanka River at Tsepelyuv, we ourselves were hanging on the enemy flank. When he approached the Salt, the artillery of the 16th Corps from the right bank of the Vistula met him with fire. Our division withdrew to the Sytsyn area and here contacted the 75th Infantry Division, which was heading towards Radom. During the

hostilities, our division occupied Sytsyn for the sixth time. On September 22, the head of the division gave her rest in this settlement. Here we learned about the so-called Opatow battle, which took place on September 20 and 21. I am not a witness to this battle and therefore I will briefly recall it, relying on archival sources.

At about ten o'clock in the evening on September 20, the headquarters of our division arrived in Yavur-Soletsky. On the way, up to 20 Cossacks from the 4th Cossack Don Division joined us, lagging behind their units, and in Yavur-Soletsky itself we met the commander of the 2nd Cossack Ural regiment, Colonel Polenov, with a hundred Cossacks. I knew him from his service in Turkestan. It turned out that he also broke away from the headquarters of the Cossack Turkestan brigade. It happened during the

battle for the city of Kielce. From the outposts of our sentry guards, which were located at night in the same villages as the guards of the German infantry, reports were received. It became clear that the unpleasant proximity to the enemy required active action from us. We figured that we would rise before the Germans and slip further north, to Ciepelów. On the night of September 21, we did not have to rest: Ilzha and its environs were occupied by the 37th Infantry Division of the 20th German Corps, and we were only 19 kilometers away from Ilzha.

At one o'clock in the morning, our division moved east. There were no more than 20 kilometers to the Vistula, but there was no crossing there. Therefore, the division headed for the settlement of Volya-Soletska. From here it was supposed to move north along the coast road to Yanovets. However, I wanted to use the bridgehead on the left bank

Vistula, before Ivangorod. I reported this to the head of the division, Erdelyi, my opinion: when the division reached Volya-Soletskaya, give the soldiers and officers a short rest here, wait for a moment and, as soon as the Germans moved east, to Solets, send the division on a flank march through the dense forest in the northwestern direction and get off at Cepielów. From here, a free route to Zvolen opened. And so it was decided. The commander of the 9th Army,

Lechitsky, advanced to the left bank of the Vistula, to Opatow, the guards rifle brigade, the guards cavalry brigade, and then parts of the 80th rifle division and, finally, the 2nd rifle brigade. In his report No. 0178 of September 19, he informed Ivanov, commander of the front, that he had entrusted the Guards Rifle Brigade with the task of stubbornly holding back the enemy's advance. Ivanov rejected this decision. On Lechitsky's report, he wrote a resolution:

"1. Indicate that the stubborn holding of the enemy is not included in the task indicated by the directive of the

9th Army. 2. Also point out that in general the advancement of one division to the west, and even more so of heavy artillery, is also not included in the task set by the directive of the 9th Army. The inclusion of heavy artillery will make it possible to get involved in a stubborn battle, which was not the task ~~of~~ Ivanov"[20] .

Lechitsky belatedly gave the order to withdraw the units. The head of the guards rifle brigade only at noon on September 21 began to withdraw his units. At this time, the enemy had already captured the brigade from both flanks.

Intercepting the radio messages of the Russian command, the headquarters of the 9th German army was quite well versed in the movements of the Russian corps. The 2nd Rifle Brigade on the left bank of the Vistula was considered by the headquarters of the 9th German Army as the vanguard of the 14th Guards Russian Corps. In fact, this corps went north along the right bank of the Vistula.

The command of the 9th German Army had the opinion that a new Russian offensive was beginning. The order for this army dated September 18 indicated that the Russian 9th Army was moving to the left bank of the Vistula to attack the Austro-German forces. The headquarters of the 9th Army expected to meet at least two Russian corps in the Opatuva area. In this regard, the 9th Army, which was making a march-maneuver in a northeast direction, turned east and southeast with the task of accelerating the decisive blow against the 9th Russian Army and defeating it. To attack the Russians near Opatow, the German command sent the 11th Landwehr Corps, the Guards Reserve Corps and more than five Austrian infantry divisions. The 37th Infantry Division of the 22nd Corps moved east from Ilzha, towards the Vistula. Our 14th Cavalry Division crossed the path of the advance of the Guards Reserve Corps, and on September 21 cut off the path of the 37th Infantry Division heading for Solets. On the same day, the 8th Cavalry Division crossed the Vistula at Jozefuw. On September 21, the 5th Cavalry Division had to withdraw to the village of Drygulets (10 km northeast of Opatuv). The reason for the withdrawal was that the headquarters of the corps did not satisfy her request, did not provide cover for her right flank. A guards German reserve corps approached Drygulets. In this regard, the 5th cavalry division withdrew to Annopol, crossing to the right bank of the Vistula under the cover of the rifle brigade of the

18th rifle corps, which advanced almost to Ozharuv and also crossed to the right bank of the Vistula. Our guards rifle brigade was attacked by four Austro-German corps. She lost 79 officers, 7,000 soldiers, 13 of her guns failed. The brigade withdrew to Sandomierz. And the guards cavalry brigade, covering the right flank of the guards rifle brigade, first withdrew to Zavikhost. There was no bridge to cross. Therefore, she went

up to Annopol and at this point crossed to the right bank of the Vistula[21]. The Russian historian Korolkov in one place of his book "The Warsaw-Ivangorod operation" accuses the divisions of the 1st cavalry corps of leaving the guards riflemen to the mercy of fate "with a light heart". And in another place in the same book, he contrad

completely aimless, because it was undertaken "against the instructions of General Ivanov."

And here's how the opposing side sees this fight. Hindenburg wanted to defeat our southern group in this battle as well. But he failed to do so. The autumn campaign of Hindenburg against Warsaw is rightly assessed in the documents of the Reichsarchive as unsuccessful. "The German offensive in the Opatow area was an air strike," these documents say. In concentrating his four corps, the enemy lost a lot of time.

This slowed down their movement to the Vistula, east and north to Pulawa and Ivangorod. The 17th German corps, which was heading north of Radom, turned towards this city and occupied it.

In connection with the withdrawal from Radom in the northeast direction of the units of the 75th Russian Rifle and 5th Cossack Don divisions, the Radom-Zvolen-Pulava highway remained uncovered. Having learned about this in the afternoon of September 22, the head of the 14th Cavalry Division, Erdeli, decided to withdraw at night through Zvolen to the east to the Laguva region. At seven o'clock in the evening, the division crossed into this area through the still unoccupied Zvolen.

The headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Corps ended up in Puława. From there, across the pontoon bridge on September 23, he was to head to the village of Aspen.

Through the location of our division, patrols of the military cavalry of the grenadier corps were already passing to the west. However, Erdeli decided to once again detain the enemy east of Laguva. On the morning of September 23, the division moved north and south of the highway to the west in two columns, followed by border guards along the highway.

It rained all day. Visibility was limited. It was possible to detect only small reconnaissance units of the enemy. They sought to bypass our flanks from the north and from the south. It was clear that there was nothing for the division to do here and that it was necessary to go beyond the Vistula. The head of our division, Erdeli, persisted, ordered several artillery shots to be fired at the edge of the forest south of the highway, where a small concentration of the enemy was discovered. Convinced that it was pointless to keep the division in this place, Erdeli gave the order to withdraw to the crossing.

At about six o'clock in the evening, the division left its combat area on the left bank of the Vistula south of Ivangorod, where it had been from the first days of the war. More throughout the war, units of the 14th Cavalry Division did not return here.

Before the World War, the term "veil" was used among cavalrymen. More than five and a half of our cavalry divisions created this curtain on the left bank of the Vistula in September 1914 to delay the rapidly advancing German 9th Army. But the cavalry curtain could hardly withstand the superior forces of the enemy for a long time. After all, he had firepower. Let us recall that the German infantry division had 72 guns, while our cavalry division could only oppose them with 8-12 guns. We only gained time by forcing the enemy to deploy in battle formation. Characteristic in this regard is the maneuverable defense of the 14th Cavalry Division near Endrzejów. For the most part, the cavalry divisions, opening long-range artillery fire, retreated as the enemy infantry approached. Only the Vistula, in which the water level rose at that time, contributed to the success of the cavalry curtain. But the curtain could achieve its goal provided that our troops succeeded in paralyzing the actions of the enemy's ground and air reconnaissance, disrupting his interceptions of the radio messages of our headquarters and deciphering them. The experience of our cavalry curtain on the left bank of the Vistula in the autumn of 1914 proved

that the times are long gone when the cavalry can operate with the firepower that it had at the end of the 18th or beginning of the 19th century ...

FROM WARSAW TO KALISH

Withdrawing to the right bank of the Vistula, the 1st Cavalry Corps received a new task: along this bank to reach the right flank of our 2nd Army, deployed west of Warsaw, and here to develop operations on the flank and rear of the enemy advancing on Warsaw.

From the previous description of the hostilities of the 1st Cavalry Corps, it can be seen that only the 14th Cavalry Division crossed the Vistula at Pulawy, and the rest of the formations were forced to force it to the south. Prior to their approach to the concentration area, our division rested for two days in the Aspen area. It was painful that we had previously lost the 6th Lancers and the 5th Hussars reconnaissance squadrons. In previous battles, they were

surrounded by German infantry. Erdeli, in addition, experienced his own personal hardships: his eldest son was an ensign in one of the regiments of the Guards Rifle Brigade, which suffered severely near Opatow. However, the information made at the headquarters of the 9th Army about the fate of Erdeli's son turned out to be more favorable than the general expected: his son was wounded, but evacuated in time.

... Autumn turned out to be damp. The roads were softened from the rains, it was difficult to move on them. The corps commander Novikov asked the front command to give the corps a four-day rest or to transport machine guns, a convoy and weak horses by rail. The Front rejected this request. The corps had to move along the only Lublin-Warsaw highway. Five days later, our 14th division

arrived in the Prague region (a suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula. - B.Sh.). It was September 30th. We, officers, were placed in apartments where the families of officers used to live. We managed to take a bath. After a two-month wandering, this gave us great pleasure. The next day, at 12 noon, I went with a report to the

head of the division. Returning from him, I visited some shops to buy things necessary for the trip. The streets and shops of Warsaw were full of people. In the west, artillery cannonade thundered. People listened to her with caution, especially

women. The relocation of the headquarters of our army from the city to the right bank of the Vistula (the headquarters was located in wagons) intensified the anxious feelings of the Varsovians. The population knew that the invasion of German troops would bring them grief and disaster. The Poles felt like masters in their city, they did not want the boots of the Germans to trample the streets of Warsaw.

On October 1, an order was received from the headquarters of the corps on the further actions of our division. By phone, I asked the head of the division to come and get acquainted with the order. Erdeli arrived at our headquarters at six o'clock in the evening. We exchanged views on the content of the order. It was clear to us that it was dictated by the situation that had developed in the sector of the 2nd Army, which had gone over to the offensive against the German troops on the Blonie, Prutkov, Dombruvka front. It was this situation that determined the role and place of the 1st Cavalry Corps in general and the 14th Cavalry Division in particular in the order. The 1st Cavalry Corps was ordered to concentrate in the Zaboruw, Leszno area, in order to strike from here at the flank and rear of the enemy, who was putting up stubborn resistance to units and formations of the 2nd Army. On the morning of October 2, the divisions were supposed to go to this area. The lead division was the 14th Cavalry. She had to cross the Vistula over the bridge at Jablonna and follow to the Zaboruva area. It was followed by the 8th and 5th cavalry

divisions. Having taken the settlement of Blonie, the Germans saddled the direct Warsaw-Sokhachev highway. Their left flank was well covered by a wooded swampy area. Using the swampy valley and water barriers (the rivers Bzura, Loss), the enemy arranged a kind of Bzura bag and pulled the 1st Caucasian Cavalry Division and the combined (three-regiment) division of General Kazankov into it. The commander of the 2nd Army, General Scheideman, pushed three more divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps into this bag. It was necessary to quickly break out to the west, across the Bzura River.

On October 2, at barely dawn, units of the 14th Cavalry Division moved along the right bank of the Vistula from the Prague region to Yablonna. The river was crossed here on a pontoon bridge and in the evening settled down for the night in the area of Zaboruw, Zaboruwiek. The Leshno area was occupied by the 1st Caucasian Cavalry Division. She led an artillery skirmish with the enemy, who was in Blon.

On October 3, the divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps received an order: to continue moving west, to the Laza area. It did not make sense to go along the high road to Leshno, since the enemy could bring down artillery fire on the marching column. Therefore, the head of the 14th Cavalry Division decided to turn to Lubets, bypassing the Leshno area through this village.

When our division approached the Bzura River, Erdeli said: "What, Boris Mikhailovich, shall we move to the western bank?" "It would be very good," I replied. - Let me anyway send two squadrons forward with lava so as not to run into an ambush.

- Send it out! Erdeli agreed. The squadrons crossed to the western bank of the Bzura and plunged into the copses. Obviously, there was no enemy here. Erdeli ordered the crossing of the brigades and their concentration in the settlement of Zhukuvka. At about nine in the evening, the entire 14th Cavalry Division camouflaged itself in Zhukuvka. Reports were received from our nearby night reconnaissance: from the direction of Iluva to Sokhachev and in the opposite direction, enemy convoys were

moving. The head of our division decided to capture Sokhachev. To this end, he ordered the 2nd brigade and border guards to strike at the enemy in the northwestern part of the city, and the 1st brigade to seize the Iluv-Sokhachev highway, striking the enemy from the west. The enemy did not expect

the appearance of our foot units from the west and north-west. This stunned him. By 11 am on October 4, both brigades broke into the city. Here was an infirmary with 200 wounded officers and soldiers of the enemy. Having knocked out the Germans from Sokhachev, the 14th division continued its offensive to the east and southeast. Enemy resistance intensified. I cannot but say that even at

the moment when our division captured Sokhachev, a plan was ripe in its headquarters: to press harder on the flank and rear of the enemy. What was required to carry out this plan? It was required that our division in Sokhachev be replaced by the 79th Rifle Division, which was located nearby. Our division, on this condition, on October 5, would be able to descend south of Sokhachev and strike at the flank and rear of the enemy. We reported our plan to the corps commander Novikov. On the night of October 5 received from

his answer: to stay on the day in Sokhachev. When we received this answer, we shook our heads.

Further events developed as

follows. At about one in the afternoon on October 5, at least five enemy batteries opened fire on Sokhachev and on the crossing over the Bzura. The city was engulfed in fire. The brigades suffered losses. Soon, more than two German infantry battalions deployed southeast of the city. They crowded our outposts. Having weighed the circumstances known to us, it was impossible not to come to the conclusion: it was useless to linger in Sokhachev, it would be more expedient to withdraw to the western bank of the Bzura. The withdrawal of the 2nd brigade, by order of the division chief, will be covered by the 1st brigade and border guards. Erdeli left with the 1st brigade. I was left with the commander of the 2nd brigade. He hurriedly pulled up guards to the eastern outskirts of Sokhachev and led the regiments out by squadron through the planned crossing to the western bank of the Bzura. Our batteries with fire at that time held back the advance of the German and Austrian infantry.

When only two squadrons with machine guns remained in the city, I headed for the crossing. The bridge was filled with the departing squadrons of the brigade, to the right and left of it the enemy's shrapnel was torn. Passing the bridge, I looked for the headquarters of the division. He took it to the right of our column and got into the zone of enemy artillery fire. I had barely driven a few tens of meters, when I felt a strong blow of an air wave to my head. I fell on the neck of the horse, he suddenly fell on his front legs, and then jumped up and carried me forward. The headache did not go away, but I did not notice any blood anywhere on myself and on the horse. It turned out that the shell that exploded overhead concussed both me and the horse. Soon I found Erdeli. He ordered the 1st Brigade and the border guards to dismount and prevent the Germans from crossing the Bzura. At about four

o'clock in the afternoon, units of the 5th Cavalry Division appeared from the north. Soon her boss arrived. He reported that he had arrived to assist the 14th division. But his assistance could no longer return the city of Sokhachev to us, because the 5th Cavalry Division was late, and the enemy managed to gain a foothold in it. But still, units of both divisions, supported by artillery, stopped the enemy's advance in the western direction. It was decided on the morning of October 6 to attack Sokhachev again.

By 12 noon on October 6, units of our division, having forced the Bzura, captured the settlement of Kozluw-Biskupi and continued their offensive to the east. Quite unexpectedly, the headquarters of the 14th cavalry division received an order from the headquarters of the corps: the division should immediately withdraw from the battle and move northwest in the direction of Iluv, to which the German infantry division was approaching. The enemy intended to thwart the attack by Sokhachev's 1st Cavalry Corps. I had to abandon the success already achieved south of the city, withdraw units from the battle and quickly move in a

northwestern direction. All this, of course, took time. But already at the beginning of the fourth hour of the day, the forward reconnaissance units of the 14th division moved at a trot to Iluv and Rybno, and the entire division followed them in two

columns, brigade by brigade. At about six o'clock in the evening, the left column (2nd brigade) reached Rybno. The enemy quickly retreated from there in

a northwestern direction. At about twelve o'clock at night, I heard strong explosions: the Germans were blowing up the railway facilities. With this message I came to Erdeli. He did not believe, and we both went outside. After a short period of time, the explosions were repeated. Now there was no doubt - the Germans were in a hurry to retreat.

Having received the order of the corps commander to advance in the general direction on Skierniewitz, our division moved south on the morning of October 7, to the Bednary station, in order to intercept the Sokhachev-Lovich railway.

In the afternoon, the Bednary station was occupied by the 1st brigade. And the 2nd brigade at that time operated to the north. One of the squadrons of the 14th Dragoon Regiment attacked the artillery park retreating from Sokhachev to the east of the railway, but met stubborn resistance: a strong infantry column with artillery approached. The enemy fired at least five batteries.

It was clear that the retreating columns of the enemy would not succeed in hitting the flank. The head of our division decided to try to capture ųowicz. At nine o'clock in the morning on October 8, the division moved in two columns: the left column (2nd brigade with border guards) - to Lagushev, the right column (1st brigade) - to the north, to Bochki, Klevkuv

with the aim of cutting off Lovich from the north of Kernoz. The morning was foggy and visibility was limited.

By eleven o'clock in the morning the headquarters of the division was on the western outskirts of Lagushev. The 1st brigade was still stretching from Bočka to Klevkow, and the 2nd brigade only approached Lagushev with the head of the column. Before us opened an unusual picture. The dismounted units of the Austrian dragoons (in blue uniforms and red breeches) quickly retreated to the city of Lovich. The 1st brigade, which was making a flanking movement towards Jowicz, did not open artillery fire, and two dismounted Austrian regiments fled into the city with impunity.

There was no doubt that Jowicz was occupied by at least one cavalry division. It was decided from Lagushev and Klevkuva to launch an attack on the city of Lovich on foot. Soon, artillery began to speak from both sides. Our dismounted units began to advance. The enemy outnumbered us in artillery. Our advance has slowed down. The area was completely open. By evening, the fighting had died down. The division settled down for the night in the villages of Klevkow and Lagushev. Jowicz is located across the river Bzura. With this water barrier in front

of them, it was difficult for the Austrian cavalry division to capture this city. On October 9, the 14th Cavalry Division, together with the approaching 5th Cavalry Division,

tried to attack Lovich. The attack was not successful. The enemy, having occupied the city, fired heavily from the southern bank of the Bzura. Reconnaissance on the flank of the 14th Cavalry Division could not break through the tributary of the Bzura - the swampy river Sludva. On October 10, the 1st Cavalry Corps concentrated north of Jowicz. On October 11, the chief of staff of

the corps, Dreyer, decided to cross the Sludva River. All artillery of the corps - 30 guns - was concentrated in one area and transferred to the artillery preparation period at the disposal of the division commander of the 5th Cavalry Division. The dismounted units of the 14th division were to advance on the settlement of Retki, the 5th cavalry division on Szymanowice. The 8th division provided the right flank of the corps, located at Zlakow Koscielny. The head of the 14th division and his entire staff were skeptical about this type of attack. After all, the divisions were losing their

artillery. However, the corps commander insisted that the artillery should operate from one area. On October 11, at nine o'clock

in the morning, artillery preparation began. It was reduced, in essence, to a competition with enemy artillery. His own infantry, located across the Sludva River, was not exposed to our artillery fire. The dismounted units of the 14th division launched an attack on Retki. Having reached the swamps of the Sludva River, they lay down: it was not possible to move forward

possible.

Having scattered the Jaeger battalion across the Sludva River, the cavalry regiments of the 7th Austrian division concentrated to the north against the village of Zlakow Koscielny. They were discovered by the 8th Cavalry Division. Soon the enemy cavalry moved further north and attacked Zlaków Borowy. First, the 8th, and then the 14th cavalry division was aimed against it. The corps commander returned their artillery to them. She quickly took up new positions, met with fire the attacking cavalry of the enemy. To the west of the village of Zlaków Borowy, the Austrians made an attempt to turn around for an attack in the evening. Artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire from our units forced them to retreat to Zhikhlin.

This episode ended the combat operations of the 1st Cavalry Corps, which we tried to survey objectively. There is no doubt that

anyone who thinks about the essence of the Warsaw Ivangorodek operation, especially those who turn to the study of documents, will involuntarily have a question: what is the reason for such slow actions of the strong Russian cavalry gathered on the flank of the 2nd Army? I have already noted above in which bag our

cavalry, not supported by infantry, was to be deployed. You involuntarily come to the conclusion: as soon as large cavalry forces fell into the army, commanded by a "native" cavalryman, then she, the cavalry, was used in a way that was not in accordance with her role and significance. Such "inveterate cavalymen" as the commander of the 2nd Army, General Scheidemann, strove to use the cavalry

almost exclusively on the battlefield, not understanding its prevailing significance in operational maneuver.

All the orders that the headquarters of the 2nd Army sent to the 1st Cavalry Corps limited its actions in the immediate

behind enemy lines: first, the corps was sent to Grodzisk, then to Skierniewice, and only then to Lodz. Such stubbornness of Scheidemann continued, despite the sound and correct instructions given on October 16 in Directive No. 4318 by the Commander-in-Chief of the North-Western Front. This directive stated: "I consider it inappropriate to direct Novikov's cavalry corps to the Blonie, Grodzisk, Brvinov area, which does not lead to a deep rear, where this corps could do a lot, but to the enemy's flank and near rear, where the cavalry will be met by infantry at every step enemy occupying local objects. It should be recalled that the 14th Cavalry Division broke out of the Bzura bag on its own initiative, shifting its operations to the

western bank of the Bzura. It was followed by units of the 1st Caucasian, and then the 5th and 8th cavalry divisions. Instead of replacing the 14th Cavalry Division with infantry in Sokhachev, they left it alone, entrusting it with the task of guarding the enemy's won flank.

I already wrote what the loss of Sokhachev led to: the cavalry clung to the Bzura River, instead of acting decisively in the deep rear, while there was such an opportunity. When Mackensen, having strengthened his left flank with the 11th corps and the cavalry corps, began to retreat to Lovich and southeast of it, the 1st cavalry corps, having lost time, was again in front of the front and without the assistance of the infantry could not move forward. Meanwhile, both the German 8th and the

Austrian 7th cavalry divisions each had a rifle battalion. They formed a support for maneuvering. Recognizing the aimless exhaustion of the divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps, the

Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army, Chagin, in his report of October 12, wrote to Oranovsky: "Gen. Novikov testifies to the strong fatigue of the horse staff, the lack of fodder in the area he occupies, and the deterioration of the material part"[22] . All this corresponded to reality, but after all, the enemy cavalry was not in the best condition.

The headquarters of the 1st corps, mechanically following the orders of the headquarters of the 2nd army, did not show sufficient efficiency and flexibility, belittled the role of the cavalry corps.

What happened to the Germans at that time? Already on September 27, the headquarters of their 9th Army gave the order: in the event of a withdrawal from Warsaw and Ivangorod, destroy

the railways and highways. The unpromising operation of the Germans on the left bank of the Vistula was approaching its logical end: they did not have enough strength, and the Russian troops were building up their forces every day beyond the Vistula and in the Warsaw region. Hindenburg and Ludendorff were very worried about their left flank near Warsaw. The commander of the German 8th Army, Mackensen, was well aware of the situation that had changed on his front, but considered the tactical position of his troops satisfactory and was afraid to shake their spirits with a withdrawal. He decided to remain in the same positions, and to provide the left flank with the Vroheim brigade and parts of the Landsturm, placing them behind the rivers Loss and Bzura to the Vistula. But the Russian cavalry crossed the Loss and took up a position that threatened the German flank.

During these tense days, as is clear from the documents of the Reichsarchive, Mackensen was misled by aerial reconnaissance. As early as October 3, she reported that in the area west of Blonie and Nowa, Dwur, Mazowiecki, no accumulation of troops was noticed. On October 4, secret orders were sent out to prepare for the withdrawal, unload the rear, etc. Only on the night of October 7 did the retreat begin. If Scheidemann had not made gross miscalculations, the Germans would not have been able to retreat unhindered. From

the history of the autumn campaign in Western Poland, it is known that Hindenburg transferred the 11th German Corps to strengthen the left flank of Mackensen's army. Near Sokhachev, he managed to resist the advancing 2nd Russian army.

On October 14, Hindenburg issued a general order for the withdrawal of the entire 9th Army to the Wielun-

Czestochowa line. It is also known that Falkenhayn refused to reinforce the Eastern Front with units formed inside Germany. He did not transfer units from the Western Front either. In this regard, Hindenburg was forced to cover the 160-kilometer distance from the Vistula to Vemon with weak landshturmen units from the corps districts with small artillery. The only support that Hindenburg gave Falkengine was that he transferred the 5th

cavalry division to Poznan and further to Pleszew.

On October 12 and 13, Novikov's entire corps stood west of the Sludva River and south of Zhikhlin, conducting only reconnaissance west of Kutno Lenchica.

On October 15, Novikov's corps received a new task - passing in front of the front of the 2nd Army, "to vigorously act on the flank and rear of the retreating enemy in the direction of the Shadek, Lodz front" [23] . The — corps retreated in perfect order, it was rarely possible to capture the stragglers of the 11th German Corps.

By the evening of October 18, the 1st Cavalry Corps reached the line Shadek, Zdunska Wola, having the 5.8 and 14th Cavalry Divisions from right to left. The divisions' patrols were located on the Warta River, the western bank of which, in the area from the town of Warta to Sieradz, was occupied by dismounted cavalry and enemy infantry. Before the 14th Cavalry Division, which reached the river near Sieradz, both bridges (railway and highway) were thoroughly destroyed. Our patrols approaching the river were met not only by rifle fire, but also by artillery fire.

This situation continued until October 20, when a message was received that the 8th Cavalry Division had successfully crossed to the area of the town of Warta. Hooking on the western bank of the river, the corps commander pulled the 5th and 14th cavalry divisions there. On the morning of October 21, these divisions also crossed to the western bank of the Warta.

Having crossed the Warta, the divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps launched an offensive to the west, driving back parts of the Austrian and German cavalry.

On the morning of October 22, the Germans opened heavy artillery fire against the 14th Cavalry Division, and in the afternoon, thick lines of their infantry went on the offensive. Eight guns of our 14th division fired continuously, holding the enemy back. Under the onslaught of superior forces, the 14th division began to retreat to the east. She had created a good artillery transport in advance. Despite the high consumption of shells, the artillery of the division did not experience an acute shortage of them. Having retreated to

the town of Varta, the 1st Cavalry Corps met here the vanguard of the 4th Siberian Rifle Division (14th Rifle Regiment with a battery). The enemy continued to advance even in the dark. The 14th Rifle Regiment also got involved. A strong firefight broke out, it developed into

separate hand-to-hand fights. Fulfilling the order of the corps commander, the cavalry divisions under the cover of infantry in the dark began to retreat to the eastern bank of the Warta.

Thus ended the first offensive of our cavalry corps on Kalisz. The mood at the headquarters

of the division was depressed: after a successful advance for three weeks, it was necessary to withdraw again to the east. Meanwhile, from the reconnaissance detachments of the division, sent to the west and crossed into German territory, there were reports about the withdrawal of the Germans to the north from Kalisz. Everything indicated that the Germans were concentrating north of the Warta River and preparing an attack along the Vistula to the southeast.

The headquarters of the 14th division was in the village of Glinno. Erdelyi called me and, after evaluating all the available intelligence data and the situation of the 2nd Army units, ordered me to draw up a report to the commander of our corps. Its essence was as follows: the 2nd Russian army goes to the river Warta. Kalisz is covered by German cavalry, supported by infantry. The gap between the rivers Vistula and Warta covered only the 1st Caucasian and consolidated Cossack divisions. Meanwhile, one should expect a German strike precisely from the direction from Torun along the left bank of the Vistula. Therefore, it would be expedient not to throw our 1st Corps at Kalisz, but to send it to the gap between the Vistula and the Warta, and with five cavalry divisions to meet the German offensive. What significance Novikov attached to this report, I still do not know. Apparently, he was not brought to the headquarters of the 2nd Army. I do not presume to judge its expediency, but I think that the presence of five cavalry divisions in the main direction of the German offensive would paralyze the development of the actions of their 1st cavalry corps and give the 2nd Russian army time to systematically complete the change of the front in a northwestern direction.

On the morning of October 23, from the observation posts of the artillery of the 14th Cavalry Division, enemy infantry columns were observed moving in a northerly direction along the western bank of the Warta River. Both batteries of the division immediately opened fire on them. The enemy was accumulating infantry and cavalry in the area of the villages of Jezersko and Ostrow, making attempts to cross over to the eastern bank of the Warta, but

the fire of the 8th Cavalry Division and the vanguard of the 2nd Siberian Corps was repulsed, and, apparently, suffered heavy losses.

On October 25, joint reconnaissance of the cavalry divisions of the Novikov corps with the infantry of the 2nd Army, advancing close to the Varta River, discovered that the enemy was guarding the western bank of the river only in small units, and withdrew to the west with the main forces. Therefore, on the same day, units of Novikov's corps on a wide front from Unieyuva to the town of Warta again crossed the river and by evening reached the line Milachev, Gluchow, Poniadow, and on the right flank was the 8th, in the center - the 5th and on the left flank - 14th Cavalry Division.

On October 26, our 1st Cavalry Corps continued to move west. The enemy offered stubborn resistance to the 14th Cavalry Division in the area of the settlement of Kozminek. It was not until evening that the 7th Austrian Cavalry Division was driven out of this point. The enemy held the

Zakshin, Kozlentkuv, Nakvasin line. The 14th Cavalry Division already had to deal with the infantry units of the Germans, who covered the direction to Kalisz. By the evening of October 27, the enemy was driven back across the Svendrnia River.

On October 28, Novikov's divisions launched an offensive against Zlotnik, Kamen, Zhelyaskow and Kalisz. In the afternoon, new enemy infantry units began to deploy from Kalisz in a northeasterly direction. They were advancing along the highway towards the village of Skarshev. Our gunners opened heavy fire on them. For the headquarters of our 14th division, it now became clear that Kalisz alone could not be taken on its own. Everything depended on how far the 5th and 8th cavalry divisions would advance to the west. According to available data, the offensive of the 5th Cavalry Division developed slowly. Having occupied Jozefina, she has not yet been able to cross the Svendrnia River. Thus, the battle on the front of the 14th division took on a protracted character: it was necessary to restrain the German infantry deploying from Kalisz.

The headquarters of the 14th division was in Bogdanow. At about four o'clock in the afternoon, an order from the corps commander was received here: to suspend the attack, to begin a retreat to the Seshchow, Raysko area. The brigade was ordered to withdraw at nightfall. The headquarters of our division moved to Kozminek. Here, at the headquarters of the corps, it was supposed to clarify the situation. Having reached the settlement of Nakvasin, our headquarters met the departing

artillery of the 5th cavalry division. When asked why they were withdrawing, the commander of the artillery battalion replied that the 8th cavalry division was defeated, the head of this division, Zander, was killed, and the regiments of the 5th cavalry division were sent by the corps chief of staff to save the 8th cavalry division.

We, having gathered at the head of the division, weighed the situation on our right flank. They came to the conclusion: at night, withdraw the brigades to the area of Blashka, Skalmierz; in the area of the village of Chvalencice, contact the 5th Cavalry Division, and in the Moravia area, establish contact with the headquarters of the corps. On the

afternoon of October 29, the enemy did not advance, both divisions remained in the same area. According to the information received, units of the 8th Cavalry Division gathered near the village of Deltse. The head of the division Zander was alive and well. True, under the threat of a blow to the flank and rear from the north, the 8th Cavalry Division succumbed to panic, threw one gun, and the brigades dispersed in different directions. The commander of the 1st brigade, Krakovsky, with part of the squadrons of his brigade, jumped back to Tsekuv and almost caused a panic in the 23rd corps located there. The 2nd brigade, together with the head of the division, gathered in the Selce area.

The behavior of the 8th Cavalry Division did not surprise me: the same thing happened to it near Radom at the beginning of the war. The resistance of this division was low. This was well known to Dreyer, but he did not take effective measures to strengthen it.

Now, looking through the documents, we find a response in higher instances for the battle, which took place on October 28.

On October 30, 1914, the commander of the 2nd Army, Scheidemann, wrote to the front commander, General Ruzsky: "There are no rifle or artillery cartridges in the Novikov corps, so it is necessary to give them time to bring them up. The second is that the 8th Cavalry Division, which has suffered heavy losses, needs to be organized and replenished, and is now unable to speak out. Thirdly, the extremely heavy sandy soil, after long movements, affected the cavalry composition of the artillery of the corps, which needed to be rested. In view of these reasons, I will allow myself to say that the movement of Novikov's corps to fulfill the task that we have set (movement northwest of Kalisz. - B.Sh.) is hardly possible even tomorrow, October 30th. 7730. Scheidemann"[24] .

The next day, October 31, Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army told the chief of staff of the front:

“The commander of the cavalry corps, General Novikov, reported that the cavalry was tired and mostly exhausted and needed to be reforged, and the horse equipment needed to be revised and corrected. Artillery horses without prior rest are categorically incapable of further work. General Novikov petitions for permission for the cavalry corps to have at least two days of rest. 7757. Chagin. On this document, General

Oranovsky imposed a resolution: “Thank you, I didn’t expect it. This means that everyone must exert their strength. 31/X”[25]. I think this is a very correct resolution. Indeed, the cavalry corps

was tired. But is it really possible to correct horses, reforge them and revise horse equipment in two days? The will of Novikov and his energetic chief of staff, Dreyer, was weakening. On November 1, the Headquarters contacted the

headquarters of the North-Western Front by direct wire, and talked with him about Novikov's cavalry corps. This was reported in the Brief Strategic Outline of the War of 1914–1918. Further in this book it is said that General Ruzsky did not at all admire the actions of the Novikov corps. During the entire time of his stay at the front, Novikov exhausted his cavalry, did not bring significant benefits. Often he acted in areas that did not correspond to the general position of the troops. He sometimes put the entire corps at a disadvantage, not always skillfully arranging it for the night. Of the three divisions, two (8th and 14th) were so exhausted that they could not act on November 1, they needed a two-week rest. But Ruzsky could not give them rest, because it was necessary to exert all the forces of the troops to achieve the goal set by the Supreme High Command, which knew that new enemy cavalry divisions were being pulled up against the flank of our 2nd Army. Such is the admission made in the aforementioned Brief Strategic Outline of the War 1914-1918.

The 1st Cavalry Corps was subordinated to the 2nd Army. Its commander Scheidemann and chief of staff Chagin reported to the front about the limited combat capability of Novikov's divisions, but their report did not say anything about the two-week rest necessary for the corps, nor about

state of affairs in the 14th Cavalry Division. For me, an officer of this division, it is completely incomprehensible on what basis the headquarters of the North-Western Front reported to the Headquarters that our division needed a two-week rest. She was then in such a state that she did not feel an acute need for rest. As

for Novikov's "wearing down" his divisions in areas that "do not correspond to the general situation" of the troops, this assertion is also without foundation. After all, Ruzsky himself pointed out to Scheidemann the incorrect use of Novikov's cavalry to strike at the nearest rear of the enemy. Novikov acted in those areas that were determined by the headquarters of the 2nd Army. Therefore, it would be more honest if the headquarters of the North-Western Front accused the commander of the 2nd Army, and not General Novikov, of "wearing down" the 1st Cavalry Corps. The headquarters of the North-Western Front itself did not understand in what conditions it put the Novikov corps and what was required of it. History confirms that the 1st Cavalry Corps

retreated from its own shadow on October 28. The enemy was no less exhausted than Novikov's corps, and did not pursue our divisions. The panic that arose in the 8th cavalry division was transferred to the 5th cavalry division, it seized both Novikov himself and his chief of staff, Dreyer. It is now clear that Dreyer was very reluctant to report the loss of the gun. In report No. 7726 dated October 29, sent by the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army to the Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front, not a single mention was made of the loss of this gun.

words.

Of course, without the support of the infantry, Novikov's cavalry corps would not have coped with the attack of ten enemy infantry battalions, which also had cavalry. At best, Novikov could recruit three or four battalions of dismounted horsemen.

The facts show that our high authorities did not understand the role of the cavalry in the combat operations of 1914. This is also evidenced by the fact that it believed: Novikov could well complete the task assigned to his corps by the command of the front and the army. Novikov's cavalry remained the same task - to move in the direction between Slupsa and Kalisz and further between Poznan and Leszno.

On October 31, the command of the North-Western Front issued directive No. 1489 on the offensive on German territory. At the same

On the same day, order No. 41 on the offensive into German territory was issued by the command of the 2nd Army. And on November 1, the commander of the 2nd Army, at his disposal No. 7791, wrote to the chief of staff of the front,

Oranovsky: "The Cavalry, on the instructions of the commander-in-chief, the task was set - to search in the general direction to Poznan, Lissa [26]

—, conducting reconnaissance in the area, having the goal is to find out the enemy forces here and destroy the railways running parallel to the border. At present, the regrouping of the enemy, apparently, has ended, and in the area between the Vistula and the Warta, the offensive of significant German forces has already been discovered; along the left bank of the Warta, an offensive was also launched in the direction of Uniejow. Under such conditions, the presence in the combat area of the army of the cavalry corps, which by decisive and bold operations on the flank and rear of the advancing enemy could greatly contribute to the success of the army, seems extremely desirable. Doesn't the commander-in-chief recognize the possibility of changing the mission assigned to General Novikov's cavalry from strategic to tactical? Remaining in the area between Kalisz, Turek, Slupsa, General Novikov's cavalry could develop energetic actions in the flank and rear of the enemy advancing from the northwest, and conduct reconnaissance to the Sompolno (Vremen), Jarocin front. 7791. Scheidemann"[27] . I don't know what answer was given to this petition by the commander of the 2nd Army,—

but the Lodz operation that had already begun reduced the actions of the cavalry corps to tactical actions. Scheidemann's telegram, to which I referred, is characteristic precisely in that he sought to

entrust the cavalry with the solution of tasks not in the operational space. The tactical tasks alone, without the support of the infantry, could not solve: they did not have enough strength.

Reviewing the entire period of October 1-29, it should be noted that the Germans skillfully organized the withdrawal, the casting of their troops to Torun; the Russian armies, on the other hand, moved slowly and were biased in assessing the intentions of the enemy.

I noted that already in the 20th of October, the head of the 14th cavalry division reported on a possible German strike from Torun. The headquarters of the 2nd Army also expressed the same assumption. But headquarters

The North-Western Front and the Headquarters categorically rejected these

assumptions. Personally, I was not oriented at that time clearly enough, but I could see that the enemy was retreating in an organized manner and that it was necessary to wait for the strike. Where? Of course, based on the German doctrine, the blow should have followed on the flank and,

precisely, the northern one, open, in essence, for this. As for Novikov's cavalry corps, he acted with spread fingers: it was not visible to concentrate at least two cavalry divisions for a strike. The 14th Cavalry Division always had a difficult task, but, solving it, every day it lost faith in Novikov's commanding abilities and more and more doubted his benevolent attitude towards the division. That is why the relationship between the headquarters of the corps and the headquarters of the division became more formal every day. The corps headquarters was to blame

for this! There was no time to think about it: to the north of the area where our division was located, artillery cannonade thundered, and the 2nd Army

changed front to the north. The Lodz operation began.

LODS OPERATION

Only military history gives military operations a proper name, sorting them by known regiments. For the troops participating in these operations, there are no such names. Troop units and formations carry out daily combat service, the purpose of which is to fulfill the task assigned to them by the high command. Neither the Russian nor the German sides, after the withdrawal

of the Hindenburg army from Warsaw, assumed that military historians would call their military operations the Lodz operation. The German high command in the east hoped that he would be able to crush the right wing of the 2nd Russian Army and, perhaps, reach Lodz. The Russian high command had its own goal - to ensure the invasion of Germany. Of course, no one thought about the Lodz operation. The failure of the advance on Kalisz and the panic in the 8th Cavalry Division caused a feeling

of bitterness in all those who had so far victoriously advanced west. The head of the division and his staff were convinced that they were not in a position to do anything more without the support of the infantry. The reconnaissance conducted by the division in the area of Kalisz, Kozminek, discovered the same enemy units (Dussen's brigade in the area of Kalisz and the 7th Austrian cavalry division with at least a regiment of infantry in the area of Kozminek).

If at the beginning of the war the 14th Cavalry Division was reinforced by border guards, now this support has also been deprived of it: the commander of the 2nd Army detached border cavalry hundreds from the division, leaving them to rest in the

Kutno region. In early November, these border hundreds, having fallen under the blow of the Germans, withdrew to Lovich. Later, a border division was formed from them. For about a month, the division had no information about its two reconnaissance squadrons left in the Lysogur forests, south of Kielce. At the divisional headquarters, there was still a glimmer of hope that one of these squadrons would break through and report their fate. New squadrons for the Lancers and Hussars had not yet been formed

Only at the end of October did both reconnaissance squadrons leave the enemy rear. They were joined by a squadron of the 5th Hussars of the 5th Cavalry Division. All three squadrons arrived at the location of our 14th division, and we learned that the squadrons, cut off by the enemy infantry, were hiding in the forests. Local peasants supplied them with bread, meat and fodder. They did not disclose to the enemy the location of the squadrons. The squadrons did not linger in one place for a long time, moving to new areas at night. They did not inflict major blows to the rear of the Germans, but they destroyed single wagons and cars.

Although the Germans allocated a cavalry regiment in order to detect and defeat both of our squadrons, they did not succeed: the peasants warned the Russians in time, and they left, covering their tracks. And yet the command did not appreciate the merit of the squadrons, believing that they acted passively. The personnel of the squadrons were not presented for awards.

From October 29 to November 1, the 1st cavalry corps remained in the area of Warta, Michalkow, Chvalencice, Kalinova, Volen, Blaszk. Corps divisions conducted reconnaissance at the Kalisz, Kozminek, and Turek fronts. They found parts of the Dussen brigade, the 7th Austrian and the 8th German cavalry divisions.

Information coming from our rear agencies confirmed that the corps of the German army began to move along the right bank of the Vistula, changing its front to the north. On November 2, the left-flank

divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps (5th and 14th) again went on the offensive in the general direction of the village of Kozminek. A fight broke out in this area. On the night of November 3, an order was received from the corps commander to suspend the offensive to the west and northwest. The 14th division was supposed to take the site from the 5th division, which was hastily leaving the corps at night and was supposed to reach the village of Zgierza with a forced march. Thus, the 1st cavalry corps remained part of two cavalry divisions (8th and 14th) with 18 guns. The enemy behaved

passively.

On the morning of November 4, an order was received for the divisions of the corps to move to the eastern bank of the Warta and settle down: the 8th Cavalry Division - in the area of Skvyatkovice, Dobruzov, and the 14th division - in the area

Willamow, Shadek. Having made a 45-kilometer march with a crossing over the Warta, the 14th division reached the indicated area with the onset of darkness. The 2nd brigade with divisional headquarters was to be located in Wilyamuwa, and the 1st brigade - southeast of Shadek.

It was expected that at dawn the enemy infantry would launch an offensive in the direction of Lask. In this regard, the 2nd brigade was entrusted with the task of occupying the village of Wrzeszczewice, and the 1st brigade was

assigned to defend at Baluch. At about eight o'clock in the morning the headquarters of the division moved to a height near Karshev. The headquarters of the corps, which remained in the manor, soon came under enemy artillery fire, and quickly moved to the southeast. At about nine o'clock the enemy artillery fire intensified, the infantry and dismounted cavalry of the Germans went on the offensive, trying to envelop the left flank of our division from the front. 8 guns of the division with difficulty restrained their advance.

At about ten o'clock in the morning our infantry appeared in the village of Karshev. An officer sent to the village found out that the vanguard of the 17th division of the 19th army corps (68th Borodino infantry regiment, which made a forced 50-kilometer night march) was approaching. The head of the division,

Erdeli, invited me to Karshev. Here, from the commander of the 68th regiment, Colonel Tumsky, we learned that the 19th Army and the 1st Siberian Corps of the 5th Army, General Plehve, were approaching to reinforce the left flank of the 2nd Army. The regiment is tired. After describing the situation to Tumsky, we asked him to give us at least one battalion to support our weak dismounted units, guaranteeing that we would hold the Germans for three hours, and during this time the regiment could rest. Tumsky agreed and gave us the lead battalion. He placed the remaining three battalions with a light battery in Karshev for rest. In the first hour of the day, the enemy,

intensifying artillery fire, began a swift offensive. It was repulsed by units of our division and the Borodino battalion. The enemy is down. We could have had some rest. At 2 p.m., Erdeli received a categorical order from the commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps - to surrender his sector to units of the 19th Corps, immediately withdraw from the battle and retreat south of Lask. Getting out of the battle during the day was, of course, not easy. I had to go back to

commander of the Borodino regiment and beg him to deploy his battalions. At four o'clock the 68th Regiment began to deploy two battalions and a battery to relieve units of the 14th Division. The regiment commander left one battalion in reserve in Karshev.

It was already getting dark when the soldiers of the dismounted units of our division went out to their grooms. Borodino residents timely entered into a hot battle. At about five and a half in the afternoon, the headquarters of the 14th division left Karshev. The commander of the 68th regiment with a reserve battalion had to go on a counterattack against the Germans himself.

Assessing the results of the day on November 5, the commander of the 19th corps wrote in his report: "By 10 o'clock in the evening, the front of the corps was as follows: the 17th division - Babenets, Kiki, the 38th division - Stry, Paskove, Baluch, Mlynisko. The most stubborn battle today was waged by the Borodino men, who, under heavy fire from heavy artillery, which silenced our battery, repulsed the attacks of significantly superior enemy forces, but they were nevertheless pushed back to Karshev from the village of Kiki, which they captured. The Moscow regiment (65th infantry. - B.Sh.), advancing, drove the enemy out of Kiki and occupied this village. In the Borodino regiment, the losses are huge, in the rest - small, and in the 38th division - very insignificant. Borodino soldiers from the battle line were assigned to the corps reserve. The 8th and 14th cavalry divisions are spending the night in the corps area today. Tomorrow morning the offensive will take place-."[28]

Holding Kalisz with Dussen's Landsturmen Brigade, the commander of the German 3rd Cavalry Corps sent his units north to Turek to cover the right flank of Mackensen's advancing 9th Army. The offensive of Novikov's corps on Kozminek

on November 2 forced Frommel to undertake a counter-manoeuve from Turek to the south. But in view of the withdrawal of the Russian cavalry, Frommel with his cavalry divisions again headed north, continuing to conduct artillery fire on the eastern bank of the Warta, along which the Russian infantry columns were moving. On November 4, the Poznan corps was formed in the Kalisz

region. It included ersatz brigades of landshturmans. He was supposed to reach the Varta River and, together with the 3rd Cavalry Corps, strike at the left flank and rear of the 2nd Russian Army. The next day, this corps, supported by heavy artillery fire, first attacked

14th and 8th cavalry divisions of the Novikov corps from the front Shadek, Wilyamuv. Then the Poznan corps was attacked by the approaching units of the 19th Army and 1st Siberian Corps. Corps "Poznan" was forced to withdraw to the line Shadek, Wilyamuv. By the evening of the same day, Dussin's brigade approached Shadek. In the following

days, when Poznański and Breslav Corps, the Germans still did not succeed here.

On November 6, our 1st Cavalry Corps rushed to Zdunska Wola. Here he started a fight with the infantry and dismounted cavalry of the enemy, who occupied the edges of the forests north of the village of Zdunska Wola. Soon the 5th Don Division approached this village. She took over the site of the 1st Cavalry Corps. His divisions were again pulled back to spend the night in the Laska area. From the headquarters of the corps, an order was received: on November 7, the 8th and 14th cavalry divisions with a reinforced march to the area of the Rokytsany station, southwest of the Kolyushki station. The corps headquarters did not orient the divisions in the current situation. Only one thing became clear: we would have to pass through the rear of two enemy armies.

Having received an order from the division commander, I sketched out two routes for the movement of brigades, each with a battery attached. Appeared to Erdeli to sign the order. After familiarizing himself with the routes, he said:

"Why, Boris Mikhailovich, are we going to drag artillery behind us through the soot?" Wouldn't it be better to send it along the highway after the 8th Cavalry Division? Then it will come sooner, and it will be easier for us.

To this I objected: the situation in the area where we were being moved is unclear, and the brigades might need artillery on the way of movement.

- Well, what an unclear situation there - we will move along the rear! We need to preserve the strength of our

horses... Indeed, I myself did not know why they were moving us and what was happening in the area of the Rokytsany station... I did not want to insist. But in the order, I nevertheless left an indication: the brigades should send close reconnaissance 15 kilometers ahead.

On the morning of November 7, the 1st Cavalry Corps moved east. The weather was bad. The division headquarters rode with the left column heading through Dlutow. The desire to clarify the situation forced me to go beyond my authority: I called from the 14th Cossack regiment

a young and intelligent cornet with six Cossacks, sent him as a communications delegate directly to the headquarters of the 2nd Army in Lodz with orders to find out and report to me what was happening on the front of the army. I told the cornet that he was obliged to remain at the headquarters of the 2nd Army. The crafty Cossack did an excellent job. In the future, he kept me informed of all events on the front of the 2nd Army.

The extent to which the troops were not oriented in the situation is shown by the following fact. In one of the villages, west of Dlutow, we ran into the Chief of Staff of the 7th Infantry Division. It was commanded by Colonel Dovbor-Musnitsky. This division was in the army reserve. We told the colonel that we were marching to the area of the Rokycany station. "Here are the wise authorities," Dovbor-Musnitsky remarked with irony, "some two squadrons of Germans broke through, and we are driving a whole cavalry corps there!" Erdeli was convinced that this thought of the colonel did not contradict the truth.

The day was fading into evening. The commanders of our brigades received reports from their patrols: not only the Rokytsany area, but also the villages west of Tushin are occupied by enemy infantry, which is firing heavy rifle fire at our patrols. There was no doubt that the enemy had more than two squadrons. Erdeli asked me where our artillery was. "Apparently, Lask passed," I replied (there were no fresh reports from the commander of the artillery division).

With the onset of darkness, both brigades of the 14th division were forced to stop in the area of Buda-Dlutovsk, Rokytsany and five to seven kilometers west and south-west of Tushin, which was occupied by German infantry. South-east of the area where the division was located, our reconnaissance discovered the enemy's infantry outposts.

Where the 8th cavalry division was, our artillery and the headquarters of the corps, was still unknown. I immediately sent reconnaissance to Pabyanitsa to establish contact with our units. Erdeli began to worry about the fate of our artillery: since the morning of November 8, military operations are coming, but the division has no artillery. Every hour the head of the division called me and asked if the artillery had arrived. I could not report anything - there were no reports from the artillerymen. Erdeli probably remembered my warning not to let go of the artillery. But, of course, it's not about excuses. Should have

take vigorous measures to seek out artillery. For this purpose, I sent another special patrol in the direction from Pabianice to Zgów. Meanwhile, at about 12

o'clock in the morning, we received two orders from the headquarters of the corps: 1) on November 8, by all means, take Tushin and 2) transmit the order of the commander of the 2nd Army of the 10th Infantry Division to attack Tushin and further to Viskitno. The 10th division at that time was located north of the settlement of Piotrkow. I reported

both orders to Erdeli. The first of these we could carry out on the condition that our artillery arrived. We decided to carry out the second order. To communicate with the 10th Infantry Division, I called one officer's detachment from each regiment and instructed them. On a two-verst map, he indicated to the chiefs of the patrols the location of our division and the presumed location of the 10th Infantry Division ...

I don't remember the names of all the heads of the patrols. I remember only one surname - well-known from the maneuvers of 1913, the cornet of the 14th Don Cossack regiment Lestyev, a modest, excellent, truly combat officer.

Having sent patrols, I lay down, but suddenly the commander of the artillery battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Artsishevsky, burst into my hut. I used far from flattering words, reproaching him for the fact that he had been disappearing somewhere for so long. "What are you arguing about?

Artsishevsky objected. "While you are sleeping here, I have already fought!" How, where did you fight? I

involuntarily asked a question. Artsishevsky said that he was moving behind the 8th Cavalry Division and in the village of Pabyanice found himself in a stream on highway from east to west.

In this stream, Artsishevsky was met by the commander of the 1st Siberian Corps, General Pleshkov, who was heading east by car. Pleshkov ordered Artsishevsky to go in the direction of Zhgów and support the 8th Cavalry Division. Having advanced the artillery battalion east of Pabyanitsa to Zhguv, Artsishevsky established contact with the head of the 8th Cavalry Division, took up a firing position and fired at the Germans until the evening, repelling their attacks from Zhguv. In addition to the dismounted units of the 8th Cavalry Division, scattered units of the infantry units of the 2nd Siberian Corps were in positions west of Zhguv.

The course of events showed that the enemy did not act in two squadrons, as Colonel Dovbor-Musnitsky claimed, but in large forces. After putting Artsishevsky to bed,

I went to Erdeli to report the arrival of artillery and receive instructions on how we would act tomorrow. The head of the division decided to attack Tushin from the south with dismounted parts.

Returning to my apartment, I found two heads of patrols establishing contacts with the 10th Infantry Division. They reported that to the south, in the direction of Piotrkow, with a front to the north, they met a German infantry outpost, through which they could not break through. About 40 minutes later, the third head of the sergeant also appeared. He reported the same. The fourth head of the patrol, the cornet Lestyev, was not there yet. I could only assume one thing: this brave officer must have broken into the location of our 10th Infantry Division. ... Dawn. November 8th arrived. I was just about to go with a report to Erdeli,

when the Lestyev junction appeared in front of the porch of my apartment. The cornet reported that he managed to break into the location of the 10th Infantry Division, find its headquarters and convey the order of the commander of the 2nd Army. I had no doubts about the validity of Lestyev's message. Asking the cornet how he got to the headquarters of the 10th division, I found out that his patrol had to break through the German

infantry outposts twice. To the south of us, separating the 14th Cavalry Division from the 10th Infantry Division, there were strong German infantry units, but their numbering has not yet been

established. The situation near Tushin and on the entire right flank of the 2nd Army was extremely difficult. If it was possible to find the 10th Infantry Division, then absolutely nothing

was known about the 5th Cavalry Division, whose task was to provide a junction between the 2nd and 1st Russian armies.

Having directed the brigades to attack Tuszyn from the southwest and south, we drove with all our headquarters to the heights west of the village of Tychow. There was silence on the battlefield. The enemy met our reconnaissance with rifle fire from a cemetery located on the southern outskirts of Tushin.

Soon both of our batteries (8 guns) opened fire on the cemetery and Tushin. Half an hour later, from the direction of Modlice, the Germans returned fire from at least three heavy batteries. The advance of our dismounted units slowed down. From the cemetery and from Tushin, the enemy intensified machine-gun fire. At about four o'clock in the afternoon, on the heights near Tychow, we found elements of the 10th Infantry Division. The head of this division and his chief of staff arrived at our headquarters. After getting acquainted with the situation, they decided to take Tushin by night assault, and we

moved to the east for the night, becoming south of Ruta's mill. The next day we were to cross the Wolbarka River and advance to the north across open country. Together with the 10th Infantry Division, the 5th Cavalry

Division also arrived, rejoining the 1st Cavalry Corps. The enemy slowly retreated near Bruytse - Karpin <? >.

On November 10, the 14th division received an order: acting together with the 10th infantry division, which had taken Tushin by storm, to continue the offensive on Kurovitsa.

The remaining divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps were to advance eastward in order to prevent the enemy from advancing eastward from the railway. As the

headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division became aware, the troops of the 2nd Army suffered heavy losses and barely held the front around Lodz; things were going better in the 5th Army. Parts of the 1st Siberian Corps and the Caucasian Cavalry Division acted from the direction of Skierniewice in the direction of Kolyushki. The management of the 2nd and 5th armies was united by the commander of the 5th army, Plehve. The commander of the 2nd Army was forbidden to leave Lodz.

The artillery rumble of guns did not stop for a whole day. At night, the reflections of cannon shots seemed especially bright. Villages were on fire. The battle near Lodz intensified. And soon a battle broke out in the northeast - in the direction of the railway station Kolyushki. Between these two fronts there was a small unlit gap of 3–4 kilometers. The Germans could escape through it. The 1st Cavalry Corps was, as it were, the bottom of the bag in which the Germans sat and which the Russian infantry had to tighten.

On November 10, the 14th Cavalry Division launched an offensive on Kurovitsa with dismounted units, and both of our batteries opened fire on the Bruytse-Kurovice road, along which the enemy's convoys were moving. Soon, south of the Bruytse-Kurovice road, infantry with enemy artillery appeared. A battle ensued with our division. The offensive of the neighbors then developed slowly. The 14th division did not achieve significant results in the battle and retreated to the village of Dalkow for the night.

On November 11, an offensive was to be carried out on the village of Laznovska Wola. The 8th Cavalry Division advanced along the railway to the Rokysany station. The 5th Cavalry Division, moving towards Kolyushki, was supposed to get in touch with our infantry advancing from Skierniewice towards Kolyushki. The offensive of the neighbors on the left - the 10th Infantry Division - was going slowly.

The corps headquarters reported that the Germans had attacked the 6th Siberian Division near the Kolushki station and that a squadron of the 17th Nizhny Novgorod Dragoon Regiment had attacked a heavy German battery at Khrusty-Staro. This dashing attack, undertaken by Nizhny Novgorod dragoons on horseback, was a partial episode. It had no effect on the course of the battle of the 6th Siberian division. Korolkov, in his book The Lodz Operation[29], clearly exaggerated the significance of this attack. —

On November 11, in the battle for the village of Laznovska Wola, our 14th division encountered not only the dismounted units of the German cavalry, but also the infantry rearguard, reinforced by artillery. Only with the approach of units of the 10th Infantry Division was Laznovska Wola cleared of the Germans. On

November 12, the 14th Cavalry Division received an order to pursue the enemy through Kolyushki in the general direction of Brzeziny. The 5th Cavalry Division moved to the right. The 8th Cavalry Division was delayed in the rear, because rumors had reached the Germans in the rear area of Tomaszow. Intelligence

did not provide reliable data on the position of the enemy. His infantry and cavalry units were mixed. Separate small patrols of the enemy wandered in the rear of the advancing divisions of our 1st Cavalry Corps. The command of the 14th division sought to quickly reach the Kolushki station and get in touch with our infantry fighting here in order to restore the common front, torn

the Germans. The word "encirclement" of the German units was not uttered by any of the participants in

this operation. On November 12, units of the 14th division crossed the Kolyushki-Piotrkow railway and for the first time encountered small groups of Siberian infantrymen in characteristic hats. The infantrymen wandered in different directions. When I stopped one of these groups, mistaking them for infantry reconnaissance, and asked what task they were performing, I received the answer: "We are riflemen of the 6th Siberian division.

We are looking for our regiment. Where is your regiment located? I asked. "Yes, we don't know ... It seems that our group is the only one left from the regiment,"

one soldier answered briskly. And indeed, the story of the Siberian soldiers was confirmed: on the battlefield, in the Galkuvek region, Russians and Germans were killed. Here we found rifles, machine guns, guns abandoned by Russian and German soldiers. Of course, there was no need to cry, and there was no time. It was necessary to learn a lesson from this ba

Small dismounted parts of the German cavalry failed to delay our movement. With the approach of our chains to a direct shot, the German cavalry instantly mounted their horses and retreated in a northwestern direction. Parallel pursuit of the enemy had to be carried out in low cloud cover and in fog. We followed on the heels of the Germans. Soon our cavalry found themselves in the rear of our infantry, which occupied Brzeziny. So, the German group of

troops, commanded by Schaeffer, safely jumped out of the "encirclement", although no one, in fact, set the goal of such an "encirclement". It should be noted that the Lodz operation

had two positive results for the Russian army: firstly, Rennenkampf, a representative of "adventurism", was removed from the post of army commander; secondly, Scheidemann, who turned out to be an incompetent boss, was also removed from the post of army commander. With the withdrawal of Schaeffer's group of troops to Brzeziny,

it was important for the Germans to organize a front, for the Russians it was important to disrupt this enemy's plan. After the end of the fighting on Ypres,

Falkenhayn began to transfer reinforcements from the Western Front to the Eastern Front, no longer with cavalry, but

whole infantry corps. We now know from history that four corps were deployed (2nd, 3rd, 13th and 24th reserve). Two of these corps reinforced the left flank of the 9th Army, while the rest advanced from Kalisz and Sieradz on Pabyanitsa.

Bloodless by battles, the Russian armies eventually lingered on the left bank of the Vistula. A different situation would have been created if all four corps had been thrown in the same direction. None of the German and Russian researchers of the history of the First World War spoke about this. We think that the German army could have succeeded if its commanders, who operated in the East, had not lost faith in the steadfastness of their units and if they had not had to plug the holes that had formed on their front. It should be taken into account that the enemy suffered heavy losses: only the 1st German cavalry corps lost 39 officers and more than 1,660 soldiers during the operation (about 25 percent of the regular strength of the corps). It is clear that after such losses this corps was taken to the rear to rest.

Following to the north-east of Kolyushka and pushing back the dismounted parts of the German cavalry, the divisions of our 1st Cavalry Corps soon again came into contact with the enemy infantry.

In search of a passage in the enemy's combat position, the divisions of the 1st Corps were not only behind the extreme right flank of the group of troops of General Pleshkov, but by November 16 they had gone beyond the left flank of the 1st Russian Army (15 kilometers southwest of Lovich). By this day, units of the 1st Russian Army were advancing westward in order to reach the Osmolin, Sobota, Pentek line. The corps commander Novikov believed that in this sector it would be possible to reach the rear of the enemy, acting through Belyava and further to Osmolin.

On November 16, our 14th division went beyond the battle front of the 67th infantry division (this division is second-rate), which had just been transferred from the St. Petersburg military district; there she guarded the coast. The 67th Infantry Division was included in the 6th Army Corps, and it launched an offensive against Beliavy.

On November 17, all divisions of the 1st Cavalry Corps descended somewhat to the south, standing behind the right flank of the group of troops of General Pleshkov, which was part of the 2nd Army. Meanwhile, the Germans stepped up pressure on Jowicz by bringing heavy artillery into action. The 55th Infantry Division (also a secondary one) took up a position across the Bzura River, to

west of Lowicz. On November 18 or 19, the head of the 14th Cavalry Division received an urgent order from the commander of the 1st Corps: on alarm, move north and occupy the front of the 55th Infantry Division, which had withdrawn South.

Soon we noticed crowds of soldiers, officers, they randomly retreated back, in a southerly direction. It was the 55th Infantry Division retreating, although silence reigned at the front. The brigades of our division hurriedly occupied the trenches of the 55th Infantry Division, sending forward reconnaissance on foot. The enemy behaved passively: at our scouts approaching his positions, he opened weak rifle fire. About five o'clock in the morning, the chief

of staff of the 55th Infantry Division came to us and announced that it was approaching its former sector in order to occupy it. Only from this chief did we manage to find out the reason for the withdrawal of the 55th division. During the day, the Germans heavily fired at the division with 152-mm shells - "suitcases", as heavy shells were then called. After spending a day under heavy shelling, the division could not stand it at nightfall and, despite the fact that the enemy had ceased fire, began to move south. In a word, there was a panic in the division. Having retreated six kilometers to the rear, the regiments stopped. Officers gathered their scattered units

and units. People were fed, and the division went in the opposite direction - to their previous positions. By dawn, the 14th Cavalry Division was relieved. Brigade-by-brigades, she went to her old district of location.

I have already noted how important it is to be able to carefully introduce reserve units into battle. Without this, you will not be successful. We made sure that the 55th Infantry Division was transferred from St. Petersburg near Skerpewice without proper preparation for combat operations. That is why she suffered heavy losses. This led to the fact that the 1st Cavalry Corps was hastily moved to the south, to the left flank of the North-Western Front - here the enemy threatened a breakthrough between the North-Western and South-Western fronts. The corps was placed at the disposal of the commander of the 19th Army Corps. With the support of one brigade of the 63rd Infantry Division (which was concentrated north of Tushin), the corps was to launch a flank attack on the left sector of the Northwestern Front.

After spending the night in the area of the villages of Volya-Rakova, Karpin, the 14th Cavalry Division on the morning of November 22 moved through Tushin to Glukhov. The 8th Cavalry Division was moving east, its task was to attack the enemy south of Glukhov. When the headquarters of our division left south of Tushin, we saw the following picture: the left flank of the North-Western Front (7th Infantry and 5th Don Cossack divisions) was fighting with the front to the north. The enemy from the south did not stop artillery fire on the 5th Don Cossack division, which responded to the Germans in the same way. Close reconnaissance to the south did not detect the enemy. Thus, it seemed expedient for the cavalry to go to the flank of the village of Yutroshev, and then, together with the infantry, to launch a flank counterattack. The head of the 14th Cavalry Division ordered to send two squadrons from each brigade with lava in a southwestern direction in order to completely paralyze the enemy's reconnaissance and observation of our flank. The squadrons were followed by brigades. They did not open artillery fire. The maneuver was a success. The Germans, distracted by fire to the north, not only failed to secure their flank, but also continued to stubbornly fire on the 5th Don Cossack Division. They weakened the attention of the site,

located in the east. In the second hour of the day, the deployment of the brigade of the 63rd Infantry Division began from Tushin, it launched an offensive in a south-western direction. Chain after chain, our infantry marched across the open country. The Germans did not fire on her. The forward squadrons of the 14th Cavalry Division were already in the forest and shawls in front of them were reconnaissance and

enemy observers, and our brigades were located in Glukhov. At about four o'clock in the afternoon, the first infantry lines reached the forest without hindrance. Then the brigades of the 14th Cavalry Division moved southwest of Glukhov, towards the forest. Soon there was a cheer in the forest. This brigade of the 63rd Infantry Division suddenly attacked the Germans. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. Batteries of the 14th Cavalry Division from the area south of Glukhov

opened fire on the Germans, and the brigades in mounted formation rushed into the eastern part of the forest. The flank attack was obviously so unexpected for the enemy that his artillery in the dark sent individual shells to places in the east where our cavalry was no longer there. The success achieved by the surprise attack enabled our troops to hasten their withdrawal to

On November 25, the 14th Cavalry Division withdrew to the east, to the Kolyushki-Piotrkow railway. The next day she was ordered to move forward, to capture the village of Renkoray, previously cleared by our units, and then again occupied by a German infantry battalion, supported by one or two artillery batteries.

Having hurried all the soldiers and advanced heavy machine guns into the chain, the 14th division successfully completed the task - they took Renkoray, capturing up to 20 Germans. The 14th Cavalry Division fought this battle in a purely infantry way, to which it was accustomed throughout the previous period of the war. A day later, the division received the task of retreating again to the Kolyushki-Piotrkow railway. The aimless movement of the cavalry back and forth caused a fair criticism in our units. As a joke, our cavalry dubbed the division the "Renkorai Reserve Battalion" for attacking Renkorai.

In early December, the 1st Cavalry Corps was replaced by infantry, and its cavalry was hastily sent north to cover the withdrawal of the 2nd Army across the Ravka River.

On the night of December 4, divisions of the 1st Corps occupied the trenches of the 2nd Army,

which began to withdraw. Only at about eleven in the morning did the enemy manage to discover that the infantry units of the 2nd Army were withdrawing. In separate groups, and then in chains, the Germans launched an offensive against our divisions. Our main forces managed to retreat across the Ravka River without contact with the enemy. And yet, quite a few of our soldiers and individual convoys trudged along in the rear of the retreating columns.

Our foot soldiers, especially the Siberians, were not afraid of the German cavalry. Meeting the rifle fire of even small units of the Russian infantry, the German horse patrols quickly dismounted. While the head of the German patrol was writing a report about the meeting with the Russian infantrymen, they increased their fire, continuing their march to the east.

Having retreated behind the infantry units of the 2nd Army, our cavalry corps stood for no more than a day in place, and then it was again transferred through Nove Miasto to the left flank of the front south of the Pilica River. In the Przystalowitsy area, the corps came into contact with the 19th Army Corps, which was fighting with a front to the northwest. The Germans

stubbornly sought to develop an offensive along the northern bank of the Pilica, pushing the left flank of the 5th Army. 8th and 14th cavalry divisions,

located southwest of Nowe Miasto, they defended the southern bank of the Pilica, preventing the enemy from organizing a crossing. With long-range artillery fire, both divisions flanked the Germans advancing east along the northern bank of the Pilica. The days were

short. The infantry of both belligerents dug deeper and deeper into the ground. After

December 21, 1914, the 14th Cavalry Division was withdrawn to the rear for ten days. The personnel of the squadrons managed to wash themselves, wash their clothes, and disinfect their clothes. I was allowed to use a ten-day break in St. Petersburg and Warsaw. I spent only three days in Petersburg. Here I met my friends, breathed in the air of the capital, learned how the capital experienced the days of the war. A courier train took me to Warsaw and then to the division. Of course, during the three days of my stay in St. Petersburg, I did not manage to accumulate many impressions. And yet I felt that official St. Petersburg did not acutely experience everything that happened in the war.

He returned to the division in early January. She was already ready to march north. It was included in the new 12th Army, commanded by General Plehve. Mounting

my horse and setting off with the division, I did not suspect that the wheel of my fate was already turning in a different direction. The service at the military headquarters, where I spent two years, ended. I was waiting for work in the higher (army and front) headquarters.

It was with pain in my heart that I parted from the headquarters of the 14th Cavalry Division. Among its many officers, who are benevolent towards honest military cadres, and among the soldiers, both in peacetime and during the war, I met the most friendly and comradely attitude. I would like to especially note that the kindest memories of my service in the ranks connected me with the 14th Cavalry Division.

MAIN DATES OF THE LIFE AND ACTIVITIES OF B.M. SHAPOSHNIKOVA[30]

1882, September 20 - Born in the city of Zlatoust, Ural (Chelyabinsk) region.

1893–1900 — Studying at the Krasnoufimsk Industrial and Perm real schools.

1901-1903 - Passed the course of the Moscow (Alekseevsky) military school in the first category, listed on the marble board of the school; awarded the officer rank of second lieutenant, assigned to the 1st rifle Turkestan battalion. 1906,

November - Awarded the rank of lieutenant.

October 1907 - Enrolled in the junior class of the General Staff Academy. 1910, May

- He graduated from the basic and additional courses of the Academy, for excellent success in the sciences he was awarded the title of staff captain.

1910, June - Qualified command of a company in the 1st rifle Turkestan ass. 1912,

November - Transferred to the General Staff with the appointment Czestochowa as a [31] of the 14th Cavalry Division in the city of senior

adjutant (Poland). 1912, December -

Promoted to the rank of captain. 1914, August - Departed for the Southwestern Front as a senior adjutant of the 14th

Cavalry Division. October 1914 - He was shell-shocked in the head by an enemy artillery shell near Sokhachev.

1915, January - Appointed to the post of assistant senior adjutant of the intelligence department of the

headquarters of the 12th army. 1915, June - Headquarters officer under the command of the quartermaster general of the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the armies of the North-Western Front.

1915, November - Chief of Staff of a separate consolidated Cossack brigade.

December 1915 - Promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. 1916, May - Chief of Staff of the 2nd Cossack Turkestan divisions.

February 1917 - Acting Chief headquarters of the 10th Army

Corps. August 1917 - Promoted to the rank of colonel. 1917, September - Commander of the 16th Mingrelian Grenadier shelf.

1917, December - Congress of Delegates of the Military Revolutionary committees was elected head of the Caucasian Grenadier Division.

January 1918 - Evacuated from the front due to illness. March 1918 - Dismissed after being demobilized from the army on

indefinite leave. April 1918 - Entered the service of the secretary of the People's Court Kazan Workers 'and Peasants' Republic.

1918, May 22 - He volunteered to serve in the Red Army and was appointed assistant head of the Operational Directorate of the Headquarters of the Supreme Military Council of the Republic, and then head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Field Headquarters of the Republic.

1918, November - Senior assistant to the head of the special office work of the military department of the Higher Military Inspectorate of the RSFSR. 1919,

March - First assistant to the chief of staff of the People's Commissariat of Defense of Ukraine. 1919,

August - Head of the Intelligence Department of the Field headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic.

1919, October - Head of the Operational Directorate of the Field headquarters of the Revolutionary

Military Council of the Republic. February 1921 - First Assistant Chief of Staff of the Red Army. October 1921 - Awarded the Order of the Red Banner. 1922, November - Was sent by a military expert of the Soviet delegation to the Lausanne

Conference (Switzerland). 1925, May - Deputy Commander, and from October - Commander of the Leningrad Military District.

May 1927 - Commander of the Moscow Military District. May 1928 - Chief of Staff of the Red

Army. 1930, October - By decision of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he was admitted to the party without completing a PhD.

April 1931 - Commander of the Volga Military District. 1931, June -

Approved by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR as an honorary Red Army soldier of the 56th cavalry regiment of the 10th Maykop division and the 166th rifle regiment of the 56th rifle Moscow division.

April 1932 - Head and Commissar of the MB Frunze Military Academy.

1934 -

Awarded the Order of the Red Star. 1935, June -

The academic title of professor of higher military educational institutions was awarded. 1935 - Member

of the Central Executive Committee of the seventh convocation. Chairman of the military commissions on the maneuvers of the Czechoslovak army.

1935, September - Commander of the Leningrad Military District. 1935, November -

Awarded the rank of commander of the 1st rank. January 1937 -

Elected deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the first convocation.

May 1937 - Chief

of the General Staff of the Red Army and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Member of the CEC of the fifth and seventh convocation.

February 1938 - Awarded the Order of the Red Star and the commemorative medal "XX Years of the Red Army". March

1938 - Introduced to the Main Military Council of the Red Army, formed in 1938. March 1939 - Elected by the 18th Congress of

the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks as a candidate member of the Central Committee of

the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. December 1939 - Awarded the Order of Lenin for successful work for the management of the operational activities of the Red Army.

May 1940 - Awarded the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. 1940,

August - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 1941,

June - Permanent Advisor at the Headquarters of the High Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

1941, July - Re-appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army and introduced to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command (since August - the High Command) of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

1942, May - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR

1942, October - Awarded the second Order of Lenin in connection with the 60th anniversary of his birth. Named after Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov to the Higher Tactical Shooting Red Banner Courses for the Improvement of the Commanding Staff of the Red Army Infantry and the First Infantry School of the Red Banner Tambov. 1943, June - Head of the Higher

Military Academy named after K.E. Voroshilov. September 1943 - By decision of

the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party, he was approved as a member of the Armistice Commission (later the Armistice Commission with Germany and the Armistice Commission with Finland, Hungary and Romania). February

1944 - Awarded the Order of Suvorov, 1st class. November

1944 - Awarded the second Order of the Red Banner. 1945,

February - Awarded the third Order of Lenin and a medal

"For the Defense of Moscow".

1945, March 26 - Death of B.M. Shaposhnikov from tuberculosis.

1945, March 28 - The funeral of Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov on Red Square in Moscow.

PRINTED WORKS B. M. SHAPOSHNIKOV

I. Books

1. Cavalry (cavalry essays). Moscow, 1923, circulation 2000 copies.
2. On the Vistula. On the history of the 1920 campaign. Moscow, 1924, circulation 3000 copies.
3. The brain of the army, book I. Moscow, 1927, circulation 5000 copies.
4. The brain of the army, book II. Moscow, 1929, circulation 4000 copies.
5. Brain of the army, book III. Moscow, 1929, circulation 4000 copies.
6. Warsaw operation (compendium). Moscow, 1933, 600 copies.
7. The path travelled, 1882-1915 (The manuscript was partially published in the "Military History Journal" No. 6-9, 12 for 1966, 1, 3 and 6 for 1967).

II. Articles

8. A month behind enemy lines. Journal "Military Affairs". Moscow, 1918, No. 27.
9. Sketches from the actions of the Russian cavalry during the World War. Collection of articles on military art, book. I. Moscow, 1919
10. Mirage and reality. "Military Affairs", 1919, No. 2.
11. Cavalry raids. "Military Affairs", 1919, No. 28-29.
12. Horse masses. "Military Affairs", 1919, No. 34-35.
13. Review of military operations of the Red Army (from November 7 to December 1). "Military Affairs", 1919, No. 34-35.
14. Review of the combat operations of the Red Army in December 1919, "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 1.
15. Review of the combat operations of the Red Army in January 1920, "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 2.
16. Review of the combat operations of the Red Army in February 1920, "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 4.
17. Review of the combat operations of the Red Army in March 1920, "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 9.

18. Police cavalry. "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 10. 19. Review of the military operations of the Red Army in April 1920. "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 11.
20. Police cavalry. "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 12. 21. The first combat steps of Marshal Pilsudski. "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 13.
22. Review of the fighting of the Red Army in May 1920. "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 13. 23. Polish Army. "Military Affairs", 1920, No. 15. 24. The modern meaning of the cavalry and its tasks. Collection of articles on the art of war, vol. 2. Moscow, 1920 25. Horse masses on the flank of the army. Journal "Military Science and Revolution", Moscow, 1921, No. 1–2. 26. Review of the book "Valiant Defense of Petrograd in October 1919". Journal "Print and Revolution", book. I. 27. Army cavalry in mobile warfare. Collection of articles on military art. Moscow, 1921 28. Cavalry in the Civil War. "Revolution and War", 1921, collection no. 6–7. 29. Red cavalry. Magazine "Political Worker", 1923, No. 1–2.
30. Murat's dreams of our days. Magazine "Military Bulletin", Moscow, 1923, No. 9-10.
31. The overthrow of the gods. "Military Bulletin", 1923, No. 7. 32. The first issue of a special group. "Red Star", 1932, No. 197. 33. He gave an example of truly ebullient activity (in memory of P.P. Lebedev). "Red Star", July 4, 1933 34. Forge of command personnel. "Red Star", 1933 ... No. 269. 35. On the threshold of the 16th year. Izvestia, January 1934, No. 16. 36. Cheerful and tireless (in memory of S.S. Kamenev), "Red Star", August 27, 1936

Illustrations



***Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich
Shaposhnikov.***



***The Shaposhnikov family, Zlatoust, 1887. Standing (from
left to right): uncle of Boris Mikhailovich - V.K.***

***Ledomsky, father - M.Ya. Shaposhnikov, elder
uncle - M.K. Ledomsky. Sitting (from left to***

right): aunt - L.K. Ledoms kaya, grandmother - Yu.N.

Ledomskaya, Boris (5 years old), mother - P.K. Shaposhnikov.



Boris Shaposhnikov is a 5th grade student of the Krasnoufimsk Industrial School. 1897



Lieutenant B.M. Shaposhnikov. 1907



B.M. Shaposhnikov among the soldiers. 1914



ON THE. Danilov.



AM Zayonchkovsky.



A.A. Neznamov.



B.M. Shaposhnikov. 1914



Lieutenant Colonel B.M. Shaposhnikov in the operational department of the Southwestern Front during the First World War.



ON THE. Suleiman.




ON THE. Buynitsky.



Sitting (from left to right): Commander-in-Chief S.S. Kamenev, member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic S.I. Gusev, commander of the South-Western Front A.I. Egorov, member of the PC In the 1st Cavalry Army K.E. Voroshilov. Standing: Head of the Field Headquarters of the RVS of the Republic P.P. Lebedev, chief of staff of the SWF N.N. Petin, commander of the 1st Cavalry Army S.M. Budyonny, head of the operational department of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic B.M. S



B.M. Shaposhnikov, M.V. Frunze, M.N. Tukhachevsky. 1922



B.M. Shaposhnikov. 1924



B.M. Shaposhnikov, S.M. Kirov, O.A. Saakov. 1925



*M.V. Frunze, A.K. Vekman (standing behind him)
and B.M. Shaposhnikov among the sailors of the destroyer
"Karl Marx". 1925*



Arrival of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR M.V. Frunze in Leningrad. From left to right in the first row: Head of the Political Administration of the Okrug O.A. Saakov, M.V. Frunze, Assistant Commander of the Leningrad District Troops B.M. Shaposhnikov. 19



Participants of the meeting of district commanders. Sitting (from left to right): G.D. Bazilevich, M.K. Levandovsky, M.N. Tukhachevsky, K.E. Voroshilov, N.N. Petin, A.I. Kork, V.M. Orlov. Standing (from left to right): A.V. Pavlov, M.V. Viktorov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, A.K. Vekman, I.P. Uborevich, K.A. Avksentevsky. 1927



*The meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR
chaired by K.E. Voroshilov.*



***Commander of the Moscow Military District B.M.
Shaposhnikov at a military parade in Moscow. May 1928***



CM. Budyonny and B.M. Shaposhnikov.



First row: K.E. Voroshilov (first from right), P.P. Lebedev (second from right), B.M. Shaposhnikov (third from right). Second row: P.E. Dybenko (second from right), P.I. Baranov (third from right) and others. At the teachings of the Kyiv military district. 1930



B.M. Shaposhnikov at the report of I.V. Stalin. 1938



B.M. Shaposhnikov among the delegates of the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b). March 1938.



***Family B.M. Shaposhnikova: wife Maria Alexandrovna
and son Igor. 1936***



***The signing of the non-aggression pact between
the USSR and Germany (the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact)
on August 23, 1939.***



M.D. Bonch-Bruевич. 1940



B.M. Shaposhnikov on vacation. Kislovodsk, 1940



Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov and General of the Army K L. Meretskov on the podium of the Mausoleum V.I. Lenin on Red Square in Moscow on November 7, 1940.



***B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.E. Voroshilov, N.N. Voronov
and a representative of the British military mission (third
from left) inspecting the military equipment of the Red
Army. Moscow region, 1942***



***Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR B.M.
Shaposhnikov in his office. 1942***

Путь русского офицера

Б.М. Шапошников

Маршал Б.М. Шапошников был одним из немногих офицеров царской армии, дослужившихся до высоких постов в Красной армии. Занимая должность начальника Генерального штаба РККА, он пользовался большим доверием И.В. Сталина, был автором многочисленных статей по теории военного искусства.

Воспоминания Б.М. Шапошникова рассказывают читателям о службе в Русской императорской армии. Автор детально отображает карьеру офицера в дореволюционной России, описывает все стадии прохождения службы и обучения в Академии Генерального штаба, размышляет о кровопролитных боях Первой мировой войны.

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Notes

1

S.S. Kamenev (1881-1936) - colonel of the old army, graduated from the Academy of the General Staff in 1907, voluntarily joined the Red Army, the front, was the Eastern Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic. After the end War, he was an inspector of the Red Army, head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs. Commander 1st rank. — ***Here and below editorial notes.***

2

P.P. Lebedev (1872-1933) - general of the old army. In 1900 he graduated from the Academy of the General Staff, joined the Red Army voluntarily, served as chief of staff of the Eastern Front, chief of the Field Staff of the RVSR. After the end of the Civil War - in leading military work.

3

XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
Verbatim report. S. 423.

4

Cit. according to the book: "Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov" (a brief outline of his life and work). M.: Military Publishing House, 1961. S. 81.

5

Cit. according to the newspaper of the Volga military district "Krasnoarmeyets", January 15, 1932, No. 14 (2030).

6

Shaposhnikov B.M. On the threshold of the sixteenth year // Izvestia, January 18, 1934

7

History of international relations and foreign policy of the USSR. T. 1. M.: International relations, 1967. S. 410.

8

Wine farming is a special type of wine monopoly (private entrepreneurs bought from the state for a certain period the monopoly right to trade in wine in a particular area).

9

Au revoir (French) - goodbye.

10

Now - the city of Khmel'nitsky.

eleven

Wafangou is a railway station 150 km north of Port Arthur.

12

Now - Kirovograd.

13

Tarnowskie Góry.

14

Bogumir.

15

Bytom.

16

The Battle of Galicia (August 18, 1914 - September 21, 1914) is the largest strategic operation on the Russian front. She consisted

from several battles near Krasnik and Tomashuv (Lublin-Kholm'skaya operation), on the rivers Zolotoy Lipa and Rotten Lipa (Galych-Lvov operation) and the battle near Gorodok (Gorodok battle). Objective historians rank the huge Russian victory in this battle higher than the one that went to the Germans in East Prussia. Barbera Takmav, author of the book *The August Cannons*, for example, writes that in the Battle of Galicia the Russians "defeated the Austro-Hungarian army, especially its officer corps, from which it never recovered." (The book "August Cannons" was published in 1972 by the publishing house "Young Guard".) However, the Russian armies also suffered significant losses. The Battle of Galicia diverted part of the German forces, which allowed the Anglo-French to deliver a strong counterattack in the Paris area in early September 1914 and, in the Battle of Marne, to push the German armies back to the River Aisne.

17

1 km northeast of Krzyzanowice.

18

Opole Lubelski.

19

Wroclaw.

20

Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. Collection of documents. 1938. S. 120.

21

Korolkov G.K. Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. 1923. S. 25.

22

Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. Collection of documents. 1938, pp. 266–288.

23

Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. S. 391.

24

Lodz operation. Collection of documents. 1936. S. 105.

25

Lodz operation. Collection of documents. 1936, pp. 105–106.

26

Leshno.

27

Lodz operation. Collection of documents. S. 153.

28

Lodz operation. Collection of documents. S. 234.

29

Korolkov G.K. Lodz operation. S. 139.

thirty

Compiled by Lieutenant General-Engineer Shaposhnikov Igor Borisovich.

31

The senior adjutant of the division was responsible for operational and mobilization issues, as well as combat division training.